retirement plan

Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff. Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy and a pension plan. Both plans were governed by ERISA, and Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both. In April 1994, the Egelhoffs divorced. Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident. At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy and the pension plan. The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her. Respondents Samantha and David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law. They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds. In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits. The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy and the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases. The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed. Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy and the pension plan. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

Johnson Controls, Inc. manufactures batteries. The manufacturing process uses lead as a primary ingredient. Occupational exposure to lead creates health risks, including potential harm to a fetus carried by a female employee. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company employed no women in battery-manufacturing jobs. In June 1977, Johnson Controls announced its first official policy on employment of women in lead-exposure work. The policy stated that protection of the health of the unborn child is the responsibility of prospective parents. It also stated that it would be illegal discrimination to treat all women capable of pregnancy as though they will become pregnant. The 1977 policy required a woman seeking consideration for employment to sign a statement. The statement acknowledged evidence that women exposed to lead have a higher rate of abortion. It advised that it was medically good sense not to run that risk if she wanted children. Five years later in 1982, after eight employees became pregnant between 1979 and 1983 while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of 30 micrograms per deciliter, Johnson Controls adopted a new policy. The new policy excluded women who were pregnant or capable of bearing children from jobs involving lead exposure. It also excluded them from jobs that could expose them through bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights. The 1982 policy defined women capable of bearing children as all women except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented. It applied to any work station where an employee had recorded a blood lead level over 30 micrograms per deciliter. It also applied where the site had yielded an air sample exceeding 30 micrograms per cubic meter over the past year. In April 1984, the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America and individual plaintiffs filed a class action. The plaintiffs included Mary Craig, who chose sterilization to avoid losing her job. Elsie Nason was a 50-year-old divorcee transferred out of a lead-exposed job with loss of compensation. Donald Penney was denied a leave of absence to lower his lead level because he intended to become a father. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The District Court certified a class of all past, present and future production and maintenance employees in UAW bargaining units at nine Johnson Controls plants. The class consisted of those who have been and continue to be affected by the 1982 Fetal Protection Policy. The District Court granted summary judgment for Johnson Controls. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the summary judgment by a 7-to-4 vote. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1990.

Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations. In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie. The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand. In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million. The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge. To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad. Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address. Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections. Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections. BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication. An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.

The Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma operated as an agricultural cooperative with roughly 23,000 members prior to its 1984 bankruptcy filing. To fund its general business operations, the Co-Op issued promissory notes payable on demand by the holder. These notes carried no collateral or insurance but featured a variable interest rate reset monthly to remain above rates offered by local banks and savings institutions. The Co-Op promoted the notes to both members and nonmembers as part of an "Investment Program," with newsletter advertisements highlighting more than $11 million in assets backing the investments and describing them as safe, secure, and available when needed. After the Co-Op filed for bankruptcy in 1984, more than 1,600 holders possessed notes valued at $10 million in total. Petitioners, a class of these note holders, brought suit against Arthur Young & Co., the accounting firm that had audited the Co-Op's financial statements and the predecessor to respondent Ernst & Young. Petitioners asserted that Arthur Young deliberately deviated from generally accepted accounting principles when valuing one of the Co-Op's principal assets, a gasohol plant, in an effort to overstate the entity's assets and net worth. They further claimed that accurate treatment of the plant in the audits would have disclosed the Co-Op's insolvency and deterred their purchases of the notes. Petitioners succeeded at trial on both their federal claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and their state securities claims, resulting in a $6.1 million judgment. On appeal, Arthur Young contended that the demand notes did not qualify as securities under either the federal statute or Arkansas law, rendering the antifraud provisions inapplicable. The Eighth Circuit agreed and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the federal issue.