Also known as: reservations · reservation of rights
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
3 senses
The creation of a new right or interest by the grantor in real property being conveyed to another. An exception withholds a pre-existing interest from the conveyance while a reservation creates a fresh one in the grantor.
The creation of a new right or interest by the grantor in real property being conveyed to another. An exception withholds a pre-existing interest from the conveyance while a reservation creates a fresh one in the grantor.
Roland Rhodes holds a senior mortgage on land owned by Renata Russo. Rhodes and Russo later agree to increase the interest rate. Junior lienholder Ryan Roberts claims the change destroys priority. Because the original mortgage contained a reservation of the right to modify, the increased rate retains senior position against Roberts.
Retention of title by a seller of goods or an interest in personal property that secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention does not impair the buyer's rights upon identification of the goods.
Riverstone Manufacturing sells equipment to Ridgeway Partners under a contract that reserves title until full payment. Ridgeway takes possession and later files for bankruptcy. The reservation allows Riverstone to reclaim the equipment because it retained a security interest under the sales agreement.
1 common questions
A power expressly retained by the donee of a power of appointment to revoke or amend an exercise of that power when the terms of the original power permit the reservation.
Ricardo Rojas receives a power of appointment over trust assets. When exercising the power he expressly reserves the right to revoke the appointment. Later Rojas attempts to revoke the exercise. The reservation permits revocation because the original power did not prohibit it.
1 common questions
Retention of title by a seller of goods or an interest in personal property that secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention does not impair the buyer's rights upon identification of the goods.
A power expressly retained by the donee of a power of appointment to revoke or amend an exercise of that power when the terms of the original power permit the reservation.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Raphael Rivera pleads guilty to conspiracy but reserves the right to contest the amount of drugs attributable to her at sentencing. At the hearing she declines to testify about quantity. The reservation does not restore her Fifth Amendment privilege once she has admitted the offense.
In 1995 Amanda Mitchell and 22 other defendants were indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in Allentown from 1989 to 1994. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and three counts of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school or playground. Without a plea agreement she pleaded guilty to all four counts. She reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count. The District Court advised her that quantity would be determined at sentencing. Before accepting the plea the District Court conducted the Rule 11 colloquy. It informed Mitchell that the range of punishment was complex because the amount of cocaine had not yet been established. She faced a mandatory minimum of ten years if held responsible for at least five kilograms. Mitchell stated under oath that she had done "some of it." After consulting counsel she reaffirmed her intention to plead guilty to all charges. The court accepted the plea. In 1996 nine codefendants went to trial. Three cooperating codefendants who had pleaded guilty testified at Mitchell's sentencing hearing. They adopted their trial testimony. One furnished additional information on the amount of cocaine petitioner sold. According to him, petitioner worked two to three times a week, selling one and one-half to two ounces of cocaine a day, from April 1992 to August 1992. Then, from August 1992 to December 1993 she worked three to five times a week, and from January 1994 to March 1994 she was one of those in charge of cocaine distribution for Riddick. Mitchell offered no evidence and did not testify. Her counsel argued that only the three documented sales to undercover buyer Alvitta Mack totaling two ounces should be credited. The District Court ruled that Mitchell had no right to remain silent at sentencing because of her guilty plea. It expressly relied on her failure to testify in crediting the codefendants' testimony. The court found her responsible for more than five kilograms and imposed the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence together with six years of supervised release and a $200 special assessment. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA state statute restricts abortion access. The plaintiff argues the statute invades a zone of privacy. The Court recognizes that the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty encompasses a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy while also noting that the right is not absolute.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseRajesh Rao buys a new car whose warranty contains a clause reserving to the manufacturer the sole discretion to determine whether a part is defective. When a defect appears the manufacturer refuses to honor the claim. The reservation is unenforceable because it imposes an unfair burden on the buyer.
In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation. Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them. The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident. An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims. The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.
View case3 common questions
A reservation creates a new right in the grantor while an exception withholds a pre-existing interest from the conveyance. Courts look to the grantor's intent when language is ambiguous.
Priority is preserved if the reservation appears in the mortgage and the modification falls within its scope. A modification outside the reservation loses priority to the extent it materially prejudices junior interests.
The letter permits the insurer to defend while preserving coverage defenses. The insured remains the client whose objectives control settlement decisions.
A buyer may replevin goods identified to the contract if cover is unavailable or if the goods were shipped under reservation and the security interest has been satisfied or tendered.
Revocation is possible only if the donee expressly reserved the power to revoke when making the exercise and the terms of the original power do not prohibit the reservation.
…liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Pp. 152-153. (b) The right of privacy is not absolute. The Court has recognized…