Also known as:res communis · common property · things common to all
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Things common to all that cannot be owned or appropriated by individuals, such as light, air, and the sea.
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Uniform Acts
Restatements
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Shared Sea Use Without Partnership
Roger Ramirez and Rosa Ruiz fish the open sea and divide their gross catch proceeds each week. They never signed any agreement to carry on a business as co-owners. Because the sea is res communes, their shared use and returns do not create a partnership between them.
Lake Access Servitudes in Subdivision
Renee Rogers buys a lakeside lot subject to recorded duties to maintain shared docks. The lake itself remains open to public use as res communes. The servitudes attach only to the lots and do not convert the lake into privately owned common property.
Roberto Reyes and other lot owners form an association by majority vote to manage shared docks on a public lake. The lake remains res communes and cannot be appropriated. The association only enforces the lot servitudes and cannot claim ownership of the water.
State Regulation of Elk Hunting
Ricardo Rojas, a nonresident, pays higher fees to hunt elk in Montana. The state treats the wild elk as res communes held in trust for the public. This status allows Montana to impose the differential fees without violating privileges and immunities.
Lester Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana436 U.S. 371, 379 n.17 (1978)
In 1975 and 1976 Montana required a resident to pay nine dollars for an elk license and four dollars for a tag. A nonresident had to buy a combination license for two hundred twenty-five dollars plus a tag for one hundred fifty-one dollars. This produced totals of thirteen dollars for residents and three hundred seventy-six dollars for nonresidents.
Appellants included Lester Baldwin, a Montana resident and licensed outfitter whose customers were mostly nonresidents. Nonresidents Carlson, Huseby, Lee, and Moris from Minnesota traveled to Montana each year to hunt elk and had purchased the higher-priced nonresident licenses in prior seasons.
Montana maintained more than four hundred outfitters. The State had a force of seventy game wardens. Each warden covered roughly two thousand one hundred square miles. The State spent more than twenty-six million dollars on wildlife management between 1966 and 1976, of which approximately thirteen million dollars came from license fees.
The State determined annual elk harvest numbers from census data and winter-range availability. It issued seventeen thousand resident and twelve hundred nonresident licenses in 1975. Elk were concentrated in the mountainous western third of the State and depended on private ranch lands for winter forage.
Nonresident big-game licenses rose five hundred thirty percent from 1960 to 1970 while resident licenses rose sixty-seven percent. Nonresidents constituted about thirteen percent of all hunters in the 1974-1975 season. In 1975 the five appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana against the Fish and Game Commission, its director, and its five commissioners. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief plus partial reimbursement of fees already paid. A three-judge district court, with one judge dissenting in part, upheld the statutes. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1977.
Ronald Reed catches minnows in Oklahoma waters and attempts to ship them interstate. Oklahoma prohibits the export because the minnows are res communes owned by the state in trust. The ban is struck down as an improper burden on commerce.
Hughes v. Oklahoma441 U.S. 222 (1979)
Oklahoma is one of 23 states having statutes that prohibit or severely restrict the exportation of minnows taken from waters within the state. The challenged provision, Okla. Stat., Tit. 29, § 4-115 (B), states that no person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were seined or procured within the waters of this state, though the prohibition does not apply to minnows raised in a regularly licensed commercial minnow hatchery.
William Hughes holds a license from Oklahoma to operate a commercial minnow hatchery and to sell minnows, and he also holds a Texas license to operate a commercial minnow business near Wichita Falls, Texas. In 1973, Hughes was arrested by an Oklahoma game ranger and convicted in Oklahoma state court of violating the statute by transporting 250 pounds of live minnows from Oklahoma to Texas. The minnows had been purchased from a minnow farm near Weatherford, Oklahoma, and were being transported to a buyer in Wichita Falls, Texas; Hughes was fined $200 and court costs.
Hughes' conviction was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in an unreported opinion that relied on Geer v. Connecticut. Hughes then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaration that § 4-115 (B) was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.
A three-judge District Court granted summary judgment for the appellees. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the appeal.
Radiant Technologies sends nonresident vessels to harvest shrimp off South Carolina. The state charges higher license fees because the shrimp are res communes subject to state trust authority. The differential fees are upheld only to the extent they compensate for added enforcement costs.
Toomer v. Witsell334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)
In 1947 five Georgia residents engaged in commercial shrimp fishing and a Florida nonprofit corporation representing fish dealers filed suit in federal district court against South Carolina officials charged with enforcing state fishing laws. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of several South Carolina statutes governing commercial shrimp trawling in the three-mile maritime belt off the South Carolina coast.
The shrimp fishery extends along the Atlantic coast from North Carolina to Florida and involves migratory shrimp that move southward in late summer and fall before returning northward in spring. With no federal regulation in place, the four states most directly involved adopted separate conservation and licensing measures. These measures produced differing restrictions on non-resident fishing and led to reciprocal limitations that effectively partitioned the fishery at state lines.
South Carolina statutes impose a tax of one-eighth cent per pound on green shrimp taken in the maritime belt, require non-resident boat owners to pay an annual license fee of $2,500 per boat while residents pay $25, condition issuance of non-resident licenses on proof that the applicant has paid South Carolina income taxes on profits from operations in the state during the preceding year, and direct that all licensed boats must dock at a South Carolina port, unload, pack, and stamp their catch before it may be shipped or transported to another state. The state also maintains an annual closed season from March 1 to July 1 and prohibits trawling in its inland waters.
A three-judge federal district court upheld the statutes, denied injunctive relief, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs took a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Some of the individual appellants had previously been convicted of shrimping out of season and in inland waters. The corporate plaintiff operates no fishing boats.
Does shared use of res communes create a partnership?
No. Joint or common rights in res communes such as the sea do not by themselves establish a partnership even when parties share returns from that use.
Can an association own res communes outright?
No. An association formed in a common-interest community may manage servitudes burdening lots but cannot acquire ownership of res communes such as navigable waters or air.
Why may states regulate access to wildlife without violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause?
Wildlife is treated as res communes held by the state in trust for the public. This status permits reasonable differential fees or limits on nonresidents that do not amount to total exclusion.
334 U.S. 385 (1948)
…sovereign or other governmental authority. More recently this thought has been expressed by saying that fish and game are the common property of all citizens of the governmental unit and that the government, as a sort of trustee, exercises this "ownership" for the benefit of its citizens. In the case of fish, it has also been…