Also known as:reopens · reopened · reopening · REOP · reopening of proceedings
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
To review an otherwise final decision or proceeding for the purpose of possibly granting or modifying relief. The action occurs only in highly unusual circumstances such as newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other grounds specified by rule or statute.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Presidential Directive on Treaty Cases
Ravi Reddy was convicted in state court and his appeals were exhausted. The President issued a memorandum directing state courts to reopen the case on the basis of an unratified treaty provision. The court refused to reopen because no implementing legislation authorized such action.
Modification of Support Decree
Renee Rogers obtained a divorce decree awarding her monthly maintenance. Two years later her former spouse moved to reduce the award after losing his job. The court considered reopening the decree only as to future installments upon proof of substantially changed circumstances rendering the original terms unconscionable.
Riverside Healthcare won a final federal judgment dismissing a class action. Congress then passed a statute directing courts to reopen all such closed cases and recalculate damages. The court held that the statute could not compel reopening of final judgments.
Revival of Time-Barred Prosecution
Roberto Reyes was investigated for conduct that occurred years earlier. After the statute of limitations had expired, the legislature extended the period and the prosecutor sought to reopen the matter. The court ruled that the extension violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Reconsideration of Wage Order
Rosalind Reed challenged a minimum-wage order issued by the state commission. The commission had authority to reopen the order and reconsider the wage amount with input from a new conference of employers and employees.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish300 U.S. 379 (1937)
In 1913 the State of Washington enacted a statute entitled An Act to establish a minimum wage for women and minors. The law created an Industrial Welfare Commission. A later statute transferred its duties to an Industrial Welfare Committee consisting of the Director of Labor and Industries, the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance, the Supervisor of Industrial Relations, the Industrial Statistician and the Supervisor of Women in Industry.
The statute required the commission to investigate wages and conditions of labor for women and minors. It required public hearings. When wages were found inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and maintain workers in health, the commission was to convene conferences of employers, employees and public representatives before issuing obligatory orders fixing minimum wages. Special licenses were authorized for physically defective or apprentice workers at lower rates. The statute had remained in force for more than twenty-three years by the time of the present litigation.
Elsie Parrish was employed by the West Coast Hotel Company as a chambermaid. She and her husband brought suit against the company to recover the difference between the wages actually paid and the minimum wage. The minimum wage was $14.50 per week of 48 hours fixed by the Industrial Welfare Committee pursuant to the statute. The company had paid her less than the prescribed minimum during her employment.
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial court judgment, sustained the statute, and directed entry of judgment for the plaintiffs.
The West Coast Hotel Company appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The appeal brought before the Court the question of the constitutional validity of the Washington minimum wage statute. The Washington law was substantially identical to minimum wage statutes enacted in Oregon in the same year. Similar laws had been adopted in the District of Columbia in 1918 and in other states during the same period.
Riverstone Manufacturing sought to introduce new evidence on energy conservation after the record had closed. The agency declined to reopen the licensing proceeding because the evidence did not meet the threshold for reasonable availability and proof.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984)
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively.
In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record.
NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977.
The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
When may a court reopen a final judgment under civil procedure rules?
A court reopens a final judgment only upon a showing of grounds such as newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other specified circumstances under the governing rule. The motion must be made within the time limits provided, typically one year for certain grounds.
Does Congress violate separation of powers by directing courts to reopen final judgments?
Congress may not require federal courts to reopen cases in which final judgments have already been entered. Such legislation interferes with the conclusive exercise of judicial power.
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, when may a court reopen a property disposition in a divorce decree?
A court may revoke or modify a property disposition only upon finding conditions that justify reopening the judgment under state law. Maintenance or support provisions may be modified only as to future installments upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances.
462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
…a Resolution that vetoed the suspension, and ordered the Immigration Judge to resume the deportation proceedings. The Judge reopened the proceedings, and Chadha moved to terminate them on the ground that the House Resolution was constitutionally invalid. The Judge held that he had no authority to declare the Act…