A future interest in property that becomes possessory upon the termination of a prior estate such as a life estate. The holder receives the property after the intervening interest ends.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Unconscionable Term in Sale Contract
Rachel Ramirez conveys land to Raphael Rivera reserving a life estate for herself with remainder interest to a named beneficiary. A court refuses to enforce an unconscionable services clause but upholds the conveyance, leaving the remainder interest intact for the designated beneficiary after Rachel's life estate ends.
Trust Modification for Special Needs
Rita Russell creates a trust giving income to her son for life with the remainder interest to her granddaughter. After the son becomes disabled, the court modifies the trust under equitable deviation principles and converts the outright remainder interest into a special needs trust that preserves assets for the granddaughter while fulfilling the settlor's intent.
Roland Rhodes conveys equipment subject to a security interest and retains a remainder interest in returned collateral. The court strikes an unconscionable warranty disclaimer but enforces the conveyance, so Reed receives the goods while the remainder interest in any returned collateral remains enforceable after the primary obligation ends.
Federal Land Allotment Dispute
Robert Rivera holds an Indian allotment subject to federal restrictions. Upon his death the remainder interest passes to his heirs. The statute extinguishing certain inheritance rights is challenged because it destroys the economic value of the remainder interest that the heirs expected to receive.
Hodel v. Irving481 U.S. 704 (1987)
In the late 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land acts that divided communal Indian reservations into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. The Act of March 2, 1889, allotted 320 acres to each male Sioux head of household and 160 acres to most other individuals on the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation, with the allotted lands held in trust by the United States.
Ownership of these allotted lands fragmented over successive generations into numerous undivided interests, with some parcels having hundreds of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew over time.
This created administrative difficulties and economic waste. A 1928 report and comprehensive 1960 House and Senate studies indicated that one-half of approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated ownership. In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Section 207 provided that no undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to the tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat. The provision was signed into law on January 12, 1983, and became effective immediately, with no compensation provided to owners of escheated interests.
Four enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe died in 1983 while owning fractional interests subject to the escheat provision. Chester Irving died on March 18, Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross died on March 23, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed died on April 2, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed died on June 23. Collectively the four decedents owned 41 such interests whose values included approximately $100 for the two interests lost by the Irving estate, approximately $2,700 for the 26 interests in the Cross estate, and approximately $1,816 for the 13 interests in the Pumpkin Seed estates.
The three appellees are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who are or represent heirs or devisees of the decedents. Mary Irving is the daughter of Chester Irving, Eileen Bissonette is the guardian for the five minor children of Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed is the son of Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed and nephew of Edgar Pumpkin Seed. But for the escheat provision the fractional interests would have passed to the appellees or those they represent. Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota claiming that the escheat provision resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Raven Logistics acquires land subject to a life estate held by a prior owner, with the remainder interest reserved for future development. A municipal zoning ordinance limits building height and thereby reduces the market value of the remainder interest that would otherwise allow commercial construction after the life estate ends.
Village of Euclid Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed 303 (1926)
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads.
Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected.
On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder.
Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance.
The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
Regal Apparel holds a remainder interest in commercial real estate leased to a utility subject to a prior leasehold. A state commission order prohibits certain promotional advertising by the utility, lowering the property's income stream and thereby diminishing the present value of the remainder interest that Regal Apparel will receive at the end of the lease term.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980)
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands.
Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977.
The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
How does a remainder interest differ from a reversion?
A remainder interest passes to a third party after the prior estate ends. A reversion remains with the grantor or the grantor's heirs.
Can a court modify a trust to change the form of a remainder interest?
Yes. Under equitable deviation principles a court may convert an outright remainder interest into a special needs trust when unanticipated circumstances arise and the change furthers the settlor's purposes.
Is a remainder interest considered a present property right?
Yes. Although possession is postponed, the remainder interest is a presently vested or contingent future interest that can be transferred, devised, or subjected to creditors.
What delivery is required to gift a remainder interest in personal property?
Symbolic delivery such as a letter suffices when the donor retains a life estate. Actual delivery of possession is not required because the donee receives only the future interest.
438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
…Law has deprived them of any gainful use of their “air rights” above the Terminal and that, irrespective of the value of the remainder of their parcel, the city has “taken” their right to this superjacent airspace, thus entitling them to “just compensation” measured by the fair market value of these air rights. Apart from…