Also known as: questions of fact · factual question · fact question
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A disputed issue whose resolution turns on the evaluation of evidence and the circumstances of the particular case rather than on the application or interpretation of legal rules. The trier of fact, whether jury or judge in a bench trial, must determine the truth or falsity of the matter presented.
Quinton Quimby mailed an offer to sell equipment to Quincy Manufacturing on Monday. Quincy Manufacturing mailed its acceptance on the following Friday. Whether the acceptance arrived within a reasonable time under all the circumstances existing when the offer and acceptance were exchanged is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
Quinlan Quick struck Quentin Quinn during an altercation. Whether the blow created a substantial risk of fatal consequences or permanent loss of function, making it serious bodily harm, depends on the amount of force, the weapon used, and Quinn's known physical condition. That determination is a question of fact for the jury.
Quiana Qualls purchased a vehicle from Quasar Technologies whose paint defects were concealed. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Whether the ratio between those awards is constitutionally excessive under the circumstances is a question of fact resolved by weighing the reprehensibility of the conduct and the actual harm suffered.
In January 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., purchased a black BMW sports sedan for $40,750.88 from an authorized dealer in Birmingham, Alabama. The vehicle had been manufactured in Germany by BMW and shipped to the United States, where an independent service company in Brunswick, Georgia, determined that its finish had been damaged by acid rain during transit from Europe and refinished it at a cost of $601.37 before delivery to the Birmingham dealership. At the time of the purchase, BMW of North America, Inc., maintained a policy of not disclosing to dealers or customers that a new vehicle had been refinished if the cost of the repairs was less than 3 percent of the suggested retail price, and the refinishing cost for Gore's car amounted to approximately 1.5 percent of that price. After driving the car for about nine months, Gore took it to an independent detailer, who informed him that the car had been repainted. Gore then filed suit against BMW of North America, Inc., alleging fraud under Alabama law for the failure to disclose the repainting. At trial, BMW acknowledged that it had sold approximately 983 refinished cars as new in the United States since 1983, including 14 in Alabama, without disclosing the repairs when the cost exceeded $300 per vehicle. The jury awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages, representing the difference in value between the car as delivered and its value had it not been refinished, along with $4 million in punitive damages. BMW moved to set aside the punitive damages award, introducing evidence that its nondisclosure policy aligned with the laws of roughly 25 states that required disclosure only for repairs exceeding 3 percent of the suggested retail price. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but reduced the punitive damages to $2 million after applying factors from Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, concluding that the jury's award was excessive but that $2 million remained permissible. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseDuring voir dire in a polygamy prosecution, a prospective juror stated he had formed an opinion about the practice. Whether that opinion actually disqualified the juror from serving impartially is a question of fact whose resolution rests on the juror's demeanor and answers, not on a legal presumption.
George Reynolds, a longtime member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was indicted in the District Court of the third judicial district of the Territory of Utah for bigamy after entering a second marriage to Amelia Jane Schofield while his first wife remained alive. Reynolds had obtained permission from recognized church authorities to contract the polygamous marriage. He and other male church members believed the practice was a religious duty enjoined by divine revelation to Joseph Smith. Refusal would bring damnation when circumstances permitted. The grand jury that returned the indictment consisted of fifteen persons under a territorial statute. This differed from the sixteen to twenty-three persons required by federal statute for United States circuit and district courts. During voir dire, the trial court overruled Reynolds's challenges for cause to prospective jurors including Charles Read who stated they had formed opinions about the case. The court sustained government challenges to other prospective jurors who were or had been living in polygamy. At trial the prosecution offered the transcript of testimony given by Amelia Jane Schofield at an earlier prosecution of Reynolds for the same offense under a different indictment. The government showed that subpoenas were served at Reynolds's house. An officer was told the witness was not at home. Reynolds declined to disclose her location. A later subpoena with the correct name also failed to locate her. Reynolds had been present and able to cross-examine at the prior trial but offered no explanation for her absence. Reynolds requested a jury instruction that he must be acquitted if the jury found he acted in the sincere belief that the second marriage fulfilled a religious duty. The court refused and instead instructed that religious belief could not excuse a knowing violation of the criminal law. The court further instructed the jury to consider the consequences of polygamy for innocent women and children. Reynolds was convicted and the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.
View caseQuintessa Quinn bought a car from Quincy Manufacturing under a contract containing a warranty disclaimer. Whether the disclaimer was part of the bargain and fairly obtained is a question of fact that the court must resolve from the circumstances surrounding the transaction rather than as a matter of law.
In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation. Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them. The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident. An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims. The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.
View caseThe government sought to enjoin publication of classified documents by Quorum Partners. Whether disclosure would cause the specific harm asserted is a question of fact that must be determined on the record before any prior restraint can be upheld.
The United States brought suit against the New York Times Company and the Washington Post Company seeking to enjoin publication of material from a classified government study on the history of United States decision-making regarding Vietnam policy. The newspapers had come into possession of the classified documents and had already begun publishing excerpts from the study in their respective newspapers before the government filed for injunctive relief. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in the New York Times case that the government had not satisfied the requirements for imposing a prior restraint. In the parallel Washington Post litigation, the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit both determined that the government had not met its burden. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the matters on an expedited schedule. Stays had been entered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 23, 1971, and by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on June 24, 1971.
View caseThe trier of fact, either the jury or the judge in a bench trial, resolves questions of fact by evaluating the evidence presented. This allocation follows from the distinction between factual disputes and legal rules.
A question of fact requires weighing evidence and circumstances to determine what occurred or exists. A question of law requires applying or interpreting legal rules and is decided by the judge alone.
A court may decide a question of fact as a matter of law only when no reasonable trier of fact could find otherwise on the record, such as on summary judgment or when evidence is legally insufficient.
Yes. The existence and scope of a usage of trade are determined as questions of fact from the circumstances, though interpretation of a written trade code is a question of law for the court.
Yes. Whether notice was sent within a reasonable time is a question of fact determined from all the circumstances of the case.