Also known as: property law · law of property
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An interest in land within the meaning of the statute of frauds is any right, privilege, power, or immunity recognized under property law that is not goods under the UCC.
Goods become fixtures when they are so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
An interest in land within the meaning of the statute of frauds is any right, privilege, power, or immunity recognized under property law that is not goods under the UCC.
Goods become fixtures when they are so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.
Pamela Phillips orally promised Preston Pratt a fee if he persuaded a seller to convey Blackacre. When the deal closed, Pratt demanded payment. Property law treats the promise as outside the statute of frauds because it creates no direct interest in land for Pratt himself.
Phuong Pham bought oceanfront lots shortly before a new state regulation prohibited all construction. The rule left the parcels with no economically beneficial use. Property law treats the regulation as a per se taking that requires just compensation unless background nuisance principles already barred the intended use at acquisition.
Pierre Poulin challenged a city ordinance that effectively eliminated his ability to keep lawfully acquired firearms on residential property. Property law principles embedded in the Second Amendment were held applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller. The Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It struck down a District of Columbia law that banned handgun possession in the home. Chicago and the village of Oak Park maintained laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. Chicago's Municipal Code required a valid registration certificate for any firearm. It prohibited registration of most handguns. Oak Park made it unlawful to possess any firearm, including pistols, revolvers, and other handguns. Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson were Chicago residents. Along with the National Rifle Association and two Oak Park residents, they filed federal suits challenging these ordinances after the Heller decision. Chicago enacted its handgun ban in 1982 to protect residents from loss of property and injury or death from firearms. The petitioners argued that the bans left them vulnerable to criminals. They pointed to Chicago Police Department statistics showing that the city's handgun murder rate had increased since the ban. Chicago residents faced one of the highest murder rates in the country along with elevated rates of other violent crimes. Several petitioners had personal experiences with threats and violence. Otis McDonald, in his late seventies and living in a high-crime neighborhood, faced violent threats from drug dealers because of his community activism with alternative policing strategies. Colleen Lawson's home had been targeted by burglars. She believed possessing a handgun would decrease her chances of serious injury or death if threatened again. The Chicago petitioners and two groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sought a declaration that the handgun ban and related ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. A separate action challenged the Oak Park law. A third action also challenged the Chicago ordinances. All three cases were assigned to the same district judge. The District Court rejected the claims. It noted that the Seventh Circuit had upheld a handgun ban a quarter century earlier. It also noted that Heller had refrained from addressing whether the Second Amendment applied to the States. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It relied on three nineteenth-century cases—United States v. Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and Miller v. Texas—that had been decided after the Slaughter-House Cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePhoebe Park rented an apartment from Pioneer Energy that lacked functioning heat and contained exposed wiring. When she withheld rent and sued, property law imposed an implied warranty of habitability that runs with the leasehold interest and cannot be waived by the tenant.
Several tenants rented apartments in Clifton Terrace, a three-building apartment complex in Northwest Washington, by separate written leases with First National Realty Corporation. On April 8, 1968, the landlord filed separate actions in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions seeking possession on the ground that each tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent due for the month of April. The tenants admitted that they had not paid the landlord any rent for April but alleged numerous violations of the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off. The tenants offered to prove that there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia in the building at Clifton Terrace, where the defendant resides, some affecting the premises of the defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to the damage of defendants. They conceded at trial that this offer of proof reached only violations which had arisen since the term of the lease had commenced. The Court of General Sessions refused the offer of proof and entered judgment for the landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that the landlord was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations. Because of the importance of the question presented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the tenants' petitions for leave to appeal.
Pierce Patterson, a trustee, published notice of an accounting proceeding only in local newspapers. Out-of-state beneficiaries never received actual notice and later challenged the decree. Property law requires notice reasonably calculated to reach known parties whose interests in the trust res will be affected.
In January 1946, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company established a common trust fund in accordance with New York Banking Law § 100-c. In March 1947, the bank petitioned the Surrogate's Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee. During the accounting period a total of 113 trusts, approximately half inter vivos and half testamentary, participated in the common trust fund, the gross capital of which was nearly three million dollars. The record does not show the number or residence of the beneficiaries, but they were many and it is clear that some of them were not residents of the State of New York. The only notice given beneficiaries of this specific application was by publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with the minimum requirements of N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (12). The notice set forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds. At the time the first investment in the common fund was made on behalf of each participating estate, however, the trust company, pursuant to the requirements of § 100-c (9), had notified by mail each person of full age and sound mind whose name and address were then known to it and who was entitled to share in the income therefrom or who would be entitled to share in the principal if the event upon which such estate, trust or fund will become distributable should have occurred at the time of sending such notice. Upon the filing of the petition for the settlement of accounts, appellant was, by order of the court pursuant to § 100-c (12), appointed special guardian and attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in the income of the common trust fund, and appellee Vaughan was appointed to represent those similarly interested in the principal. There were no other appearances on behalf of any one interested in either interest or principal. Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice and the statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore that the court was without jurisdiction to render a final and binding decree. Appellant's objections were entertained and overruled, the Surrogate holding that the notice required and given was sufficient. A final decree accepting the accounts has been entered, affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. The effect of this decree, as held below, is to settle all questions respecting the management of the common fund. The decree is made binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth in the account upon everyone having any interest in the common fund or in any participating estate, trust or fund.
2 common questions
An interest in land includes any right, privilege, power, or immunity recognized under property law that is not goods under the UCC. A promise to pay a commission for inducing a land sale creates no such interest in the promisee and therefore falls outside the statute.
Supporting sources
A regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use constitutes a per se taking unless the prohibited use was already barred by background principles of nuisance or property law at the time of acquisition. Total wipeouts receive the same treatment as physical appropriations.
Supporting sources
Phoenix Technologies installed specialized cooling units in a leased warehouse owned by Pacific Bank. When the bank later foreclosed, the units remained bolted to the structure and connected to permanent ductwork. Property law classifies the units as fixtures because they have become so related to the real property that an interest arises under real property law.
1 common questions
Goods become fixtures when they are so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law. Once that relation occurs, real property doctrines govern priority and encumbrances even though the items began as personal property.
Supporting sources
…has instead relied on the principle that some property interests are necessarily limited by background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance. Regulations that do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved under those principles do not deprive the owner of any "property" interest. Pp.…