Also known as: prevent harm · preventing harm · harm prevention
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A principle that determines when the failure of a third person to intervene breaks the chain of causation in negligence cases. The principle ordinarily treats such failure as a non-superseding cause unless the duty to prevent harm has shifted because of lapse of time or other circumstances.
A principle that justifies regulation of noxious property uses as a valid exercise of police power rather than a compensable taking.
A principle that determines when the failure of a third person to intervene breaks the chain of causation in negligence cases. The principle ordinarily treats such failure as a non-superseding cause unless the duty to prevent harm has shifted because of lapse of time or other circumstances.
A principle that justifies regulation of noxious property uses as a valid exercise of police power rather than a compensable taking.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Peter Park negligently leaves an open excavation near a busy sidewalk. A city inspector notices the hazard but walks away without posting barriers. A pedestrian falls in and is injured. The inspector's inaction does not relieve Peter of liability because the failure of a third person to prevent the harm is not a superseding cause.
Pablo Perez leaves a dangerous chemical spill on his property. Years later the current owner ignores repeated warnings and takes no steps to contain it. When a neighbor is harmed, the long passage of time shifts the duty to prevent harm to the new owner, making the new owner's inaction a superseding cause that cuts off Pablo's liability.
Perry Pratt keeps an unrestrained alligator in a retention basin on his vacant lot. Teenagers regularly trespass to swim there. One is attacked. Because the possessor's duty to prevent harm to foreseeable trespassers from a wild animal is judged by the same negligence standards that apply to other dangerous conditions, the court evaluates whether Pratt acted reasonably in light of known risks.
2 common questions
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452(1), the failure of a third person to act to prevent harm threatened by the actor's negligence is ordinarily not a superseding cause. Liability remains unless the duty has shifted to the third person because of lapse of time or other circumstances under subsection (2).
Supporting sources
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 512 provides that the possessor's negligence liability for failing to prevent harm to a trespasser from a wild animal is judged by the same rules that govern other dangerous conditions on the land. The presence of the animal does not create a special, more limited duty framework.
Supporting sources
Preston Pratt buys two beachfront lots intending to build homes. A new state law bars all construction to protect the dunes from erosion. Because the regulation prevents a use that would cause harm to the coastal environment, the court treats it as a valid exercise of police power rather than a compensable taking even though it deprives the lots of all economic value.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseOwner keeps a pig farm that creates runoff harming downstream water. A county ordinance bans the operation to prevent the harm. The court upholds the ban as police-power regulation rather than a taking because the use itself constitutes a common-law nuisance.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
Developer plans high-density construction on eroding shoreline lots. State coastal commission imposes strict setbacks to prevent harm to dunes and neighboring properties. The court finds the restriction a valid prevention-of-harm measure that avoids takings liability.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
1 common questions
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council the Court recognized that regulations preventing harmful or noxious uses of property have long been upheld without compensation. When the prohibited use would constitute a common-law nuisance or similar harm, the regulation is treated as an exercise of police power rather than a taking.
Supporting sources
…and those that confer a benefit. But this distinction is difficult to sustain. Almost any regulation can be characterized as preventing harm or conferring a benefit. We think the better approach is to focus on the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. The South Carolina Supreme Court also erred in assuming that…