Also known as: premeditate · premeditates · premeditated · premeditating · premeditated murder
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A deliberate decision to kill formed prior to the homicidal act. The element distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder in jurisdictions that grade homicide by degree. It is shown by evidence of planning, preparation, or reflection before the killing occurs.
NationalStyle created a large in-store poster and matching social media graphic accusing former manager Harper of embezzlement. The materials were prepared in advance, distributed widely to customers and employees, and left visible for an extended period. A court evaluating whether the statements constitute libel considers the deliberate and premeditated character of the publication along with its area of dissemination and persistence.
James spent several days researching knife purchases and viewing security-camera diagrams after learning he would be replaced on a project. The night before the confrontation he disabled hallway cameras at the office. When he later stabbed Sheri multiple times in vital areas during their argument, the prior steps supply evidence that he formed a deliberate intent to kill before the act.
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseMateo had feuded with Captain Lewis for months and stated that the captain would get what was coming during the next storm. Before a forecasted gale Mateo secretly cut only Lewis's safety line. When Lewis was swept overboard and drowned, the targeted preparation supports a finding that Mateo acted with a formed intent to kill.
Ronald Harmelin was convicted in Michigan state court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Michigan law imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that quantity of the drug. Harmelin had no prior felony convictions. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and affirmed the sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The quantity of cocaine at issue had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. The sentencing court imposed the mandatory term without considering any individualized circumstances of the offense or the offender. Harmelin challenged the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing both that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime and that the mandatory nature of the penalty was unconstitutional.
View caseClaudia invited coworker Bobby to a late-night repair on an elevated unguarded platform at a remote substation after he caused her to lose a bonus. She chose the isolated, hazardous site knowing no one else would be present. When she shoved him to his death during their argument, the advance selection of conditions designed to produce a fatal fall shows premeditation.
In September 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the drive-up window of a bank in Glendale, Arizona. Inside the van were a driver, a guard, and a messenger carrying a bag with more than $270,000 in cash. As the van waited for the bank to open, a man armed with a rifle approached the driver's side of the van while another man armed with a handgun approached the passenger side. The man with the rifle shot and killed the driver. The man with the handgun shot at the guard but missed. The guard returned fire, shooting and wounding the man with the handgun. The wounded man with the handgun was later identified as Timothy Ring. Ring was indicted for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and other crimes. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that Ring and two others had planned to rob the armored van. The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder. It convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. At the sentencing stage of the trial, the judge found two aggravating factors. The judge found that the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain and in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. The judge found one mitigating factor consisting of Ring's minimal criminal record. Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, the judge sentenced Ring to death. On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that claim, relying on Walton v. Arizona, and affirmed Ring's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Walton can be reconciled with Apprendi.
View caseBianca retrieved a scalpel from an operating room shortly before confronting nurse Carol in a corridor. After weeks of clashes over charting errors, Bianca directed the scalpel at Carol's chest during their argument. The deliberate arming with a deadly instrument aimed at a vital area permits an inference of intent to kill formed before the stabbing.
In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.
View caseJade retrieved and concealed a fireplace poker before driving to a prearranged meeting with managing partner Chelsea. When Chelsea grabbed and slapped her during the termination discussion, Jade immediately struck Chelsea on the head with the poker. The prior retrieval and concealment of the weapon support a finding that Jade formed a deliberate intent to kill before the confrontation escalated.
On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol. Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers. A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later. In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law. The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence. Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.
View casePremeditation requires a deliberate decision to kill formed before the act, whereas second-degree murder requires only an intent to kill without that prior deliberation. Evidence of planning, preparation, or reflection distinguishes the two grades of murder.
Yes. When a defendant intentionally uses a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the victim's body, the factfinder may infer an intent to kill formed before the act. The inference satisfies the premeditation element for first-degree murder.
Supporting sources
No. Prior planning or preparation such as researching weapons, disabling cameras, or selecting a hazardous location can establish premeditation even if the final confrontation occurs during an argument. The key is whether the intent to kill was formed before the killing act.
Supporting sources
Premeditation supplies the malice aforethought required for murder. Voluntary manslaughter reduces an intentional killing to a lesser offense only when it occurs in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation before a reasonable cooling-off period. Advance planning or arming undercuts a heat-of-passion claim.
Supporting sources
…be the most unnatural, and it is by this present Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor:. . . his goods and chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he…