Also known as:peculiars · royal peculiar · ecclesiastical peculiar
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in tort law
A risk of physical harm that is unusual in nature or degree because of the specific character of the work to be performed. The risk arises only when the work involves dangers that call for special precautions beyond those ordinarily taken.
2
in commercial law
Sense 1
1
in tort law
A risk of physical harm that is unusual in nature or degree because of the specific character of the work to be performed. The risk arises only when the work involves dangers that call for special precautions beyond those ordinarily taken.
See Our Sources· 2 sources
Restatements
Sense 2
2
in commercial law
Knowledge or skill that is specialized and particular to the goods or practices involved in a transaction. The knowledge or skill must be attributable to a party's occupation, dealings in the goods, or use of an agent or intermediary who possesses it.
Knowledge or skill that is specialized and particular to the goods or practices involved in a transaction. The knowledge or skill must be attributable to a party's occupation, dealings in the goods, or use of an agent or intermediary who possesses it.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Examples2
Excavation Near Power Lines
Pioneer Energy hired an independent contractor to dig trenches for new utility lines near live high-voltage cables. The work created a peculiar unreasonable risk of electrocution unless the contractor used insulated equipment and posted warning barriers. Pioneer Energy neither required those precautions in the contract nor verified that the contractor implemented them. When a passerby suffered severe burns from contact with an exposed cable, Pioneer Energy faced liability for the harm.
Roof Repair on Busy Street
Premier Manufacturing retained an independent contractor to repair the roof of its warehouse located directly above a public sidewalk. The work created a peculiar risk of falling debris injuring pedestrians unless netting and ground-level barriers were installed. Even though the contract required those precautions, the contractor failed to use them and a pedestrian was struck by falling tiles. Premier Manufacturing remained subject to liability for the resulting injuries.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
How does the peculiar-risk doctrine differ from ordinary negligence in independent-contractor cases?
The peculiar-risk doctrine imposes liability on an employer who hires an independent contractor for work that creates an unusual risk of physical harm unless special precautions are taken. Liability arises even if the employer contracted for those precautions when the contractor fails to implement them. Ordinary negligence requires only that the employer exercise reasonable care in selecting or supervising the contractor.
Supporting sources
4
Sneaker Resale Dispute
Tammy had completed over 150 limited-edition sneaker resales in three years and used professional packaging and tracking for every buyer. She contracted with Valley Outlet for 400 pairs at a wholesale price. When the market price dropped and Tammy refused delivery, Valley Outlet invoked merchant rules. Tammy's repeated dealings and commercial practices showed she held herself out as possessing knowledge or skill peculiar to sneaker transactions, making her a merchant.
Out-of-State Charter License
Perry Pratt, a licensed charter boat captain in State SS, sought a license in State TT to operate fishing trips. State TT required seven years of residency for nonresidents but imposed no such requirement on its own citizens. Pratt challenged the rule as discriminating against out-of-state citizens in pursuit of a common calling. The court examined whether nonresidents were a peculiar source of any problem the state sought to address before upholding or striking the restriction.
Griswold v. Connecticut381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961.
At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free.
The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.
The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
Pavel Petrov owned land in the Village of Euclid and sought a variance to build a commercial structure in a residential zone. The village ordinance imposed restrictions that applied differently to owners based on the peculiar characteristics of their parcels. Petrov argued the restrictions lacked a substantial relation to public health and safety. The court evaluated whether the zoning classification reflected legitimate distinctions peculiar to the property's location and use.
Village of Euclid Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed 303 (1926)
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads.
Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected.
On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder.
Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance.
The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
Expert Testimony Challenge
Priscilla Parks offered expert testimony linking a pharmaceutical product to birth defects. The defendant moved to exclude the testimony under the Daubert standard. The court assessed whether the expert's methodology rested on principles and methods that were reliable and peculiar to the scientific field at issue. After evaluating the testimony's foundation, the court determined whether the evidence could reach the jury.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982.
Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects.
The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries.
Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What must a party show to qualify as a merchant under the UCC definition involving peculiar knowledge or skill?
A party must demonstrate either regular dealings in goods of the kind or an occupational holding out of specialized knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods or practices. Attribution through an agent or intermediary who possesses that knowledge also satisfies the definition. General business experience alone does not suffice without the required peculiar connection to the transaction.
Supporting sources
Does a state regulation survive privileges-and-immunities scrutiny when nonresidents are not shown to be a peculiar source of the problem?
No. When a state imposes residency requirements or fees that discriminate against out-of-state citizens in pursuing a common calling, it must demonstrate that nonresidents are a peculiar source of the identified harm and that the discrimination is closely related to that harm. Absent such a showing, the regulation violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Supporting sources
381 U.S. 479 (1965)
…was not given by the Framers, but rather has been bestowed on the Court by the Court. This fact is perhaps responsible for the peculiar phenomenon that for a period of a century and a half no serious suggestion was ever made that the Ninth Amendment, enacted to protect state powers against federal invasion, could be used as…