Also known as: particularize prejudice · particularizes prejudice · particularizing prejudice · specific prejudice
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A concrete demonstration of harm to the defense that a defendant must ordinarily prove to obtain relief from certain constitutional violations. Structural errors such as the erroneous disqualification of chosen retained counsel relieve the defendant of any obligation to make this showing because the violation itself distorts the framework of the trial.
Philip Powell hired a nationally known attorney two weeks before trial and moved to substitute that lawyer for his appointed counsel. The trial court refused the substitution solely because of timing. On appeal the reviewing court reverses the conviction automatically because the denial of counsel of choice is structural error.
Pablo Perez retained a transportation specialist licensed in a neighboring state and sought her temporary admission. The trial judge denied the motion on an untested accusation without a hearing. The appellate court reverses the conviction without requiring Pablo to demonstrate how the chosen lawyer would have altered the outcome.
Pearl Porter met with her retained counsel to plan trial strategy while an undercover officer attended the meeting. The officer later testified for the prosecution. The court of appeals reverses the conviction automatically because the intrusion on the attorney-client relationship constitutes structural error.
Pierce Patterson's trial was broadcast live over his objection and created constant distraction. The reviewing court reverses the conviction without any inquiry into whether the cameras affected the verdict because the violation is structural.
Paul Peterson and a codefendant were represented by the same retained lawyer. The trial court disqualified the lawyer over Peterson's objection despite his waiver. The appellate court reverses the conviction automatically because the erroneous disqualification is structural error.
Phuong Pham was indicted five years after the alleged conduct. She argues that the delay impaired her defense but offers no specific evidence of lost witnesses or documents. The court denies relief because particularized prejudice must be shown to establish a speedy-trial violation.
Appellees Marion and Baxter operated Allied Enterprises, Inc., a business engaged in selling and installing home improvements such as intercom sets, fire control devices, and burglary detection systems in the District of Columbia metropolitan area. They were indicted on April 21, 1970, and charged in nineteen counts with offenses committed between March 15, 1965, and February 6, 1967, involving alleged misrepresentations, alterations of documents, and deliberate nonperformance of contracts. Allied Enterprises had been subject to a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist order on February 6, 1967. In October 1967 a series of articles appeared in the Washington Post reporting the results of that newspaper's investigation of practices employed by home improvement firms such as Allied and predicting that indictments would soon be forthcoming. In the summer of 1968, at the request of the United States Attorney's office, Allied delivered its business records to that office, and appellee Marion was interviewed there about his conduct as an officer of the company. The grand jury that indicted appellees was not impaneled until September 1969, appellees were not informed of the grand jury's concern with them until March 1970, and the indictment was finally handed down in April 1970. On May 5, 1970, appellees moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to commence prosecution within time to afford due process and speedy trial rights. No evidence was submitted at the hearing on the motion, and no specific prejudice was claimed or demonstrated. The District Court granted the motion on June 8, 1970, for lack of speedy prosecution. The United States appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
View caseA defendant need not prove particularized prejudice when the constitutional violation is classified as structural error. The erroneous disqualification of chosen retained counsel is one such structural violation. Automatic reversal follows once the appellate court determines the disqualification was wrongful.
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No. The Supreme Court treats the erroneous denial of chosen retained counsel as structural error. Structural errors affect the framework of the trial itself and therefore require reversal without any showing of particularized prejudice.
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Ordinary trial errors are subject to harmless-error review that asks whether the defendant suffered particularized prejudice. Structural errors such as wrongful disqualification of retained counsel are not. The violation itself undermines the basic fairness of the proceeding.
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A knowing waiver does not cure an erroneous disqualification. The structural-error rule still applies once the court determines that the disqualification lacked a sufficient basis such as an actual conflict. Reversal remains automatic.
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…of their convictions. It has generally been assumed that Glasser requires reversal, even in the absence of a showing of specific prejudice to the complaining codefendant, whenever a trial court improperly permits or requires joint representation. See Austin v. Erickson , 477 F.2d 620 (CA8 1973); United States v. Gougis , 374…