partial performance

Mary Armendariz and Dolores Olague-Rodgers were hired by Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. in July and August of 1995 for positions in the Provider Relations Group and were later promoted to supervisory roles with annual salaries of $38,000. As a condition of their employment, the employees signed application forms and separate arbitration agreements that required binding arbitration of any dispute arising from termination of employment. The arbitration clause provided that the employees' exclusive remedies would be limited to back wages from the date of discharge until the arbitration award and expressly excluded other remedies such as reinstatement and injunctive relief. On June 20, 1996, the employees were informed that their positions were being eliminated and that they were terminated. During their employment, they alleged that supervisors and coworkers engaged in sexually based harassment and discrimination, and they claimed the termination occurred because of their perceived or actual sexual orientation. The employees filed a complaint against the employer and its parent company alleging a cause of action for violation of the FEHA as well as tort and contract claims for wrongful termination, seeking general damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs. The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, supported by declarations. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract containing provisions so one-sided as to shock the conscience, including the requirement that only employees arbitrate claims and the limitation of damages to backpay. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, holding that the damages provision was unconscionable but that the remainder of the agreement should be enforced after severance. The Supreme Court granted review of the case.

Roy Smith and his twin brother Ray Smith became involved in a dispute over land ownership that originated with acquisitions in the 1940s and 1950s. Ray Smith purchased an 80-acre rectangular tract in 1943. In 1950, Ray, Roy, and their mother obtained joint title to a 42-acre tract positioned cattycornered southwest of Ray's 80 acres. In 1960, Ray and their mother transferred their interests in the 42-acre tract to Roy. This allowed Roy to mortgage the property and acquire an additional 80-acre tract north of the 42 acres and west of Ray's original holding. The brothers differed on the purpose behind the 1960 conveyance of the 42-acre tract. Ray maintained that it served only to help Roy finance the northern 80-acre purchase, with the understanding that Roy would later transfer half of the 42 acres back to Ray. Roy asserted that the transfer formed part of their parents' plan for the twins to achieve equal land ownership through mutual conveyances of half their respective parcels. On December 30, 1963, Roy conveyed about 20 acres from the 42-acre tract to Ray. Roy alleged that this transfer occurred under an oral agreement whereby Ray would convey the northern half of his 80-acre tract to Roy in exchange. Ray denied entering into any such agreement. Seventeen years later, in May 1981, Roy initiated a lawsuit against Ray seeking specific performance of the alleged oral contract. The case proceeded to a bench trial without a jury, resulting in a judgment for Roy. Ray then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, raising three grounds of error related to the enforcement of the oral contract.

On July 28, 1955, plaintiff, a licensed general contractor, was preparing a bid on the Monte Vista School Job in the Lancaster school district with bids due before 8 p.m. It was customary in that area for general contractors to receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for bidding and to rely on them in computing their own bids. Plaintiff's secretary received between 50 and 75 subcontractors’ bids by telephone that day and recorded them on special forms for plaintiff to post on a master cost sheet. Late in the afternoon, defendant's estimator telephoned and submitted a bid of $7,131.60 for the paving work according to the plans and specifications. Plaintiff listened to the bid over an extension telephone and posted it on the master sheet, where it was the lowest bid for the paving. Plaintiff computed his own bid of $317,385 accordingly, submitted it naming defendant as the subcontractor for the paving, and was awarded the contract when his bid proved the lowest. The next morning, plaintiff stopped at defendant's office and was told by defendant's construction engineer that they had made a mistake in their bid and could not do the work for the price bid. Plaintiff informed the engineer that he expected defendant to carry through with the original bid since he had used it in compiling his bid. Defendant subsequently refused to perform the paving work for less than $15,000. Plaintiff obtained figures from other subcontractors. After several months, he engaged L & H Paving Company to do the work for $10,948.60. The trial court found that defendant made a definite offer to do the paving for $7,131.60 and that plaintiff relied on the bid in computing his own bid and naming defendant as the subcontractor. It entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,817, the difference between defendant's bid and the cost of the paving to plaintiff, and defendant appealed from that judgment.

In June 1918, James A. Halsey, an old man and a widower, was living without family or housekeeper in his house in Hornell, New York. He told the plaintiffs that if they gave up their home and business in Andover, New York, and boarded and cared for him during his life, the house and lot with its furniture and equipment would be theirs upon his death. The plaintiffs did as he asked, selling out an interest in a little draying business in Andover and boarding and tending him until he died about five months after their coming. Neither deed nor will nor memorandum subscribed by the promisor exists to authenticate the promise, and the plaintiffs ask specific performance. During Halsey's lifetime the plaintiffs had no possession of the property and did not occupy it as owners. Halsey retained possession, and the plaintiffs lived with him merely as his servants or guests who could be asked to leave at any time. The plaintiffs paid food bills and performed housekeeping work while Halsey paid the taxes and upkeep costs. There were ties of kinship between one of the plaintiffs and Halsey.

In February 1964, Alpine Slopes Development Company conveyed Lot 101 of Alpine Meadows Estates Subdivision No. 3 in Placer County to Ernest H. and Jewel Riley by grant deed recorded on March 13, 1964. The deed contained no restrictions upon the use of the plaintiffs’ property nor any reference to any instrument purporting to impose restrictions upon Lot 101. At the time of the conveyance there was no document of record purporting to restrict the use of Lot 101. Nine months later, on November 25, 1964, the grantor recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, restrictions and reservations on lots 72 through 116 of the subdivision. The declaration recited that the grantor had established a general plan for the improvement and development of the property and set forth 26 numbered paragraphs of restrictions, covenants and conditions, including paragraph 6, which required submission of plans and specifications to the Bear Creek Planning Committee and its approval before any dwelling, garage, building, fence, wall or other structure or excavation could be commenced or maintained. At a time not established by the record the Rileys constructed a snow tunnel on their lot. On January 12, 1972, the committee recorded a notice of violation of covenants, conditions and restrictions that referred specifically to Lot 101 and the declaration recorded November 25, 1964, and recited the probable violation of paragraph 6 in that a covered walkway had been constructed without prior compliance. The Rileys filed a complaint to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. The planning committee and some of its members cross-complained for declaratory relief. The trial court entered judgment quieting title in the Rileys against all claims of defendants and ruling for the Rileys on the cross-complaint. The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court granted a hearing for the purpose of giving further consideration to the issues raised.