Also known as: parol testimonies · oral testimony · parol evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Oral testimony offered to prove the terms of an agreement or the true character of a transaction. Courts admit the testimony when a writing is not completely integrated or when offered to show that an absolute deed was intended only as security for a debt.
Perry Pratt purchased a medical building from Prosperity Investments. The contract contained a merger clause and the deed described only the land and building. After closing Pratt sought to enforce an earlier email promise for reserved parking spaces. The court refused to admit the oral and written statements because the integrated writing and deed controlled the parties' obligations.
Preston Pratt and Prism Analytics signed a detailed forty-page supply contract containing an integration clause. Pratt later attempted to enforce an oral side promise for minimum purchase volumes. The court first determined the writing was completely integrated and therefore excluded the prior oral term from consideration.
Portia Price conveyed her townhouse by absolute deed to Phoenix Technologies after receiving a cash advance. Side emails described the transfer as temporary security. After repayment Price offered the emails to prove the deed was a mortgage. The court admitted the parol testimony to establish the parties' true intent and allowed redemption.
Pedro Pacheco's will left his estate to his two named children. His neighbor offered testimony that the testator had orally stated the neighbor was also a child for inheritance purposes. The court admitted the extrinsic statements to correct a scrivener's error and effectuate the testator's actual intent.
Alicia Erickson, the daughter of decedent Ronald K. Erickson, appealed from a trial court judgment that affirmed the Probate Court’s decree admitting her father’s will to probate in favor of defendant Dorothy Erickson, the executrix of the estate. On September 1, 1988, the decedent executed a will while unmarried and the father of three daughters. Two days later, on September 3, 1988, he married the defendant. He died on February 22, 1996. The will named the defendant as executrix and guardian of the decedent’s daughters and included among its beneficiaries the defendant’s four children—Thomas Mehring, Christopher Mehring, Maureen Mehring, and Kathleen Mehring—whose identities the trial court admitted into evidence. The plaintiff filed a motion in limine before trial seeking to limit proof to the will, the marriage certificate, and the death certificate. The defendant responded with a detailed offer of proof concerning the decedent’s intent and his communications with his attorney. The trial court granted the motion in limine as to most extrinsic evidence of intent but denied it regarding the beneficiaries’ identities. It then concluded after a de novo hearing that the will’s provisions and the two-day interval between execution and marriage supplied clear and convincing evidence that the instrument accounted for the contingency of marriage. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). The defendant cross-appealed the evidentiary ruling excluding the balance of her proffered proof.
View casePablo Perez purchased a lot subject to recorded restrictions. He offered testimony that the developer had orally agreed the restrictions would not bind his parcel. The court excluded the testimony because the written instruments constituted the final expression of the parties' understanding.
In February 1964, Alpine Slopes Development Company conveyed Lot 101 of Alpine Meadows Estates Subdivision No. 3 in Placer County to Ernest H. and Jewel Riley by grant deed recorded on March 13, 1964. The deed contained no restrictions upon the use of the plaintiffs’ property nor any reference to any instrument purporting to impose restrictions upon Lot 101. At the time of the conveyance there was no document of record purporting to restrict the use of Lot 101. Nine months later, on November 25, 1964, the grantor recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, restrictions and reservations on lots 72 through 116 of the subdivision. The declaration recited that the grantor had established a general plan for the improvement and development of the property and set forth 26 numbered paragraphs of restrictions, covenants and conditions, including paragraph 6, which required submission of plans and specifications to the Bear Creek Planning Committee and its approval before any dwelling, garage, building, fence, wall or other structure or excavation could be commenced or maintained. At a time not established by the record the Rileys constructed a snow tunnel on their lot. On January 12, 1972, the committee recorded a notice of violation of covenants, conditions and restrictions that referred specifically to Lot 101 and the declaration recorded November 25, 1964, and recited the probable violation of paragraph 6 in that a covered walkway had been constructed without prior compliance. The Rileys filed a complaint to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. The planning committee and some of its members cross-complained for declaratory relief. The trial court entered judgment quieting title in the Rileys against all claims of defendants and ruling for the Rileys on the cross-complaint. The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court granted a hearing for the purpose of giving further consideration to the issues raised.
View casePierre Poulin executed a living will directing no artificial nutrition. Family members offered testimony that he had later orally changed his wishes. The court considered whether the parol statements could vary the written directive under applicable evidentiary standards.
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
View caseCourts admit the testimony when the deed is absolute on its face yet contemporaneous writings or conduct indicate the transfer secured a debt. The evidence establishes the parties' true intent and permits the grantor to redeem upon repayment.
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A merger clause states the writing is the complete agreement. After the deed is delivered and accepted, the contract merges into the deed and prior promises not reflected in the deed are discharged unless an exception such as fraud or a collateral agreement applies.
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The court makes the preliminary determination whether the agreement is completely or partially integrated. This finding controls whether prior agreements may be admitted to contradict or supplement the writing.
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No. Exceptions permit parol testimony to establish fraud, mutual mistake, or a collateral agreement that the parties did not intend to merge into the writing.
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…The dissent presented a two part response, with which we also agree. First, it noted that, “[i]n the law of contracts, where the parol evidence rule has undergone considerable erosion, this risk has not been found to have been unmanageable. In the law of wills, the risk is limited by the narrowness of the exception that this case…