Also known as: offsets · offsetting · set-off · setoff
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A credit or reduction applied against a claim, obligation, recovery, or distribution to balance or compensate for an opposing amount already paid, owed, or received from another source.
Oliver Okeke sued Olympus Banking in federal court claiming $90,000 in damages from an account error. After trial the court found he was entitled to only $60,000 once the bank established its right to withhold certain fees. Because the recovery fell below the jurisdictional threshold when computed without regard to the setoff, the district court denied costs to Oliver and imposed costs on him.
Orchard Farms LP authorized a cash distribution to its limited partners after selling equipment. Limited partner Odessa Okada owed the partnership unpaid lease damages on vehicles she had supplied. The general partner reduced her distribution share by the amount of those claims before paying any net amount, treating her as a creditor only for the remainder.
Overland Transport partnership voted to distribute proceeds from asset sales to its partners. Partner Oriana Oberman had outstanding obligations to the firm from prior vehicle repairs she had failed to reimburse. The managing partner applied an offset against her share equal to those obligations before releasing any funds to her.
Otis Olsen was interrogated after arrest without warnings. The Court noted that new procedural rules aim to offset the inherent pressures of custodial questioning that might otherwise produce unreliable statements, thereby protecting the integrity of any resulting confession.
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
View casePenn Central entered a lease allowing construction above Grand Central Terminal. The agreement provided that annual rents payable by the developer would be offset in part by the loss of concession income the railroad would suffer from displaced tenants during and after construction.
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA political committee filing monthly reports with the FEC listed every person providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest as an offset to operating expenditures when the aggregate exceeded $200, thereby reducing the net expenditure totals shown on the disclosure forms.
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations. In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie. The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand. In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million. The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge. To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad. Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address. Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections. Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections. BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication. An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.
View caseA payment made in compensation for the same harm reduces the plaintiff's remaining claim at least to the extent of the payment, regardless of whether the payor was liable or named as a defendant. This prevents double recovery for a single injury.
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Once a partner becomes entitled to a distribution, the partnership may offset any amount the partner or dissociated partner owes it before paying the net sum. The partner retains creditor status only for the remaining balance.
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The statute directs courts to compute the amount in controversy without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be entitled. A plaintiff who ultimately recovers less than $75,000 may therefore face denial or imposition of costs.
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When fair market value exceeds the foreclosure sale price, the deficiency defendant receives an offset equal to the difference after subtracting senior liens that survived foreclosure. The determination is not automatic and requires an affirmative request.
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…has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous confessions. The Court's new rules aim to offset these minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police interrogation. The rules do not serve due process interests in preventing blatant coercion since, as I noted earlier,…