Also known as: offense-specific · offence specific · offence-specific
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A limitation on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that confines its protection to the specific offense for which formal adversary proceedings have begun. The right therefore does not bar questioning about unrelated uncharged crimes even after the right has attached to the charged offense.
Olga O'Neill was indicted for falsifying Medicare billing records and placed in a holding cell. An undercover officer posing as a former nurse steered conversation toward an uncharged prescription-drug diversion scheme. Olga described the diversion in detail. The statements are admissible at a later trial on the diversion charges because the Sixth Amendment right had not attached to that offense.
Oskar Ocampo was indicted for bid rigging on a stadium project and housed with an undercover officer posing as a construction worker. The officer elicited details about an uncharged equipment-sabotage plan on a different project. The statements may be introduced at the bid-rigging trial because the questioning concerned a distinct uncharged offense.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Oscar Ortiz was indicted for insider trading in TechCorp securities and assigned counsel. An undercover agent in his cell elicited admissions about an uncharged laundering scheme involving BioPharm stock. The statements are admissible on the laundering charges because the right to counsel had not attached to that separate offense.
Onyx O'Reilly was indicted for unlawfully accessing one cloud provider and held in jail. An undercover detective elicited details about an uncharged breach at a rival firm using different servers. The statements may be used at a later prosecution for the rival-firm breach because the right had not attached to that offense.
Orson Ochoa was indicted for falsifying customs declarations and detained in a federal facility. An undercover officer posing as an inmate elicited statements about an uncharged human-trafficking plan. The statements are admissible at a subsequent trafficking trial because the right to counsel had not attached to that distinct offense.
No. The right is offense specific. Once formal proceedings begin on one offense, officers may still question the defendant about unrelated uncharged crimes without counsel present, including through undercover agents in a cell.
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No. Invocation is offense specific. A request for counsel on one charge does not invoke protection for unrelated uncharged offenses, so officers may question about those separate crimes without violating the Sixth Amendment.
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Statements obtained by deliberate elicitation about an uncharged offense are admissible at a trial on that uncharged offense because the right never attached to it. The same statements could not be used at trial on the charged offense for which the right had attached.
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Courts examine whether the offenses share the same elements or arise from the same conduct. Offenses that require proof of different facts or involve distinct courses of conduct are treated as separate, so the right attached to one does not cover the other.
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…as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 4. That is true when the questioning is unrelated to charged crimes — the Sixth Amendment right is “offense specific,” McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U. S. 171, 175 (1991). We have never said, however, that officers may badger counseled defendants about charged crimes so long as they do not use information…