An obligation arising between two persons who have not contracted with each other but have formed a relationship similar to a contractual one. The obligation prevents unjust enrichment by requiring restitution for benefits conferred without a formal agreement.
2
An obligation arising where a payment is made in error. The obligation prevents unjust enrichment by requiring restitution for benefits conferred without a formal agreement.
Sense 1
1
Sense 1
An obligation arising between two persons who have not contracted with each other but have formed a relationship similar to a contractual one. The obligation prevents unjust enrichment by requiring restitution for benefits conferred without a formal agreement.
Examples3
Broken Engagement and Reliance Losses
Gavin promised Grant co-ownership in his shipping company after their marriage and encouraged her to quit her job and pay off company debts in preparation. When Gavin ended the engagement, Grant sued for the value of her unpaid labor and savings. The court treated the claim as arising under a quasi-contractual obligation because the parties had formed a relationship akin to contract through reliance on the marriage promise, allowing recovery of actual expenditures to prevent unjust enrichment.
Sense 2
2
Sense 2
An obligation arising where a payment is made in error. The obligation prevents unjust enrichment by requiring restitution for benefits conferred without a formal agreement.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Inverse Condemnation and Lawful Obligation
A developer spent millions improving coastal property after the city imposed land-use restrictions that prevented any economic use. When the restrictions were later held to constitute a taking, the developer sought compensation measured by the value of the improvements. The court recognized an obligation similar to contract because the developer had conferred a measurable benefit on the city through lawful reliance, requiring payment to avoid unjust enrichment even though no agreement existed.
City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd.526 U.S. 687, 734 (1999)
The respondent Del Monte Dunes and its predecessor in interest owned a 37.6-acre ocean-front parcel in the city of Monterey that had previously served as an oil-company terminal and tank farm. The parcel contained remnants of industrial use, including tank pads, broken concrete, oil-soaked sand, and nonnative ice plant that had spread across roughly 25 percent of the site and threatened the remaining native buckwheat habitat of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly. The property was zoned for multi-family residential development under the city's general zoning ordinance.
Between 1981 and 1986 the landowners submitted a series of development proposals that began with 344 units and were successively reduced, at the city's suggestion, to 264 units, then 224 units, and finally 190 units. The planning commission denied each application. The city council twice overruled the commission and granted a conditional-use permit for 190 units subject to specific conditions.
After the landowners revised their plans to satisfy those conditions, devoting substantial acreage to public open space, beach access, view corridors, and buckwheat restoration, the planning commission rejected the final proposal in January 1986 and the city council denied it in June 1986 without specifying further measures the landowners could take. After five years, five formal decisions, and nineteen site plans, Del Monte Dunes filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city's actions effected a regulatory taking, violated due process, and denied equal protection.
The district court initially dismissed the claims as unripe. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand the district court submitted the takings and equal-protection claims to a jury while reserving the substantive-due-process claim for the court. At trial the jury heard evidence of the city's shifting demands, inconsistent positions, and interest in acquiring the parcel for public use. The court instructed the jury that it should find for Del Monte Dunes if the city's denial either left the property without any economically viable use or failed to substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury returned a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on the takings claim, a separate verdict on the equal-protection claim, and an award of $1.45 million in damages. The district court denied the city's post-verdict motions, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether liability issues on the regulatory-takings claim were properly submitted to the jury. The Court also addressed whether the court of appeals had applied an erroneous standard permitting reweighing of the city's land-use decision. Finally, the Court considered whether the rough-proportionality test of Dolan v. City of Tigard applied to this denial of development.
During marriage a wife supported her husband while he obtained an advanced degree that dramatically increased his future income. Upon divorce she sought a share of the enhanced earning power created by her efforts. The court analyzed the claim under quasi-contract principles because the marital relationship created an obligation to restore the value of benefits conferred without an express agreement, preventing one spouse from retaining the full enrichment.
In re Marriage of Graham574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978)
Anne P. Graham and Dennis J. Graham were married on August 5, 1968, in Denver, Colorado. Throughout the six-year marriage Anne worked full-time as an airline stewardess and contributed seventy percent of the financial support used for family expenses and Dennis's education. Dennis attended school for approximately three and one-half years of the marriage and obtained a bachelor of science degree in engineering physics and a master’s degree in business administration at the University of Colorado. The couple jointly managed an apartment house and Anne performed the majority of the housework and cooking. No children were born during the marriage and no marital assets were accumulated.
On February 4, 1974, the parties jointly filed a petition for dissolution in the Boulder County District Court. Anne did not make a claim for maintenance or attorney fees. After a hearing on October 24, 1974, the trial court found that the education obtained by Dennis during the marriage was jointly-owned property. The court evaluated the future earnings value of the M.B.A. at $82,836 and awarded Anne $33,134 payable in monthly installments of $100.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's decision in Graham v. Graham, 38 Colo. App. 130, 555 P.2d 527 and reversed it. The Supreme Court of Colorado then took up the case.
How does obligatio quasi ex contractu differ from an actual contract?
It arises without mutual assent or bargained-for exchange when one party confers a benefit on another in circumstances that make retention unjust. Courts impose the obligation to prevent unjust enrichment rather than to enforce a promise.
What remedies are available under obligatio quasi ex contractu?
Restitution measured by the reasonable value of the benefit conferred is the usual remedy. Recovery is limited to the enrichment actually received and retained, not expectation damages or lost profits.
Supporting sources
Does the doctrine apply when parties mistakenly believe a contract exists?
Yes. When parties perform under a mutual mistake that voids the agreement, the performing party may recover the value of benefits conferred on the other under quasi-contract principles to restore the status quo.
Supporting sources
Can breach of promise to marry give rise to this obligation?
In states that retain the action it is treated as a quasi-contract claim allowing recovery of actual expenditures made in preparation for marriage, though not for expected financial benefits from the marriage itself.
Supporting sources
…to be the closest cousin to the plurality's conception of § 1983 as applied here, the resemblance is limited by that strain of
quasi-contract
theory holding that the defendant must pay for what he has received to avoid unjust enrichment, see E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.20, p. 101 (3d ed. 1999), whereas the theory of just…