Also known as: nonmarital person · non-marital persons · non-marital person · unmarried persons
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Unmarried individuals. The constitutionally protected right of privacy in decisions about contraception belongs to each person regardless of marital status.
Jordan, an unmarried software engineer, attempted to use advanced contraception features on a state-regulated fertility app. The platform disabled those tools after Jordan indicated unmarried status, while married users retained full access. Jordan sued, claiming the marital-status distinction burdened the individual privacy right in contraceptive choice.
Craig and Nancy, a same-sex couple married in another state, applied for married-student housing at a public university. The university denied benefits because it refused to recognize their out-of-state marriage. They challenged the denial as unequal treatment of their marital status under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes. The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee. Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
View caseA disabled adult child receiving benefits based on a deceased parent's earnings remarried. The agency terminated payments solely because of the new marital status. The child sued, arguing the marital-status rule produced arbitrary results unrelated to actual dependency.
Mr. Jobst has been disabled by cerebral palsy since his birth in 1932. He qualified for child’s insurance benefits in 1957, several months after his father died. In 1970 he married another cerebral palsy victim. Since his wife was not entitled to benefits under the federal Act, the statute required the Secretary to terminate his benefits. Mr. Jobst brought this suit to review the Secretary’s action. The District Court held that the statute violated the equality principle applicable to the Federal Government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment because all child’s insurance beneficiaries are not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who marry other social security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently. The court held this distinction irrational. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. Noting that Mr. Jobst and his wife had become entitled to benefits under a newly enacted statute authorizing supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled, this Court remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of that program. The District Court reviewed the new program, concluded that it had no relevance to the issues presented by this case, and reinstated its original judgment. The Secretary again appealed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act authorized a monthly benefit for qualified wage earners at least 65 years old. In 1939 Congress created secondary benefits for wives, children, widows, and parents of wage earners. In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child’s benefit to include those who were under a disability which began before age 18. In 1958, Congress adopted an amendment providing that marriage would not terminate a child’s disability benefit if the child married a person who was also entitled to benefits under the Act.
View caseAfter a long-term cohabitation ended, one partner sued the other for breach of an oral agreement to share property acquired during the relationship. The defendant argued no enforceable contract existed between nonmarital partners. The court considered whether the agreement could be enforced without relying on marital status.
In October 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement. While the parties lived together, they would combine their efforts and earnings. They would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual or combined. They further agreed to hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife. Plaintiff would render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to defendant. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff agreed to give up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer. She did so to devote her full time to defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. In return, defendant agreed to provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life. The parties lived together from October 1964 through May 1970. During this period, as a result of their efforts and earnings, they acquired in defendant's name substantial real and personal property. This included motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support plaintiff until November 1971 but thereafter refused to provide further support. Plaintiff brought this action asserting two causes of action. The first, for declaratory relief, asked the court to determine her contract and property rights. The second sought to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. Defendant answered the complaint after an unsuccessful demurrer. Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial. When the case was called for trial, plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings. This was augmented by a stipulation that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967. The court granted the motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment. She asked leave to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after the divorce became final. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
View caseYes. The Supreme Court has held that the right of privacy inheres in the individual, married or single, and protects decisions whether to bear or beget a child from unwarranted governmental intrusion. A classification that withholds access to contraception from unmarried persons while granting it to married persons violates equal protection.
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No. When a program withholds subsidized contraceptives from unmarried recipients while providing them to married recipients, the classification burdens the individual privacy right and violates equal protection. The distinction treats similarly situated persons differently in a matter fundamentally affecting personal reproductive choice.
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Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the liberty of adults to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial sexual intimacy. A statute that criminalizes such conduct between unmarried persons rests on no legitimate state interest beyond moral disapproval and therefore fails rational basis review.
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…H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958). : No doubt there are many distant relatives and unrelated persons who do not qualify for benefits even though they are actually dependent on a wage earner. Similarly, some married children and some 19-year-old children remain dependent on their parents…