Also known as: uniform rule of naturalization
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional clause authorizing Congress to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. The clause empowers the federal government to set consistent standards for conferring citizenship on aliens.
Congress passes a statute requiring all applicants for citizenship to demonstrate five years of continuous residence and pass a civics exam. Nathaniel Newman, an applicant from Canada, meets every requirement under the federal statute. A state attempts to impose an additional six-year residency rule on him. The federal statute controls because the Naturalization Clause requires uniformity nationwide.
Jagdish Rai Chadha receives a suspension of deportation from the INS under a federal naturalization-related statute. One house of Congress then vetoes the suspension without bicameral action or presentment. Chadha argues the veto exceeds congressional authority under the Naturalization Clause. The Court invalidates the one-house veto as inconsistent with the constitutional structure for exercising the naturalization power.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View caseArizona enacts a statute imposing state criminal penalties on aliens who fail to carry federal registration documents. Nikhil Narayan, a lawful permanent resident, faces state prosecution under the new law. The federal government challenges the statute as interfering with the uniform national scheme created under the Naturalization Clause. The Court holds the state law preempted because it conflicts with the federal power to set naturalization and immigration rules.
In 2010, the State of Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, commonly known as S. B. 1070. The statute's stated purpose is to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States. Arizona officials described the law as establishing a policy of attrition through enforcement. S. B. 1070 contains four provisions that became the focus of litigation. Section 3 makes it a state misdemeanor to willfully fail to complete or carry an alien registration document in violation of federal law. Section 5(C) makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in Arizona. Section 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant a person whom the officer has probable cause to believe has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States. Section 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to make reasonable efforts, in some circumstances, to verify the person's immigration status with the Federal Government. The United States filed suit against Arizona in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, seeking to enjoin enforcement of these provisions. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the four provisions from taking effect. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction in 2011. Arizona experiences significant effects from unlawful immigration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens are apprehended in the State each year, and unauthorized aliens are estimated to comprise almost six percent of the population. In Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix, unauthorized aliens are reported to account for a disproportionate share of serious crime. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
View caseFederal civil service regulations bar noncitizens from most federal jobs. Mow Sun Wong, a lawfully admitted resident alien, applies for a position and is rejected solely on citizenship grounds. Wong challenges the regulation as exceeding the scope of authority delegated under the Naturalization Clause. The Court examines whether the restriction is properly tied to the federal naturalization power.
Five Chinese aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence brought this litigation after each was denied federal employment solely because of alienage. Mow Sun Wong, admitted in 1969 after working as an electrical engineer in China, participated in the California Supplemental Training and Education Program and was assigned to the General Services Administration but could not obtain a janitor position. Siu Hung Mok, admitted in 1968 with eighteen years of business experience in China, likewise participated in the STEP program and was assigned to the Federal Records Center of GSA but could not retain a file clerk position. Kae Cheong Lui performed satisfactory work for the Post Office Department for ten days before termination when his personnel record showed he was not a citizen. Francene Lum, admitted in 1946 with fifteen years of teaching experience and a master's degree in education, was not permitted to take an examination for an evaluator position in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Anna Yu, admitted in 1965, was barred from taking a typing test for a clerk-typist position. Two of the plaintiffs had filed declarations of intent to become citizens while the other three had not. On December 22, 1970, the five plaintiffs commenced a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California naming the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission and the heads of the three agencies that had denied them employment. The complaint alleged that approximately four million aliens reside in the United States, that about three hundred thousand federal jobs become available each year, and that noncitizens are generally barred from competing for those positions. The District Court rejected a jurisdictional challenge but ruled for the defendants on the merits after defendants moved to dismiss and plaintiffs moved for summary judgment supported by affidavits. Four plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeal was pending for over two years, the Supreme Court decided Sugarman v. Dougall and In re Griffiths on June 25, 1973. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court judgment. Only the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission petitioned for certiorari. In 1971 Congress established the United States Postal Service and removed its officers and employees from the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. In 1974 the Postal Service amended its regulation to make noncitizens who have permanent resident alien status eligible for most positions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Civil Service Commission regulation barring resident aliens from federal competitive civil service employment is constitutional. The regulation at issue, 5 CFR § 338.101, provided that a person may be admitted to competitive examination or given appointment only if a citizen of or owing permanent allegiance to the United States, with limited exceptions for executive assignments when no qualified citizens are available. The Commission construed the permanent allegiance category to cover only natives of American Samoa.
View caseDred Scott, born into slavery, claims citizenship after residing in free territory. The Court must decide whether Congress can confer citizenship on persons of African descent through naturalization legislation. The decision addresses the limits of the naturalization power when determining who qualifies as a citizen under federal law.
Dred Scott, along with his wife Harriet and their two children Eliza and Lizzie, was held as a slave by the defendant John F. A. Sandford in the State of Missouri. Scott initiated an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri asserting his and his family's right to freedom. The declaration averred that Scott was a citizen of Missouri and the defendant a citizen of New York to establish diversity jurisdiction. The defendant responded with a plea in abatement asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because Scott was not a citizen of Missouri. Scott was a negro of African descent whose ancestors were of pure African blood and had been brought into the country and sold as slaves. Scott demurred to this plea. The Circuit Court overruled the plea and required the defendant to answer over. The defendant then filed pleas in bar. After a trial on the merits the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, leading to judgment for him. Scott then prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court. The underlying facts showed that Scott had been the slave of Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the United States Army. In 1834 Emerson took Scott from Missouri to Rock Island in Illinois, where he held him as a slave until 1836. Emerson then removed Scott to Fort Snelling in the Territory of Upper Louisiana north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, holding him there until 1838. Harriet, originally the slave of Major Taliaferro, was also brought to Fort Snelling and sold to Emerson. Scott and Harriet were married at Fort Snelling in 1836 with Emerson's consent, and their children were born there or during the return journey. In 1838 Emerson brought the family back to Missouri, where they resided until Emerson sold them to Sandford. The case reached the Supreme Court after two arguments. The Court ordered reargument on some of the points due to differences of opinion among the justices and the importance of the questions involved.
View caseA U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem seeks to have his passport list his place of birth as Israel rather than Jerusalem. The executive branch refuses under its foreign affairs authority. The citizen invokes the Naturalization Clause as support for congressional power to direct the designation. The Court analyzes the interplay between the naturalization power and executive authority over passports.
In 1948, President Truman formally recognized the State of Israel but did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. Over the subsequent decades, the Executive Branch maintained a consistent policy that the status of Jerusalem should be decided through negotiations rather than unilaterally. The State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual directed that passports for citizens born in Jerusalem list only "Jerusalem" as the place of birth. In 2002, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, including section 214(d), which provided that for a United States citizen born in Jerusalem, the Secretary of State shall, upon request, record the place of birth as Israel on the passport. When signing the Act, President George W. Bush issued a statement asserting that the provision would impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authority if construed as mandatory. Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem in 2002 to United States citizens. His mother requested that his passport list "Jerusalem, Israel" as the place of birth, but embassy officials followed State Department policy and listed only "Jerusalem." Zivotofsky's parents then brought suit on his behalf in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on political question and standing grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the political question determination after initially reversing on standing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Court of Appeals held the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari again.
View caseThe clause authorizes Congress to create a uniform rule for granting citizenship to aliens. This power ensures that standards for naturalization remain consistent across the United States rather than varying by state.
Supporting sources
The clause focuses on rules for conferring citizenship rather than broader immigration regulation. Federal authority over immigration often draws from other constitutional sources such as the commerce power.
Congress may use the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement its authority under the Naturalization Clause. Challenges to statutes enacted under these combined powers often test whether the chosen means are within constitutional bounds.
Supporting sources
No. The requirement of uniformity prevents states from creating separate standards for citizenship. Federal law enacted under the clause preempts conflicting state measures.
Supporting sources
…the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress' Art. I power "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is…