Also known as: NY Times rule · New York Times rule · N.Y. Times v. Sullivan rule · actual malice standard · Sullivan rule
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional standard in defamation law requiring a public official or public figure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published a false statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was true.
Phoebe, the elected state treasurer, sued Pinnacle Investments and editor Kayla after the newsletter accused her of diverting pension funds. Kayla approved the story based only on unnamed Wall Street sources and an ambiguous draft budget document without contacting public offices for verification. A jury could find that this complete failure to check obvious leads despite the story's dramatic tone satisfies the actual malice requirement.
Norton Bank issued a confidential credit report labeling Neptune Energy as financially unstable. Neptune Energy sued for defamation. The court applied ordinary negligence standards rather than actual malice because the plaintiff was a private entity and the speech was not on a public concern.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Norman Nash, a local official, sued after St. Amant broadcast an interview accusing him of misconduct. St. Amant had known the source for only a few months and made no effort to check the source's reputation for truthfulness. The court held that failure to investigate alone does not establish reckless disregard under the actual malice standard.
Nolan Nunez sued New Yorker Magazine after an article attributed fabricated statements to him. The magazine had edited his words for dramatic effect without any indication that the changes altered the meaning in a defamatory way. The court examined whether the alterations demonstrated knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.
Mayor Nalini Narula sued Harte-Hanks Communications after the newspaper published accusations based on a source whose credibility was seriously undermined by other evidence in the reporters' possession. The reporters chose not to pursue leads that would have resolved the doubts. The court found that consciously avoiding contradictory information can support a finding of actual malice.
A public official must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the statement with actual malice. Actual malice exists when the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. This standard protects robust public debate on matters of official conduct.
Supporting sources
No. The rule applies only to public officials and public figures. Private plaintiffs generally need show only negligence regarding the truth of the statement when the matter is one of public concern.
Supporting sources
No. Mere failure to investigate does not by itself prove reckless disregard. The plaintiff must show that the defendant entertained serious doubts about the truth or deliberately avoided confirming facts that would have revealed falsity.
Supporting sources
Consciously discounting or ignoring strong contradictory evidence already in the defendant's possession can support a finding of reckless disregard. A jury may infer that the publisher proceeded with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.
Supporting sources
…that do not involve matters of public concern. The First Amendment does not require the application of the New York Times actual malice standard in such cases. Dissenting opinions Dissenting — Justice Brennan The Court today holds that a private individual need not show actual malice to recover presumed and punitive…