Also known as: mistake of fact standard · mistake-of-fact standards · mistake of fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
3 senses
A standard under which an actor remains liable for an intentional tort such as trespass or conversion despite an honest mistake of fact about ownership, boundaries, or authority. The mistake supplies no defense unless the possessor or owner induced it through conduct.
A standard under which an actor remains liable for an intentional tort such as trespass or conversion despite an honest mistake of fact about ownership, boundaries, or authority. The mistake supplies no defense unless the possessor or owner induced it through conduct.
Miles Montgomery saw an approaching figure raise an arm in the dark and struck first with a stick. The figure was a jogger stretching, not an assailant, and the jogger had done nothing to create the impression of threat. Because the jogger's privilege to be there rested on no fault of Montgomery, the mistake supplied no defense to battery.
1 common questions
A standard permitting reformation of an unambiguous donative document when clear and convincing evidence shows that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention.
Mohan Malhotra's will left his donor-advised fund at Helping Hands to one charity. He maintained a second account under a different email that he always treated as part of the same gift. Clear and convincing evidence showed the omission resulted from a mistake of expression about the number of accounts, so the court reformed the will to include both.
A standard under which a mistake of fact constitutes a defense if the mistake negates the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense.
Marco Marquez carried a firearm believing his peace-officer status under a statute exempted him from licensing requirements. The statute did not cover his position. Because the mistake concerned a matter of fact about his classification rather than the legal effect of the statute itself, the defense failed.
A standard permitting reformation of an unambiguous donative document when clear and convincing evidence shows that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention.
A standard under which a mistake of fact constitutes a defense if the mistake negates the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
No. An intentional entry onto land possessed by another remains a trespass even when the entrant holds an honest and reasonable belief about ownership or boundaries, provided the possessor did not induce the mistake.
Maria Morales created a trust that allocated low-basis assets to charity and a retirement account to her niece. Both parties had mistakenly believed the allocation would minimize estate tax. Clear and convincing evidence established the mistake of law regarding tax consequences and the settlor's actual intention, so the court reformed the trust terms.
1 common questions
Reformation is available when clear and convincing evidence establishes both that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and what the donor's actual intention was. Direct evidence contradicting the text may be considered.
Defendant Marrero was a Federal corrections officer employed at a facility in Danbury, Connecticut. In 1977 he was arrested inside a Manhattan social club while carrying a loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol. At the time of arrest he asserted his Federal corrections officer status and maintained that he was authorized to carry the weapon without a permit. Marrero claimed that his belief rested on interpretations supplied by fellow officers and teachers together with the wording of the peace officer statutes themselves. The case had already moved through several procedural stages before trial. Marrero's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment was granted at 94 Misc 2d 367. The Appellate Division reversed that order and reinstated the indictment by a divided vote at 71 AD2d 346. Marrero's subsequent appeal from the Appellate Division order lapsed and was dismissed. At trial Marrero sought to present evidence that his personal misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a peace officer excused his conduct. The trial court rejected the proffered defense, refused to charge the jury on the issue, and the jury returned a verdict convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
View caseMason McCarthy engaged in sexual intercourse after the complainant hugged and kissed him and initiated the act. He honestly believed she consented. The jury instruction on reasonable and good-faith mistake of fact was required because the evidence supported a finding that the mistake negated the required mental state for forcible rape.
On Saturday, November 4, 1989, Deborah S. and her sister Jenny S. were staying at the Episcopal Sanctuary homeless shelter at Eighth and Market Streets in San Francisco after arriving from Wichita, Kansas approximately two weeks earlier. Deborah waited outside the shelter while Jenny went inside. Defendant Wash Jones Williams, a 52-year-old electrician, volunteer, and resident at the shelter who stood 6 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 220 pounds, approached the 28-year-old Deborah, who was 5 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 117 pounds. Williams suggested getting coffee with no strings attached, and the pair spent the morning walking, talking, and eating. Williams purchased a bracelet for Deborah from a street vendor on Turk Street. He led her to the Dahlia Hotel, rang the buzzer, rented a room, and requested a sheet from the clerk. Once inside the room, Deborah noticed there was no television. Deborah attempted to leave but could not release the bolt lock. According to Deborah's testimony, Williams punched her in the left eye. Williams pushed her onto the bed. Williams ordered her to remove her pants while stating he did not like to hurt people. Williams engaged in sexual intercourse for 10 to 15 minutes despite her screams and efforts to push him off. Williams testified to a different version of events, stating that Deborah hugged and kissed him upon entering the room, initiated removal of her clothes, fondled him for 10 to 15 minutes to overcome his impotence as a diabetic, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After the encounter, Deborah returned to the shelter, obtained directions to the nearest police station, walked to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, and reported that she had been raped, at which point her eye was swollen shut. An officer took Deborah's statement and drove her to the hospital, where she waited approximately seven hours for an examination. The examining nurse and doctor observed that the eye injury was more consistent with a punch than a slap. Vaginal slides showed the presence of semen. Deborah had additional complaints of pain and tenderness consistent with her account. She appeared scared during the exam. Williams was convicted of two counts of forcible rape and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court instructed the jury on consent but refused to give the requested instruction on reasonable and good faith but mistaken belief as to consent. The jury convicted Williams on all counts, and he was sentenced to eight years in state prison. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding substantial evidence supported giving the requested instruction based on Deborah's willing accompaniment to the hotel, her lack of objection to the bedsheet, Williams's account of events inside the room, and the clerk's failure to hear screams or sounds of violence.
View caseMing Ma took an unmarried girl from her father's custody after she told him she was eighteen and he had reasonable grounds for believing her. The girl was under sixteen. Because the statute imposed strict liability on the age element, the mistake of fact supplied no defense.
Henry Prince stood trial at the Surrey assizes before Denman, J. He faced a charge under section 55 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, for unlawfully taking Annie Phillips, an unmarried girl under sixteen years of age, out of the possession and against the will of her father. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Judgment was respited to allow the Court for Crown Cases Reserved to consider a legal question arising from the case. The evidence established that Annie Phillips was fourteen years old. She had told Prince she was eighteen, and she appeared older than her actual age. Prince maintained that he had acted on a bona fide and reasonable belief that Phillips was eighteen years old. Denman, J., reserved the case for the opinion of the Court on whether the defendant's belief constituted a defence to the charge.
View case2 common questions
The defendant must show that the mistake was genuine and directly negated the knowledge element required by the offense. Visible facts or prior training that establish actual knowledge will defeat the defense even if the defendant claims a sincere belief to the contrary.
In criminal law the defense turns on whether the mistake actually negates the required mental state. Reasonableness is not an independent requirement. In tort law reasonableness is irrelevant because even a reasonable uninduced mistake supplies no defense.
…II. DISCUSSION In People v. Mayberry , supra , 15 Cal.3d 143, this court held that a defendant's reasonable and good faith mistake of fact regarding a person's consent to sexual intercourse is a defense to rape. ( Id. at p. 155.) Mayberry is predicated on the notion that under section 26, reasonable mistake of fact…