Also known as: military courts · court-martial · military tribunal
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A tribunal established under military authority to adjudicate offenses by members of the armed forces and certain civilians during hostilities. These tribunals operate independently of the civilian court system and remain subject to constitutional limits that bar their use against American civilians when ordinary courts are open and functioning.
Miguel Mendoza, a civilian nurse at a private hospital, was arrested after a bioterror incident. Military authorities declared the hospital a temporary military zone and convened a court-martial even though the nearby federal courthouse continued to hold jury trials. Mendoza petitioned the district court to halt the proceeding.
Monica Morgan, a U.S. citizen software engineer, was seized at a federal technology hub and held in a military brig as an enemy combatant. The government offered only ex parte review of classified affidavits with no opportunity for her to appear or present evidence. Morgan filed a habeas petition demanding a neutral forum to contest the designation.
Matthew Martinez, a civilian subcontractor on an overseas base project, sued a foreign supplier for breach of a supply agreement. The executive branch directed the claim into a joint military tribunal created by treaty rather than an Article III court. Martinez challenged the referral as exceeding constitutional bounds on non-Article III adjudication.
Knudsen filed a claim for compensation against Benson under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act with Deputy Commissioner Crowell of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. The evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner was directed largely to the employment issue and was conflicting. After considering the evidence the deputy commissioner found that Knudsen was in Benson's employ at the time of the injury and filed an order for compensation. Benson then brought suit in the United States District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award. Benson alleged that Knudsen was not his employee at the time of the injury and that the claim lay outside the deputy commissioner's jurisdiction. An amended complaint further challenged the constitutionality of the Act on multiple grounds. Those grounds included alleged violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and the judicial power provisions of Article III. The District Judge denied motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the law. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting the issue as to the fact of employment, and the evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the enforcement of the award. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and this Court granted writs of certiorari.
View caseMarcus Mitchell, a former service member accused of an offense committed while on active duty, faced a court-martial convened under a broad statutory delegation to the executive. He argued that the delegation lacked an intelligible principle and improperly assigned core judicial functions to a military body. The district court reviewed the scope of the delegation before allowing the proceeding to continue.
In 2006 Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. The statute requires sex offenders to register in the jurisdictions where they live, work, and attend school. It also directs the Attorney General to specify the applicability of its requirements to offenders convicted before the Act’s enactment and to prescribe rules for their registration. At the time of enactment the nation’s population of sex offenders exceeded 500,000, and Congress left the treatment of these pre-Act offenders to the Attorney General after concluding that immediate application would impose costly burdens on states and localities. The Attorney General first left pre-Act offenders unregulated for six months after enactment. An interim rule issued in 2007 then required all pre-Act offenders to follow the same registration rules as post-Act offenders. Subsequent Attorneys General issued varying guidelines, with one directing states to register only some pre-Act offenders, another requiring registration only for those convicted of a new felony after enactment, and still others differing on whether pre-Act offenders could receive credit for time already spent in the community. Herman Gundy pleaded guilty in 2005 to possessing child pornography. He was released from prison five years later. He was arrested in 2012 for failing to register as a sex offender under the rules then prescribed for pre-Act offenders and faced an additional ten-year prison term. Gundy was convicted in 2012. He argued in the district court that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it authorized the Attorney General to specify the applicability of SORNA’s requirements. The district court rejected the argument. The Second Circuit affirmed, relying on its precedent that SORNA does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseMichelle Murphy, a U.S. citizen journalist, was detained after reporting from a conflict zone and transferred to a military commission for trial on charges of aiding enemy forces. The commission operated under procedures that limited access to classified evidence and denied full confrontation rights. Murphy sought review in federal court asserting that the commission lacked statutory and constitutional authority.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by militia forces in Afghanistan in November 2001 during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban regime that then governed the country. The militia turned him over to the United States military, which transported him to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in June 2002. Over a year later, on July 3, 2003, the President determined that Hamdan was eligible for trial by military commission for then-unspecified crimes. Subsequently, on July 13, 2004, the government charged Hamdan with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by military commission. The charging document alleged that from February 1996 to November 2001 he had joined an enterprise with al Qaeda members and committed four overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy. Hamdan then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge both the authority of the military commission and the procedures it would employ. The District Court granted Hamdan's habeas petition on November 8, 2004, stayed the commission proceedings, and concluded that the commission lacked authority under the law of war and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable and that the commission's jurisdiction and procedures were lawful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 2005. On December 30, 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, after which the government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court postponed ruling on the motion and later denied it, retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.
View caseMadison Meyers, a civilian employee at a military installation, was charged with an offense arising from her work and referred to a military court. She contested the referral on the ground that the executive's removal authority over tribunal members undermined the required separation between military and civilian justice. The court examined the structural relationship before deciding whether to permit the military proceeding.
Frank S. Myers was appointed postmaster at Portland, Oregon, of the first class on July 10, 1917, for a term of four years fixed by statute. On January 3, 1921, President Wilson directed his removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers protested to the department that his removal was illegal and refused to surrender his office. He was, however, ousted and a successor appointed with the consent of the Senate. He brought suit in the Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against him. The case comes here on appeal. By act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, it was provided that postmasters of the first, second and third classes should be appointed and might be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term of the office was fixed at four years.
View caseCongress may not authorize military courts to try American civilians when civilian courts remain open and functioning, even during declared martial law. The Constitution requires that civilians receive indictment and jury trial protections in Article III courts under those circumstances.
Supporting sources
A U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant inside the United States is entitled to a meaningful opportunity before a neutral decisionmaker to contest the factual basis for detention. Procedures may be tailored for military exigencies, including use of hearsay and rebuttable presumptions, but the government cannot deny all opportunity to refute the allegations.
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Civilian courts may independently determine whether a military tribunal had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter and whether it exceeded its powers, because Congress has not provided for direct review of military tribunal decisions.
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Yes, a properly constituted military tribunal can serve as the neutral decisionmaker required by due process when a citizen is detained as an enemy combatant, provided the detainee receives a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis even under relaxed evidentiary rules.
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…rejected any constitutional distinction between capital and noncapital offenses as regards congressional power to provide for court-martial trials of civilian dependents of armed forces personnel. Having previously held that civilian dependents could not constitutionally be deprived of the protections of Article III and the…