Also known as:material misrepresentations · materially misrepresent · materially misrepresented · material misrep
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in contracts
A false statement that is likely to induce a reasonable person to assent or that the maker knows is likely to induce the recipient to assent. The statement must induce justified reliance by the recipient to render the contract voidable.
2
in professional responsibility
Sense 1
1
in contracts
A false statement that is likely to induce a reasonable person to assent or that the maker knows is likely to induce the recipient to assent. The statement must induce justified reliance by the recipient to render the contract voidable.
See Our Sources· 1 source
Restatements
Examples
Sense 2
2
in professional responsibility
A false or misleading communication about a lawyer or the lawyer's services that contains a misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to prevent the statement from being materially misleading when considered as a whole.
A false or misleading communication about a lawyer or the lawyer's services that contains a misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to prevent the statement from being materially misleading when considered as a whole.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
4
Demographics Misstatement in Master Policy
Metro’s director understated member ages and loss history to obtain favorable terms from Summit Insurance. Summit discovered the statements and rescinded the master agreement. Lopez, a member who applied for coverage, could not enforce benefits because the underlying contract was voidable from formation.
False Product Safety Label on Paint
Aurora Colors labeled its solvent-based paints as fume-free and safe for indoor studio use without ventilation. Lena relied on the label and worked for hours in an unventilated room. The resulting respiratory injury followed directly from her justifiable reliance on the public representation.
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014)
Lexmark International, Inc. manufactures and sells laser printers along with the toner cartridges designed exclusively for those printers.
It introduced a Prebate program that offered customers a 20-percent discount on new cartridges if they agreed to return the empty cartridges to Lexmark once used. The program terms were communicated to consumers through notices printed on the toner-cartridge boxes.
Static Control Components, Inc. manufactures and sells components necessary for remanufacturers to refurbish used Lexmark toner cartridges. Static Control developed a microchip that could mimic the microchip in Lexmark Prebate cartridges, enabling remanufacturers to refurbish and resell those cartridges after replacing the original chip.
In 2002 Lexmark sued Static Control alleging violations of the Copyright Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Static Control counterclaimed under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging that Lexmark misled end-users into believing they are legally bound by the Prebate terms. Static Control further alleged that Lexmark sent letters to remanufacturers falsely advising that it was illegal to sell refurbished Prebate cartridges and to use Static Control products.
Static Control alleged that these statements caused it lost sales and damage to its business reputation. The district court granted Lexmark’s motion to dismiss the Lanham Act counterclaim on prudential standing grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed after applying the reasonable-interest test. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the appropriate analytical framework.
A state board restricted pharmacists from advertising prices for prescription drugs. Consumer groups challenged the restriction as limiting access to truthful commercial information. The rule suppressed material facts that reasonable consumers would consider important when deciding where to purchase medication.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.425 U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976)
Virginia law made it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to publish, advertise, or promote any price for prescription drugs under Va. Code Ann. § 54-524.35(3).
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy regulated the profession to protect public health, safety, and welfare. It licensed pharmacists only after they showed good moral character, graduated from an approved school, completed up to twelve months of experience, and passed a Board examination. Licensed pharmacists remained subject to penalties or license revocation for negligence, fraud, or unprofessional conduct.
Prescription drug prices varied sharply even within the same locality. In Richmond the cost of forty Achromycin tablets ranged from $2.59 to $6.00. In the Newport News-Hampton area the price of tetracycline ranged from $1.20 to $9.00. About ninety-five percent of prescriptions were filled with dosage forms prepared by manufacturers. Some pharmacies refused to quote prices over the telephone.
An individual Virginia resident who suffered from diseases requiring daily prescription drugs, together with two nonprofit organizations whose members included many users of such drugs, brought suit against the Board and its members. The plaintiffs claimed the ban prevented them from learning where their limited resources could be spent most effectively. A prior challenge to the same statute brought by a drug retailer and one of its pharmacists had been rejected on due-process and equal-protection grounds.
The three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia declared the quoted portion of the statute void and enjoined its enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the Board's appeal.
Secondary Actor Statements in Securities Sale
Scientific Atlanta supplied equipment and made statements about its functionality to investors in a cable company. The investors later claimed the statements contributed to a fraudulent scheme that inflated the company’s value. The statements were not actionable as primary violations because they did not directly induce the investors’ purchases.
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, served as lead plaintiff in a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on behalf of purchasers of Charter Communications, Inc., common stock. The suit named as defendants Charter itself, some of its executives, its independent auditor Arthur Andersen LLP, and two other companies that had acted as both suppliers and customers of Charter. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent accounting practices throughout 2000 so that its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for subscriber growth and operating cash flow.
By late 2000 Charter executives realized that these practices would still leave the company short of projected operating cash flow by fifteen to twenty million dollars. To close the gap, Charter entered into arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc., under which Charter overpaid the respondents twenty dollars for each digital cable converter box it purchased through the end of the year. In return, the respondents agreed to purchase advertising time from Charter at prices higher than fair value, with the transactions documented through backdated contracts and false statements about increased production costs.
The arrangements had no economic substance, yet Charter recorded the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalized its purchases of the set-top boxes, thereby inflating reported revenues and operating cash flow by approximately seventeen million dollars on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and disseminated to the public. Respondents had no role in preparing or disseminating Charter's financial statements, and they recorded the transactions as a wash on their own books under generally accepted accounting principles. It is alleged that respondents knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter's intention to use the transactions to mislead research analysts and investors.
The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allegations showed at most aiding and abetting by respondents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a misrepresentation become material in a contract setting?
A misrepresentation is material if it would induce a reasonable person to assent or if the maker knows it is likely to induce the particular recipient to assent for a special reason. The recipient must also show justified reliance on the statement.
Supporting sources
Does a third-party beneficiary lose rights when the underlying contract is voidable for material misrepresentation?
Yes. A beneficiary’s rights are derivative and subject to any infirmity that makes the contract between the promisor and promisee voidable at formation. Rescission by the defrauded party eliminates the duty the beneficiary seeks to enforce.
Supporting sources
Can a seller face liability for a public product claim even without fault?
Yes. A commercial seller who makes a material factual representation to the public about a product’s character or quality can be strictly liable for physical harm caused by a consumer’s justifiable reliance on that representation.
Supporting sources
1
Exclusive Certification Claim in Ad
Griffin’s firm ran an online ad stating it was the only firm in the city certified to handle complex software patent disputes. Other firms in the city held comparable credentials from different bodies. The claim created an impression of unique qualification that a reasonable prospective client could find material when selecting counsel.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What makes a lawyer communication false or misleading under Rule 7.1?
The communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to keep the statement as a whole from being materially misleading. Responsibility rests with the lawyer even when an advertising agency drafts the language.
Supporting sources
939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)
…Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech. , 912 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.1990). : Step-Saver also advanced claims under negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract theories. Step-Saver does not appeal these claims. : All three parties agree that the terminals and the program are "goods" within the meaning of UCC § 2-102…
ContractsThird-party rights and obligations · Third-party beneficiariesNEXTGENFoundational