marriage promise

David S. Maynard and Lydia A. Maynard were husband and wife when David left their home in Ohio to seek opportunities in the western territories. Upon his arrival in the Territory of Oregon, David settled upon public land under the donation act of Congress of September 27, 1850, claiming 640 acres as a married settler to obtain the grant for himself and his wife. Subsequently, on December 22, 1852, the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oregon passed a special act declaring the bonds of matrimony between David S. Maynard and his wife dissolved. David subsequently remarried another woman after the divorce took effect. Lydia received no notice of the legislative proceeding and received no support from David after his departure from Ohio, leaving her without resources during this period. Lydia A. Maynard filed a bill of complaint in the courts of the Territory asserting rights to the east half of the donation claim and alleging that no cause existed for the divorce.

In October 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement. While the parties lived together, they would combine their efforts and earnings. They would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual or combined. They further agreed to hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife. Plaintiff would render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to defendant. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff agreed to give up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer. She did so to devote her full time to defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. In return, defendant agreed to provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life. The parties lived together from October 1964 through May 1970. During this period, as a result of their efforts and earnings, they acquired in defendant's name substantial real and personal property. This included motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support plaintiff until November 1971 but thereafter refused to provide further support. Plaintiff brought this action asserting two causes of action. The first, for declaratory relief, asked the court to determine her contract and property rights. The second sought to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. Defendant answered the complaint after an unsuccessful demurrer. Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial. When the case was called for trial, plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings. This was augmented by a stipulation that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967. The court granted the motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment. She asked leave to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after the divorce became final. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.

A.Z. and B.Z. married in 1977. For the first two years they resided in Virginia, where both served in the armed forces. They underwent fertility testing after difficulties conceiving. The wife suffered an ectopic pregnancy that resulted in miscarriage and removal of her left fallopian tube. In 1980 the couple moved to Maryland for a year of additional fertility treatment that produced no pregnancy. The wife transferred to Massachusetts in 1988 while the husband remained in Maryland for schooling. He joined her in Massachusetts in 1991. After arriving in Massachusetts the wife began IVF treatments at a clinic. The couple first attempted a GIFT procedure on November 6, 1988, which produced another ectopic pregnancy and removal of the wife's remaining fallopian tube. They then pursued IVF from 1988 through 1991. Each time before egg retrieval the couple signed a clinic consent form. They executed seven such forms in total, the last in August 1991. On every form the wife wrote that the preembryos should be returned to her for implantation should the couple separate. The husband usually signed the forms while blank and before the wife completed the disposition language. The 1991 treatment produced twin daughters born in 1992, and two vials of preembryos were frozen for possible later use. In spring 1995, before the couple separated, the wife thawed one vial and had a preembryo implanted without informing the husband. He learned of the procedure from an insurance notice. Relations deteriorated, the wife obtained a protective order against the husband, the couple separated, and the husband filed for divorce. At the time of divorce one vial containing four frozen preembryos remained in storage. The husband moved for a permanent injunction prohibiting the wife from using the preembryos. The Probate and Family Court bifurcated the preembryos issue from the divorce action and held a hearing at which both parties were represented by counsel. The probate judge found the consent form unenforceable because of changed circumstances since 1991 and balanced the parties' interests, granting the husband a permanent injunction. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion. On February 8, 2000, it issued an order affirming the Probate and Family Court judgment, with this opinion to follow.

The plaintiff, a courier, and the defendant entered into an agreement on 12 April 1852. Under its terms, the plaintiff was to serve as the defendant's courier on a tour of the continent of Europe beginning 1 June 1852 for three months at a monthly salary of 10l. The plaintiff agreed to be ready to start on that date, and the defendant promised to employ him on those terms. On 11 May 1852 the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that he had changed his mind, declined the services, and refused any compensation. The plaintiff had remained ready and willing to perform from the time of the agreement. The action was commenced by writ dated 22 May 1852. Between the filing of the suit and 1 June the plaintiff secured employment with Lord Ashburton on terms equally good, though the new engagement was not to begin until 4 July. At the trial before Erle J. during the London sittings in Easter Term, the defendant's counsel contended that no breach could occur before 1 June. The judge left the remaining questions to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, while reserving leave to enter a nonsuit on the timing objection. The defendant then obtained a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit or arrest the judgment. The principal question presented on the motion was whether a contract can be broken before the day fixed for performance arrives when one party has repudiated it in advance.