Also known as:lucrative offices · office of profit
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A public position that generates salary or fees for the holder. The compensation must be tied to the performance of the office's duties and exceed incidental expenses.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Congressional Consent Requirement
Luna Lang, a U.S. diplomat, is offered a paid advisory role by a foreign prince. She accepts the position without first obtaining congressional approval. The acceptance violates the constitutional bar on holding a lucrative office from a foreign source.
Presidential Removal Power
Logan Lane serves as a postmaster earning a government salary. The president removes Lane without Senate consent. The removal is upheld because the position is a lucrative office subject to the president's constitutional authority over executive subordinates.
Frank S. Myers was appointed postmaster at Portland, Oregon, of the first class on July 10, 1917, for a term of four years fixed by statute. On January 3, 1921, President Wilson directed his removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers protested to the department that his removal was illegal and refused to surrender his office. He was, however, ousted and a successor appointed with the consent of the Senate.
He brought suit in the Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against him. The case comes here on appeal.
By act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, it was provided that postmasters of the first, second and third classes should be appointed and might be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term of the office was fixed at four years.
Luke Latham is appointed notary public, a position that pays fees for services rendered. The state refuses to commission him because he declines to declare a belief in God. The requirement is struck down as an invalid religious test for holding a lucrative office.
Torcaso v. Watkins367 U.S. 488 (1961)
The Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution contains Article 37, which states that no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in the State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God.
The Governor of Maryland appointed Torcaso to the office of Notary Public. Torcaso was refused a commission to serve in that capacity because he would not declare his belief in God.
Torcaso brought this action in a Maryland Circuit Court to compel issuance of his commission. He charged that the State’s requirement that he declare this belief violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The Circuit Court rejected these federal constitutional contentions. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing and requires declaration of belief in God as a qualification for office without need for implementing legislation.
The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
Lola Langley, a corporate officer, directs company funds toward independent political advocacy. Challengers argue the spending protects lucrative offices from shareholder oversight. The Court holds that such expenditures are protected speech and do not implicate the officeholder restrictions at issue.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations.
In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie. The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand.
In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million. The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge. To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad. Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address. Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections.
Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections. BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication. An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state.
Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.
What distinguishes a lucrative office from other public positions?
A lucrative office is one that produces salary or fee revenue tied directly to the performance of official duties and exceeding incidental expenses. Positions without such compensation do not qualify under the definition.
Does the Constitution restrict acceptance of a lucrative office from a foreign source?
Yes. Article I Section 9 prohibits any person holding an office of profit or trust under the United States from accepting an office from a foreign state without congressional consent.
How does the term arise in removal-power cases?
Courts have described inferior officers as occupying the great majority of lucrative offices and noted that Congress retains power to regulate their removal.
Can a state impose a religious test for a lucrative office?
No. The Supreme Court has invalidated state requirements that condition appointment to a paid public office on a declaration of religious belief.
558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)
…L. Rev. 341, 393, n. 245 (2009) (hereinafter Teachout); see also U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust . . . shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State”). Professor…
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