Also known as: lower estates · servient estate
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The land burdened by an easement or other servitude. The owner of this estate must allow the beneficiary to exercise the rights conferred by the servitude and may not use the land in ways that unreasonably interfere with those rights.
Lattice Systems holds an easement across land owned by Lorenzo Lugo for a high-pressure gas pipeline. After heavy rains damage the pipeline cover on Lugo's property, Lattice Systems must repair the cover to prevent interference with Lugo's farming. Lugo has no obligation to perform the repairs himself.
Lucia Lopez owns land subject to an easement allowing Lotus Pharmaceuticals to run a utility line along the northern edge. Lopez decides to plant a row of trees in that same strip for shade. The planting does not block access to the line, so Lopez may proceed with the landscaping.
Lola Langley owns the dominant parcel benefited by an access easement across Leonard Lowe's land. Langley begins using the easement to reach a newly acquired adjacent parcel she also owns. Lowe obtains an injunction because the expanded use exceeds the easement's original scope.
On April 1, 1977, plaintiffs Will and Jean Brown purchased land designated as parcel B from the Christensens. Parcel B is adjacent to and north of land designated as parcel A owned by defendants Fred and Hattie Voss. Access to parcel B is from the south by means of a road that crosses several parcels including parcel A. The roadway easement across parcel A arose by express grant to the Christensens to provide access to parcel B. On July 31, 1977, the Browns purchased from the Rylanders the contiguous tract designated as parcel C north of parcel B. Parcel C was not a dominant estate with respect to the easement across parcel A. The Browns plan to build a residence that would straddle the property line between parcels B and C. The Browns began clearing parcels B and C in November 1977. They performed most of the preparation of the land for construction during the following spring and summer. To the existing easement road the Browns connected a new road that they had built across parcels B and C. After traversing parcel B, the new road crosses the line between parcels B and C and then loops back onto parcel B. The Browns have used the road in connection with their construction activities. In February and March of 1978, the Vosses erected a chain link fence along the side of the easement road. The parties stipulated that the fence was located upon the 16-foot-wide easement. Sometime in 1978, the Vosses placed obstructions on the easement road. In March 1979, the Browns sought damages and to enjoin the Vosses from interfering with their use of the easement. The Vosses counterclaimed, seeking damages for trespass and an injunction to stop the Browns from using the easement road to gain access to parcel C. Before trial, the parties agreed to relocate the easement. The trial court's order reflected this agreement by declaring that the plaintiffs have an easement of record. It consists of a strip of land 16 feet in width immediately west of the permanent chainlink fence for ingress and egress from the property of plaintiffs. The trial court denied the injunction requested by the Vosses. It ruled that the easement may be used for ingress to and egress from parcel C as long as the properties are developed and used solely for the purpose of a single family residence. The Vosses appealed from the judgment denying their counterclaim for an injunction to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
View caseLena Lawson owns the servient parcel subject to a recorded restriction limiting the land to residential purposes. She erects a building for selling ice cream and dairy products. The neighboring dominant owners obtain an injunction enforcing the restriction against the commercial activity.
On September 5, 1906, title to a tract of land at Brier Neck in Gloucester was registered in the name of Luce, from whom it soon passed to Shackelford. The tract was bounded northerly by a line through a pond near Thatcher Road, easterly by other land, southerly by the Atlantic Ocean, and westerly by Witham Road. The northerly part including what became lot D was low and marshy, while the southern part rose to a hill and slope suitable for summer residences. In 1907, the land south of Thatcher Road was divided into about a hundred building lots. Between July 8, 1907, and January 23, 1923, almost all these lots were sold by Shackelford with uniform restrictions limiting each to one dwelling house costing at least $2500 and prohibiting outbuildings with privies without consent. On June 15, 1923, the remaining unsold land south of Thatcher Road was conveyed to J. Richard Clark subject to similar restrictions. A revised plan in 1919 divided the northerly marshy land into parcels C, D, and E. On January 23, 1923, Shackelford conveyed these parcels to Robert C. Clark subject to restrictions allowing only one dwelling house per parcel costing at least $2500 unless otherwise approved. On February 18, 1933, Robert C. Clark conveyed the larger part of lot D to defendant Van Dam subject to the restrictions insofar as they remained in force. The defendants erected a large building on lot D for selling ice cream and dairy products and operating as a common victualler. The plaintiffs, each owning a lot south of Thatcher Road with a summer residence, brought suit in Middlesex County seeking an injunction against the defendants for violating the restrictions.
View caseThe owner of the lower estate generally has no duty to repair or maintain the servient land or the improvements used by the easement beneficiary. Joint use of the same improvements creates a duty to share reasonable repair costs between the parties.
The owner of the lower estate may use the land in any manner that does not unreasonably interfere with the beneficiary's enjoyment of the servitude. Uses that substantially impair the granted rights are prohibited.
A properly created and recorded easement runs with the lower estate and binds subsequent owners who take with notice. Later owners cannot unilaterally obstruct or revoke the rights granted by the easement.
The language of the grant fixes the permissible scope of use. Increases in intensity that remain within the stated purpose are normally allowed unless they unreasonably burden the lower estate beyond what the grant contemplates.
…Reed, J.; Petrich, C.J., and Petrie, J., concur Opinion of Reed, J. Defendants, Fred and Hattie Voss, owners of the servient estate, appeal from a judgment that denied their counterclaim for an injunction against Will and Jean Brown, plaintiffs, owners of the dominant estate. Defendants requested the injunction to…