location of the subject matter

In 1985, DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar was captured on assignment in Mexico, taken to a house in Guadalajara, tortured over the course of a two-day interrogation, and murdered. Based in part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials in the United States came to believe that respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, was present at the house and acted to prolong the agent's life, thereby extending the interrogation and torture. In 1990, a federal grand jury in the Central District of California indicted Alvarez for the torture and murder of Camarena-Salazar, and the district court issued a warrant for his arrest. The DEA asked the Mexican government for help in getting Alvarez into the United States, but when requests and negotiations proved fruitless, the DEA approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United States for trial. Petitioner Jose Francisco Sosa participated in the group that abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers. Once in American custody, Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his seizure was outrageous governmental conduct and violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. The district court agreed, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fact of Alvarez's forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal court. The case was tried in 1992 and ended at the close of the government's case when the district court granted Alvarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal. In 1993, after returning to Mexico, Alvarez began the civil action at issue here. He sued Sosa, Mexican citizen and DEA operative Antonio Garate-Bustamante, five unnamed Mexican civilians, the United States, and four DEA agents. Alvarez sought damages from the United States under the FTCA alleging false arrest and from Sosa under the ATS for a violation of the law of nations. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the FTCA claim but awarded summary judgment and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ATS judgment but reversed the dismissal of the FTCA claim. A divided en banc court reached the same conclusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the companion cases to clarify the scope of both the FTCA and the ATS.

Offshore Rental Company is a California corporation with its principal place of business in California. It derives its revenues in large part from leasing oil drilling equipment in Louisiana's Gulf Coast area. Continental Oil Company is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York. It does business in California, Louisiana, and other states. In November 1967, Offshore opened an office in Houston, Texas, to establish a base closer to the Gulf Coast. In June 1968, Offshore's vice-president Howard C. Kaylor traveled from that office to Louisiana to confer with Continental's representatives. During that trip, Continental negligently injured Kaylor on its premises in Louisiana. At the time, Kaylor was responsible for obtaining contracts for Offshore's increased business in Louisiana. Continental compensated Kaylor for his injuries. Offshore then filed suit in California seeking $5 million in damages for the loss of Kaylor's services. In a bifurcated trial on choice of law, the trial court found that all significant contacts were in Louisiana except for Offshore's California residency. The court determined that Louisiana law governed whether a corporation could maintain an action for damages from personal injuries to its employee. Finding that Louisiana law barred the action, the court entered judgment for Continental. Offshore appealed from the judgment.

Delaware initiated this original action against New York in 1988 after New York escheated substantial sums from unclaimed securities distributions held by intermediaries. The Supreme Court granted Delaware leave to file its complaint and appointed a Special Master to oversee the proceedings. Texas subsequently moved to intervene as a plaintiff, and all remaining states along with the District of Columbia sought leave to participate as intervenors. The property in dispute consists of unclaimed dividends, interest, and other distributions on securities that intermediaries such as banks, brokers, and depositories hold in their own names as record owners for beneficial owners who cannot be identified or located. These street name arrangements allow for efficient book-entry transfers and customized financial services, with most New York Stock Exchange equity securities immobilized in depositories. Between 1985 and 1989, New York took custody of $360 million in such funds from intermediaries doing business within the state, applying its abandoned property law without regard to the beneficial owners' last known addresses or the intermediaries' states of incorporation. On January 28, 1992, the Master filed his report and recommendation. Delaware and New York both filed exceptions to portions of the report, as did several other parties whose intervention motions remained pending at that time. The Master’s report concludes, first, that the issuer of securities is the relevant “debtor” and, second, that the State in which the debtor’s “principal executive offices” are located should be considered the debtor’s State. The procedural history includes the Court's grant of intervention to Texas in 1989 and the subsequent filing of exceptions by multiple states after the Master's report. All pending motions to intervene were ultimately granted by the Court in conjunction with its resolution of the exceptions.

Ralph Hague, a Wisconsin resident who had been employed in Red Wing, Minnesota, for the fifteen years preceding his death, died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck from behind by an automobile. The accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin, immediately across the Minnesota border from Red Wing. The operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents, as was the decedent, who resided with respondent in Hager City, Wisconsin. Mr. Hague held a policy issued by petitioner Allstate Insurance Co. covering three automobiles owned by him. The policy contained an uninsured motorist clause insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists. The uninsured motorist coverage was limited to $15,000 for each automobile. After the accident, respondent moved to Red Wing, Minnesota. She subsequently married a Minnesota resident and established residence with her new husband in Savage, Minnesota. At approximately the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed respondent personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate. Following her appointment, she brought this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband’s three automobiles could be stacked to provide total coverage of $45,000. Allstate defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law. Allstate pointed out that the insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident. The Minnesota District Court interpreted Wisconsin law to disallow stacking. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Minnesota’s choice-of-law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. The court refused to apply Wisconsin law as inimical to the public policy of Minnesota and granted summary judgment for respondent. The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court. The court interpreted Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking and applied Minnesota law after analyzing the Minnesota contacts and interests within the analytical framework developed by Professor Leflar. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars the Minnesota Supreme Court’s choice of substantive Minnesota law.