An asset or interest subject to seizure in satisfaction of a judgment through execution.
See Our Sources
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Limited Partnership Judgment Execution
Sylvia obtained a judgment against Apex Auto Parts, L.P. for injuries from a warehouse accident. Dennis, the sole general partner, held a collection of classic cars. Sylvia petitioned the court to authorize a levy on those cars after noting the partnership's encumbered assets. The court evaluated whether Dennis's personal property qualified as leviable under the statutory prerequisites.
General Partnership Asset Reach
Leah secured a defamation judgment against Brock individually. The studio used by Ash Channel stood in the partnership name. Leah sought to execute directly against the studio to satisfy her claim. The court assessed whether the studio counted as leviable property belonging to Brock personally.
A creditor held an unsatisfied judgment against a limited partnership. Partnership inventory proved encumbered and of uncertain value. The creditor asked the court to permit execution against a general partner's personal holdings. The court considered whether the facts supported treating the partner's assets as leviable.
Equitable Grounds for Execution
A partnership judgment creditor faced minimal partnership assets after discovery. The creditor moved for permission to reach a partner's separate property. The partner opposed on grounds that no writ had yet been returned unsatisfied. The court weighed whether equitable considerations rendered the partner's assets leviable.
Commercial Speech Regulation Challenge
Union Entertainment challenged federal grant conditions tied to age-restriction laws. The company argued the conditions exceeded congressional authority. The court examined whether the regulatory scheme imposed burdens that functioned as leviable exactions. Resolution turned on the distinction between valid conditions and improper penalties.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980)
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands.
Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977.
The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
A state sought to collect taxes from an out-of-state corporation. The corporation contested the forum's power to reach its assets. The court analyzed whether the corporation's contacts rendered its property leviable within the jurisdiction. The outcome depended on minimum contacts sufficient to support execution.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
International Shoe Co. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. The company manufactured and sold shoes and other footwear. During the years 1937 to 1940 the company employed eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington and whose principal activities were confined to that state. These salesmen were compensated by commissions totaling more than $31,000 each year.
The salesmen displayed samples to prospective purchasers. On occasion they rented permanent sample rooms in business buildings or rented rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals was reimbursed by the company. The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection. When accepted the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f. o. b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state.
Washington state maintained a comprehensive unemployment compensation scheme. The costs of the scheme are defrayed by contributions required to be made by employers to a state unemployment compensation fund. The contributions are a specified percentage of the wages payable annually by each employer for his employees' services in the state. The assessment and collection of the contributions and the fund are administered by appellees.
For the years in question notice of assessment for delinquent contributions was personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant in the State of Washington. A copy of the notice was mailed by registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis, Missouri. Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment and moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the service upon appellant's salesman was not proper service upon appellant. Appellant also asserted that it was not doing business within the state and that it is not an employer and does not furnish employment within the meaning of the statute.
The motion was heard on evidence and a stipulation of facts by the appeal tribunal which denied the motion and ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner. Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. The company appealed to the United States Supreme Court under section 237(a) of the Judicial Code. The facts found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the state courts showed that the company had no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.
When may a judgment creditor reach a general partner's personal assets for a limited partnership debt?
A judgment creditor may reach a general partner's personal assets only after obtaining a judgment against the partner and satisfying one of the statutory conditions, such as an unsatisfied writ against the partnership, bankruptcy, partner agreement, court permission based on insufficient assets, or independent liability.
Supporting sources
Does a judgment against a partnership alone permit levy on a partner's separate property?
No. A judgment against the partnership is not by itself a judgment against a partner, and a judgment against the partnership may not be satisfied from a partner's assets unless there is also a judgment against the partner.
Supporting sources
What findings allow a court to authorize levy on partner assets without first exhausting partnership property?
A court may authorize levy when partnership assets are clearly insufficient, exhaustion would be excessively burdensome, or equitable considerations support immediate recourse to personal assets.
Supporting sources
Can a conditional fee interest in real property be reached by the holder's creditors?
Yes. A holder of a fee simple subject to a condition has a present transferable estate that creditors may reach through levy while the condition remains unsatisfied.
Supporting sources
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
…Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment. See Levy, Legacy of Suppression (1960), at 258 et seq.; Smith, Freedom's Fetters (1956), at 426, 431, and passim. That statute made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison,…