Also known as: legally sufficient provocations · adequate provocation · sufficient provocation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of provocation recognized at common law as sufficient to arouse sudden and intense passion in an ordinary person. The category reduces an intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter when the defendant actually became provoked, a reasonable person would not have cooled off, and the defendant in fact did not cool off.
Lars Lindstrom saw his brother struck repeatedly by a neighbor during an argument. Lars immediately seized a nearby tool and struck the neighbor fatally. The serious battery on a close relative supplied the recognized category of provocation that satisfied the first element of the defense.
Latoya Lane returned home early and found her spouse in bed with another person. She seized a nearby object and killed the intruder on the spot. The discovery placed the killing within the recognized category that mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Lillian Locke was slapped and shoved by a coworker during a workplace dispute. She grabbed a nearby letter opener and struck back fatally before any interval passed. The serious battery met the category of provocation that can reduce the offense.
Luis Lopez learned of his spouse's infidelity through direct observation at a party. He struck the other person fatally within moments. The facts triggered the category because an ordinary person would experience sudden intense passion from the same events.
Levi Lowe faced an advancing coworker who brandished a knife after an argument. Levi responded with a fatal blow from a nearby object. The threat of deadly force placed the incident within the category courts most frequently recognize as adequate.
Lena Lawson discovered her spouse's affair and left the scene. Hours later she returned and killed the other person after receiving additional messages. The passage of time removed the incident from the recognized category because passion had cooled.
The appellant was convicted by a jury on two counts of an indictment charging him with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). He was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. Count One charged that Austin, by force and violence and by intimidation, took from the person and presence of a bank teller approximately $10,000.00. Count Two charged that in committing the offense he assaulted the teller and put her in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit, a pistol. The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the lesser offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is included in the offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), so that a defendant may not be convicted and punished for both. The statute defines the basic robbery offense in subsection (a) and provides an enhanced penalty in subsection (d) for committing any offense defined in subsections (a), (b), and (c) by assaulting a person or putting a life in jeopardy with a dangerous weapon or device. The Government argued that the two counts state separate and distinct offenses for which the defendant may be convicted and punished. It relied on the principle that a single transaction may give rise to a violation of more than one statute as in Blockburger v. United States and Gore v. United States. The court noted that the question is one of legislative intent. The court cited Prince v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be validly sentenced on both a count charging entry into a bank with intent to rob and a count charging robbery. The Government sought to distinguish Prince on the ground that the two offenses there involved were proscribed by separate subsections of the statute, while here both offenses are embraced within a single subsection, namely (d). The court rejected this distinction. The plain meaning of the language in (d) is that the use of a dangerous weapon must occur in the course of the commission of one of the offenses defined in the earlier subsections. Subsection (d) does not define a separate and distinct offense but provides for an increased penalty. This interpretation was confirmed by the legislative history of the statute. The original bank robbery statute was enacted in 1934. It contained what is now subsection (a) and a subsection (b) which is now (d). House reports from 1934 and 1935 treated the use of a dangerous weapon as an aggravation of the offense of taking by force and violence or by intimidation. The statute was amended in 1948 to its present form. The Reviser's Note stated that the section consolidates the earlier statutes without change of substance. The court concluded that Congress at no time intended to provide for cumulative penalties for the single offense of bank robbery. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to vacate the conviction and sentence on Count One of the indictment.
Certain situations qualify, including a serious battery on the defendant or a close relative and catching one's spouse in the act of adultery. Courts also recognize a threat of deadly force. Mere words, trivial battery, and past wrongs do not qualify.
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…Assault with intent to murder by a white person was punishable by a prison term of from 2 to 10 years. Div. 4, § 4258. While sufficient provocation could reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter, the code provided that "[o]bedience and submission being the duty of a slave, much greater provocation is necessary to reduce a homicide of…
…of passion—whether produced by rage, resentment, anger, terror or fear—is reduced from murder to manslaughter only if there was adequate provocation, such as might naturally induce a reasonable man in the passion of the moment to lose self-control and commit the act on impulse and without reflection. See Bishop v. United States , 71…
…manslaughter, which was initially restricted to cases of “chance medley,” came to include homicides where the existence of adequate provocation rebutted the inference of malice. 3 id. , at 46-73. The growth of the law continued in this country, where there was rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death…
…to that paragraph, it is an element of manslaughter that the defendant injured the deceased in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation, and the Government must prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. Taken literally, this has the ludicrous result that a jury which finds the evidence in balance on the question of
The provocation must be of a type that would cause an ordinary person to experience sudden and intense passion sufficient to overwhelm self-control. The defendant must also have actually become provoked. Both the objective and subjective elements must be satisfied.
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Yes. The killing must occur before a reasonable person would have cooled off, and the defendant must in fact not have cooled off. Time spent completing other tasks or traveling can demonstrate cooling even if the original provocation was adequate.
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No. Mere words alone remain categorically inadequate regardless of how insulting they are. A serious battery or discovery of adultery must accompany or replace the words to satisfy the category.
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Yes. A serious battery inflicted on a close relative satisfies the recognized category. The fact that the battery was not directed at the defendant personally does not remove it from the category.
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