leave of court

Getty Oil Co. and Pennzoil Co. negotiated an agreement under which Pennzoil was to purchase about three-sevenths of Getty's outstanding shares for $110 a share. Appellee Texaco Inc. eventually purchased the shares for $128 a share. On February 8, 1984, Pennzoil filed a complaint against Texaco in the Harris County District Court, a state court located in Houston, Texas, the site of Pennzoil's corporate headquarters. The complaint alleged that Texaco tortiously had induced Getty to breach a contract to sell its shares to Pennzoil. Pennzoil sought actual damages of $7.53 billion and punitive damages in the same amount. On November 19, 1985, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Pennzoil, finding actual damages of $7.53 billion and punitive damages of $3 billion. The parties anticipated that the judgment, including prejudgment interest, would exceed $11 billion. By recording an abstract of a judgment in the real property records of any of the 254 counties in Texas, a judgment creditor can secure a lien on all of a judgment debtor's real property located in that county. If a judgment creditor wishes to have the judgment enforced by state officials so that it can take possession of any of the debtor's assets, it may secure a writ of execution from the clerk of the court that issued the judgment. Such a writ usually can be obtained after the expiration of thirty days from the time a final judgment is signed unless the judgment debtor files a good and sufficient supersedeas bond in at least the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs. Even before the trial court entered judgment, the jury's verdict cast a serious cloud on Texaco's financial situation. The amount of the bond required would have been more than $13 billion. Texaco would not have been able to post such a bond. The business and financial community concluded that Pennzoil would be able to commence enforcement of any judgment before Texaco's appeals had been resolved. The effects on Texaco were substantial: the price of its stock dropped markedly; it had difficulty obtaining credit; the rating of its bonds was lowered; and its trade creditors refused to sell it crude oil on customary terms. On December 10, 1985, before the Texas court entered judgment, Texaco filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in White Plains, New York, the site of Texaco's corporate headquarters. Texaco alleged that the Texas proceedings violated rights secured to Texaco by the Constitution and various federal statutes. It asked the District Court to enjoin Pennzoil from taking any action to enforce the judgment. The District Court rejected Pennzoil's arguments under the Anti-Injunction Act, Younger abstention, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It found that Texaco had shown a likelihood of success on its constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the due process and equal protection claims were within the District Court's jurisdiction, that Texaco had stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that abstention was unwarranted. Later that same day the Texas trial court entered judgment against Texaco for $11,120,976,110.83. On February 12, 1987, the Texas Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the judgment but remitted $2 billion of the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) and considered the case.

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address the long-standing problem of racial discrimination in voting that had persisted in parts of the country for nearly a century. Prior civil rights acts from 1957, 1960, and 1964 had proven largely ineffective because case-by-case litigation was slow, expensive, and inadequate to overcome widespread and persistent discrimination. South Carolina filed an original bill of complaint in the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that selected provisions of the Act were invalid and an injunction against enforcement by the Attorney General. The case proceeded on original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, after the Court dispensed with a special master and expedited the hearing due to South Carolina's desire for a ruling before its June 1966 primary elections. The Act's coverage formula applied to any state or political subdivision that maintained a test or device on November 1, 1964, and where less than 50 percent of voting-age residents were registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election. South Carolina was brought within the formula on August 7, 1965, along with Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, twenty-six counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona. The challenged provisions included the suspension of literacy tests and similar devices under section 4(a), the preclearance requirement for new voting rules under section 5, and the authorization for the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners under section 6(b). South Carolina had altered its voting laws in 1965 to extend polling hours from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. but had not submitted the change for federal review. The Court invited all states to participate as amici curiae, several of which submitted briefs or argued orally.

In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against him carried a potential life sentence. Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 bond. In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other crimes by information without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. At the time respondents were arrested, a Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. The Florida courts had held that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. They had also held that habeas corpus could not be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to test the probable cause for detention under an information. The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 days. Arraignment was often delayed a month or more after arrest, as the District Court found. Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials in the Federal District Court claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Respondents Turner and Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently intervened. Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for Dade County, was one of several defendants. After an initial delay while the Florida Legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court granted the relief sought. The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) and ordered the Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for further detention. It also ordered them to submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted by information. The defendants submitted a plan prepared by Sheriff E. Wilson Purdy and the District Court adopted it with modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a first appearance hearing. The magistrate would explain the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If either requested more time, the magistrate would set the date for a preliminary hearing. The hearing was to be held within four days if the accused was in custody and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the District Court's order pending appeal. While the case was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. Under the amended rules every arrested person must be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. This first appearance is similar to the first appearance hearing ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause. The rule amendments also changed the procedure for preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to persons charged by information or indictment. In a supplemental opinion the District Court held that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without a judicial determination of probable cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable as long as it was provided to all defendants in custody pending trial. State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.