Also known as:owners of land · landowners · land owner · landowner · real property owner
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Persons holding legal title to real property who possess protected interests in its use and development. These interests include vested rights to complete projects after substantial good-faith expenditures made in reliance on existing permits or zoning. Regulations that eliminate all economically beneficial use trigger per se takings liability unless the prohibited activity was already barred by background nuisance principles.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Vested Rights After Permit Reliance
Levi Lowe secured a valid building permit for a warehouse on his parcel and spent over $750,000 installing foundations and utilities before the city rezoned the area. When the city revoked the permit, Lowe invoked his vested right to finish the project. The court protected the development because the expenditures were made in good-faith reliance on the prior zoning.
Total Regulatory Taking Claim
Lila Lin purchased coastal acreage zoned for residential construction. A new state regulation barred all building because of erosion risks, leaving the parcel with no economically viable use. Lin sued, asserting a per se taking. The court required compensation because the restriction eliminated all productive value without a background nuisance justification.
Landon Long owned a single lot surrounded by single-family homes. The city rezoned only his parcel for commercial use at the request of a neighboring retailer. Luke Latham, an adjacent homeowner, sued to invalidate the change. The court struck down the rezoning as spot zoning inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and lacking a legitimate public purpose.
Coming to the Nuisance Defense
Luis Lopez bought rural land next to an existing cattle feedlot operated by Legacy Motors. After Lopez built homes on the parcel, odors and flies from the feedlot prompted a nuisance suit. The court denied injunctive relief because Lopez knowingly purchased land near the established agricultural operation.
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
In 1956, Spur’s predecessors in interest developed feedlots about ½ mile south of Olive Avenue in an area between the confluence of the usually dry Agua Fria and New Rivers, some 14 to 15 miles west of the urban area of Phoenix. By April and May of 1959, the Northside Hay Mill was feeding between 6,000 and 7,000 head of cattle and Welborn approximately 1,500 head on a combined area of 35 acres. In 1960, Spur purchased the property and expanded the feedlot operation from approximately thirty-five acres to one hundred fourteen acres by 1962, eventually maintaining between twenty thousand and thirty thousand head of cattle at the time of trial.
Del E. Webb Development Co. began planning Sun City, a retirement community, in May 1959 after purchasing twenty thousand acres of farmland for fifteen million dollars. Construction of a golf course started that September. Homes were first offered in January 1960. The first residents moved in during 1960. By the time of trial, Sun City had a population of approximately fourteen thousand people, and the development had extended south to within five hundred feet of Spur's feedlot north of Olive Avenue.
Residents of Sun City began complaining about odors and flies from the feedlot, which produced over a million pounds of wet manure per day, and Webb encountered sales resistance starting around 1963 in the southwestern portion of the development. Webb attempted to buy the feedlot from Spur but the parties could not agree on a price. Webb then filed suit alleging that the feedlot was a public nuisance because flies and odors drifted over the southern portion of Sun City, rendering in excess of one thousand three hundred lots unfit for residential development.
The trial court, after proceedings that included an advisory jury later discharged and special actions in the Arizona Supreme Court, found the feedlot to be a nuisance, permanently enjoined its operation, and awarded damages to Webb. Spur appealed from the injunction and the damages award, while Webb cross-appealed from the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees. During the appeal process, Spur agreed to and did shut down its operation without prejudice to the final determination.
Lillian Locke purchased rural acreage and obtained permits for agricultural structures. After substantial good-faith expenditures on foundations, the county revoked the permits under new zoning rules. Locke sued to protect her vested right to complete the project. The court upheld the right because the expenditures were made in reliance on the prior permits.
Ault v. International Harvester Co.528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974)
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries on November 8, 1964, when the Scout vehicle in which he was a passenger plunged 500 feet down Nine Mile Canyon Road near Mojave, California. The road was dry and twenty feet wide, and the vehicle had been traveling at only ten to fifteen miles per hour. The owner and driver had previously traversed the same road in the Scout without incident. Both the driver and plaintiff suffered retrograde amnesia following the accident and could not testify about its circumstances.
Following the accident, it was discovered that the gear box of the Scout had broken. Plaintiff contended that the break occurred on the highway due to metal fatigue in the aluminum 380 material from which the gear box was manufactured, causing the vehicle to go out of control. Defendant asserted that the gear box broke upon impact as the vehicle fell into the canyon and that the accident resulted from driver negligence or collapse of the roadway.
At trial, plaintiff presented expert testimony that aluminum 380 was unsuitable for the gear box, that malleable iron was a stronger material, and that defendant had changed to malleable iron in manufacturing the gear box three years after the accident in 1967. Experts also testified regarding two other accidents involving similar failures of aluminum 380 gear boxes in Scout vehicles. The jury returned a verdict awarding plaintiff $700,000.
Defendant appealed the judgment, challenging the trial court's admission of evidence regarding the post-accident change in materials, testimony about other accidents, refusal to admit a superseded complaint from a prior trial between the parties, and denial of a motion for mistrial related to hearsay testimony read from the prior proceeding. The matter came before the California Supreme Court on this appeal.
Lakeshore Industries owned waterfront property left with no economically beneficial use after a new state regulation barred all development to protect coastal resources. The owner sued, claiming a per se taking. The court awarded compensation because the restriction eliminated all productive value without a background nuisance justification.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker554 U.S. 471 (2008)
In March 1989 the Exxon Valdez supertanker grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, releasing millions of gallons of crude oil.
Exxon Shipping Company, the vessel's owner and now known as SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., together with its parent Exxon Mobil Corporation, confronted widespread liability from the spill. The company settled a class action brought by more than 32,000 commercial fishermen, Native Americans, landowners, and others for $2.5 billion in compensatory damages. Exxon also pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Refuse Act, paying $150 million in criminal fines, and spent an additional $2.1 billion on cleanup.
Respondents, other persons whose businesses and livelihoods were disrupted by the spill, filed this civil action seeking punitive damages. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs into three classes and conducted a three-phase trial. In the first phase the jury found Exxon Shipping Company and Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the ship's master, reckless and therefore potentially liable for punitive damages. In the second phase the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon.
The District Court later reduced the punitive award to $2.5 billion. On appeal the Ninth Circuit reinstated the jury's original $5 billion punitive damages award. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the $2.5 billion punitive damages award was excessive under maritime law.
What expenditures suffice to create a vested right for a landowner?
Substantial good-faith expenditures or other changes in position made in reliance on a valid permit or existing zoning create the right. Jurisdictions differ on whether substantial construction is required or whether a balancing test applies.
When does a regulation become a per se taking for a landowner?
A regulation that deprives the owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of the land constitutes a per se taking. Compensation is required unless the proscribed use was already prohibited by background nuisance or property principles at acquisition.
How does spot zoning affect a landowner's rezoning request?
Rezoning that benefits only a single parcel or small area in a manner inconsistent with the comprehensive plan may be invalid. The change must serve a legitimate public purpose rather than primarily private interests of the particular owner.
328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946)
…States concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air navigation. It also argues that the landowner…