Also known as: justiciability · justiciable · justiciability doctrines · case or controversy · justiciable controversy
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional limitation on federal judicial power requiring that disputes present an actual case or controversy capable of resolution through the judicial process. The doctrine encompasses requirements such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and the prohibition on political questions to confine courts to their proper role under Article III.
Justin Jarvis, a voter in a state legislative district, sued state officials alleging that the district lines diluted his vote in violation of equal protection. The district court dismissed the suit as a nonjusticiable political question. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for adjudication on the merits.
Jacobs Shipping sued a competitor in federal court on a federal antitrust claim arising from a disputed shipping contract. It added a state-law breach-of-contract count against an additional supplier based on the same transaction. The district court exercised jurisdiction over the state claim because it formed part of the same constitutional case.
Jiang Textiles filed a federal copyright-infringement action against a rival that copied its fabric designs. It appended a state unfair-competition claim arising from the identical copying. The court retained the state claim because it shared a common nucleus of operative facts with the federal claim.
Jeanette Jensen sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a city ordinance that had never been enforced against her or anyone else. The city had routinely permitted the conduct the ordinance nominally prohibited. The court dismissed the action for lack of a live case or controversy.
Jonathan Jaffe, a federal taxpayer, challenged a congressional appropriation that funded religious schools. He alleged the expenditure violated the Establishment Clause. The court permitted the suit because the plaintiff demonstrated a sufficient nexus between his taxpayer status and the constitutional claim.
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseJennings Forge purchased coastal property subject to a new state environmental restriction that barred all development. It sued claiming a total taking before applying for any variance or permit. The court dismissed the action because the owner had not obtained a final decision on permitted uses.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseThe doctrine requires an actual case or controversy under Article III. It includes standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political-question doctrine to ensure disputes are suitable for judicial resolution rather than advisory opinions.
A challenge fails when the statute has never been enforced and no realistic threat of enforcement exists. Courts refuse to issue advisory opinions on dormant laws that present only hypothetical disputes.
Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) extends to claims forming part of the same Article III case or controversy as a claim within the court's original jurisdiction. The claims must share a common nucleus of operative facts.
…therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot. B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's litigation as a…