Also known as: jury instruction · jury charge · jury charges · instructions to the jury
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Directions given by a judge to a jury explaining the legal rules the jury must apply when deciding the facts of a case. The instructions frame the elements of claims or defenses and guide the jury on burdens of proof and permissible inferences.
After both sides rested in a contract dispute, Joanna Jung submitted written requests to the court specifying how the jury should be told to evaluate breach and damages. The court considered the requests before charging the jury. Jung's filing preserved her objections to the final instructions delivered.
In a maritime pollution suit, the judge instructed the jury on factors for setting punitive damages, including the defendant's financial condition and the need for deterrence. The charge limited the award to an amount that would not bankrupt the company. The jury returned a reduced punitive figure after applying the guidance.
In March 1989 the Exxon Valdez supertanker grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, releasing millions of gallons of crude oil. Exxon Shipping Company, the vessel's owner and now known as SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., together with its parent Exxon Mobil Corporation, confronted widespread liability from the spill. The company settled a class action brought by more than 32,000 commercial fishermen, Native Americans, landowners, and others for $2.5 billion in compensatory damages. Exxon also pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Refuse Act, paying $150 million in criminal fines, and spent an additional $2.1 billion on cleanup. Respondents, other persons whose businesses and livelihoods were disrupted by the spill, filed this civil action seeking punitive damages. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs into three classes and conducted a three-phase trial. In the first phase the jury found Exxon Shipping Company and Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the ship's master, reckless and therefore potentially liable for punitive damages. In the second phase the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon. The District Court later reduced the punitive award to $2.5 billion. On appeal the Ninth Circuit reinstated the jury's original $5 billion punitive damages award. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the $2.5 billion punitive damages award was excessive under maritime law.
View caseDuring a murder trial, the court told the jury it could consider withheld exculpatory statements when weighing the defendant's guilt. The instruction emphasized that the prosecution bore the burden on every element. The jury acquitted after evaluating the material under the charge.
Brady and his companion Boblit were found guilty of murder in the first degree and were sentenced to death following separate trials in Maryland, with Brady tried first. At his trial Brady took the stand and admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that Boblit did the actual killing. Prior to the trial Brady's counsel requested the prosecution to allow him to examine Boblit's extrajudicial statements. Several of those statements were shown to him. One statement dated July 9, 1958, in which Boblit admitted the actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to Brady's notice until after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced and after his conviction had been affirmed. Brady moved the trial court for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence that had been suppressed by the prosecution. His appeal from a denial of that motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeals without prejudice to relief under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. The petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal the Court of Appeals held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecution denied petitioner due process of law and remanded the case for a retrial of the question of punishment, not the question of guilt. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case. The crime was murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery. In Maryland punishment for that crime is life imprisonment or death, the jury being empowered to restrict the punishment to life by addition of the words "without capital punishment." By reason of the state constitution the jury in a criminal case are the judges of law as well as of fact.
View caseIn a joint robbery prosecution, the judge instructed the jury that one defendant's confession could not be used against the other. The charge directed separate consideration of each defendant's evidence. The jury convicted only the confessing defendant.
In June 1966, petitioner George William Bruton and codefendant Evans were jointly tried before a jury in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They faced a federal charge of armed postal robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2114. A postal inspector testified that during two interrogations at the St. Louis city jail on April 11 and May 4, 1966, Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton had committed the robbery and that Evans had an accomplice whom he would not name. The interrogations followed an April 8 confession Evans gave to local police officers without warnings while held on state charges. Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction on the ground that his oral confessions should not have been received in evidence against him. However, the court affirmed Bruton’s conviction because the trial judge had instructed the jury that Evans’ confession was competent evidence only against Evans and inadmissible hearsay against Bruton. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The trial had begun one week after Miranda v. Arizona, and the Court of Appeals applied that decision to hold the confessions tainted. On retrial Evans was acquitted. The Solicitor General later submitted a memorandum stating that in light of the record the judgment as to Bruton should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
View caseAt a firearms possession trial, the court instructed the jury on the constitutional limits of the charged statute. The charge required the jury to determine whether the defendant's conduct fell within protected activity. The jury acquitted after applying the legal framework.
In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio. That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district. The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop. As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith. In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership. Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda. The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute. Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications. From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties. The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair. The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants. A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges. At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives. The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation. The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed. The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected. The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
View caseAfter a conviction, the appellate court examined whether an erroneous jury instruction on witness credibility affected the outcome. The charge had misstated the reasonable-doubt standard. The court found the error harmless because other instructions and evidence supported the verdict.
In 1939 and 1940, petitioners Kotteakos, Lekacos, Regenbogen and other defendants obtained loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration by submitting applications through Simon Brown, president of the Brownie Lumber Company, that contained false statements about the purpose of the loans, property ownership, purchase prices, and financial details. Brown prepared the applications, received the loan proceeds from lending institutions, paid the sellers, and divided the difference with the defendants who had procured each application. Each petitioner or small group of defendants dealt exclusively with Brown on distinct transactions and had no knowledge of or connection to the activities of any other group. The indictment named thirty-two defendants and charged them with one conspiracy to defraud the United States by making false statements and representations to the Federal Housing Administration for the purpose of obtaining credit. Nineteen defendants were brought to trial, and the jury acquitted seven, disagreed as to four, and convicted the remaining twelve petitioners. The Government's evidence established at least eight separate and independent groups of defendants, each acting independently with Brown as the sole common link and without any agreement or communication among the groups. Brown pleaded guilty and testified at trial. No evidence showed that any defendant knew of or participated in the transactions of defendants outside his own group. The trial court instructed the jury that the indictment charged a single conspiracy, that the jury must find each defendant was a member of that conspiracy to convict, and that the acts or statements of any conspirator could be considered against all defendants once membership was established. The court did not instruct the jury that it could convict only upon finding the single conspiracy charged or that it must keep evidence of separate transactions separate. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, recognizing that the proof showed multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged but concluding that the variance and instructional error were not prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.
View caseThe court determines the legal standard stated in jury instructions. The judge decides questions of law such as the existence of a duty or the elements of a claim and then frames those rules for the jury. The jury applies the standard supplied by the court to the facts it finds.
A party may file written requests for jury instructions at the close of the evidence or at any earlier reasonable time ordered by the court. Requests on issues that could not reasonably have been anticipated may be filed after the close of the evidence.
Jury instructions that create a mandatory presumption on an element of an offense violate due process. Such instructions shift the burden of proof to the defendant and relieve the prosecution of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
A court need not always give a specific instruction on the presumption of innocence. Whether the instruction is required depends on the totality of the circumstances, including other instructions, counsel's arguments, and the strength of the evidence.
…abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that that Act related to "the case where a child is killed by a wilful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary…