Also known as: commerce clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional provision granting Congress authority to regulate commerce among the several states. The clause supplies the basis for both affirmative federal legislation and limits on state measures that discriminate against out-of-state interests.
Iris Irons operates a bait shop near the border and attempts to import live minnows from a neighboring state. State officials seize the shipment under a new statute that bars all out-of-state baitfish to protect local fish populations from parasites. Iris sues, claiming the ban burdens interstate commerce. The court upholds the statute because the measure advances a legitimate ecological interest and no nondiscriminatory alternative exists.
Island Manufacturing ships hazardous waste generated in its out-of-state plant to a disposal site in State B. State B charges Island a surcharge twice as high as the fee imposed on in-state generators. Island challenges the differential. The court strikes down the surcharge as presumptively invalid discrimination based on origin.
Inertia Dynamics contracts with a private hauler to take its factory waste to an out-of-state facility. State C enacts an ordinance directing all waste to a newly created public processing plant. Inertia sues, alleging favoritism toward the public facility. The court applies lenient review and upholds the ordinance because the preference serves a traditional government function rather than economic protectionism.
Ibrahim Iqbal works for a state-run printing plant that sells products across state lines. Congress extends minimum-wage and overtime rules to state employers. State officials challenge the extension as beyond federal power. The court sustains the statute, holding that states receive protection through the political process rather than judicial limits on commerce power.
Infinity Bank finances a nuclear-waste facility that receives out-of-state material. State D imposes a congressionally authorized surcharge on the imported waste. A competing in-state generator challenges the fee. The court rejects the challenge because Congress expressly permitted the discrimination.
Idris Ives is prosecuted under a federal statute for possessing a firearm near a school. He moves to dismiss, arguing the statute exceeds Congress's power. The court examines whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce and concludes the statute falls outside the clause's scope.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseCongress may regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
A facially discriminatory state law survives if it serves a legitimate and important non-economic local interest such as protecting ecological resources and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives exist.
Yes. When Congress expressly authorizes states to impose surcharges on out-of-state nuclear waste or similar measures, the authorized discrimination does not violate the dormant commerce clause.
A monetary exaction functions as a tax when it is collected by the IRS with income tax returns, varies with revenue, and is expected to raise substantial revenue regardless of its regulatory label.
…assigning as error that the challenged statutes as applied infringe the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause. The facts as found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the state Superior Court and Supreme Court, are not in dispute. Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place…