Also known as: inter-state commerce
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Trade and other business activities between those located in different states, especially traffic in goods and travel of people between states. For constitutional purposes the phrase encompasses the channels, instrumentalities, and activities that substantially affect commerce among the states.
Ibrahim Iqbal catches live baitfish in State A and sells them to buyers in State B. State A enacts a statute forbidding any export of the fish to keep supplies available only for local anglers. The court invalidates the statute because the prohibition discriminates against interstate commerce by shielding in-state purchasers from out-of-state competition.
Innovate Pharmaceuticals generates solid waste at its State A plant. A local ordinance requires all such waste to be processed at a designated State A facility before any shipment elsewhere. The court strikes down the ordinance because it forces waste to remain inside the state and blocks out-of-state processors from competing for the business.
State A sells timber from state forests to Infinity Bank. The sales contract requires the bank to process the timber inside State A before shipping any boards out of state. The court holds the downstream condition invalid because it reaches beyond the initial sale and discriminates against interstate commerce in later transactions.
State A imposes a surcharge on nuclear waste shipped from out-of-state generators for disposal inside its borders. Congress has enacted a statute expressly permitting such surcharges. The court upholds the surcharge because the federal authorization removes any Dormant Commerce Clause objection.
Interlink Communications, an out-of-state firm, pays a higher gross-receipts tax in State A than local carriers pay. Congress has passed legislation allowing states to impose such discriminatory taxes on interstate carriers. The court sustains the tax because the federal statute removes the usual constitutional barrier.
Ivan Ivanov carries a handgun onto the grounds of a State A high school that sits near an interstate highway. Federal prosecutors charge him under a statute banning firearms in school zones. The court dismisses the charge because the possession is non-economic local conduct that lacks a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Activities qualify when they involve the channels or instrumentalities of commerce or when they substantially affect interstate commerce. Courts aggregate the effects of economic activity to determine whether the substantial-effect test is met. Non-economic local conduct generally falls outside the category unless it is part of a larger regulatory scheme.
…as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as imposing a constitutionally prohibited burden on interstate commerce. The cause comes here on appeal under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a), appellant assigning as error that the challenged statutes as applied infringe the due process…
…terms. It neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. The statute does not, therefore, represent a valid exercise of Congress’ power to “regulate Commerce
…milestones. The authorization to impose surcharges is an exercise of congressional authority to permit States to burden interstate commerce when Congress so chooses. The Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge is a federal levy on
…10b-5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, "(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make…
…Milk Act” of Congress of March 4, 1923 (c. 262, 42 Stat. 1486, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63), which prohibits the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream, transcends the power of Congress to regulate
A state law violates the clause when it treats out-of-state actors or goods less favorably than in-state counterparts without congressional authorization. Export bans, forced in-state processing, and downstream restrictions are classic examples of forbidden protectionism. Congress may expressly permit such discrimination, removing the constitutional objection.
Yes. A well-pleaded complaint that asserts a violation of federal constitutional protections for interstate commerce arises under federal law. The presence of an underlying state toll schedule or administrative rule does not defeat jurisdiction when the claim turns on the federal constitutional limit.
Yes. When Congress expressly permits states to impose discriminatory taxes or surcharges on out-of-state commerce, the Dormant Commerce Clause objection disappears. The state regulation remains subject to any conflicting federal statute on the same subject.