Also known as: interspousal immunities · inter-spousal immunity · spousal immunity · interspousal tort immunity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A common-law doctrine that barred one spouse from bringing a tort action against the other. The doctrine rested on the view that spouses formed a single legal entity and that litigation would disrupt marital harmony or invite collusion.
A common-law doctrine that barred one spouse from bringing a tort action against the other. The doctrine rested on the view that spouses formed a single legal entity and that litigation would disrupt marital harmony or invite collusion.
Wisconsin domiciliaries Isaiah Ishikawa and his wife are injured in a California car accident. She sues him in Wisconsin tort for negligence. California recognizes interspousal immunity while Wisconsin does not. The court applies Wisconsin law as the law of the marital domicile and permits the suit to proceed.
An evidentiary privilege that prevents one spouse from being compelled to give adverse testimony against the other in a criminal proceeding. In federal court the privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse, who may choose to testify or refuse.
Federal prosecutors subpoena Imani Idowu to testify against her husband Idris Ives in an insider-trading trial. Imani states she is willing to appear. Idris moves to quash the subpoena on spousal-immunity grounds. The court overrules the motion because the privilege belongs to Imani alone and she may choose to testify.
An evidentiary privilege that prevents one spouse from being compelled to give adverse testimony against the other in a criminal proceeding. In federal court the privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse, who may choose to testify or refuse.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Haumschild, and her husband were domiciled in Wisconsin at all relevant times. Wisconsin is both the state of the forum and of the domicile while California is the state where the alleged wrong was committed. While the couple was traveling in California, Mrs. Haumschild sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident that was allegedly caused by her husband's negligence. She subsequently commenced an action in Wisconsin circuit court against her husband and Continental Casualty Company, his insurer, seeking damages for those injuries. The defendants asserted that California law barred a wife from suing her husband in tort and therefore precluded recovery. The circuit court rendered judgment against the plaintiff on that ground. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The appeal was argued before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on March 2, 1959. On April 10, 1959, the court reversed the judgment in an opinion authored by Justice Currie, with Justice Fairchild filing a separate concurrence joined by Justice Brown.
View caseAn Oklahoma plaintiff injured in Texas sues her husband in Oklahoma court. Texas law would bar the suit under interspousal immunity. Oklahoma has abolished the doctrine. The court applies Oklahoma law and allows the tort action to continue.
In this personal injury action, plaintiff Marilyn S. White alleged that she was a passenger in a truck driven by defendant Robert W. White. They were traveling south on Interstate 35 near the city of Louisville, Texas, when the defendant lost control of his truck, overturning it and causing injury to her body. The petition alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by negligent acts of the defendant. He failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles properly on the highway. He followed the vehicle in front of him too closely in violation of specific Texas statutes which were pleaded and attached. Robert White drove his vehicle into a space between the divided roadway and failed to keep his vehicle only upon the righthand roadway in violation of another specific Texas statute which was pleaded. He drove his vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances in violation of another specific Texas statute which was also pleaded and attached. The plaintiff pleaded that as a result of said negligent actions she suffered broken bones and other injuries to the body resulting in permanent disability, medical expenses, and lost income with her damages totaling some $200,000.00. The petition further alleged that at the time of the accident the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White were engaged in a joint venture or partnership operating a long-haul truck tractor-trailer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants to help operate the truck. At the time of the accident she was within the scope of her employment. The defendants failed to carry Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, and that she has elected to proceed in the District Court. Attached to the petition and made a part thereof was the Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability Certificate of Insurance. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma certified that Employers Casualty Corporation had issued to Edward White of Fort Cobb, Oklahoma an insurance policy covering the obligations imposed upon the insured by the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle provisions. Employers Casualty Corporation is not a party to this appeal because the cause against it was dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff. In response to the petition the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White filed special demurrers. They demurred to the petition on the grounds that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. In arguing that the demurrers should be sustained both Robert and Edward White argued that the plaintiff Marilyn S. White lacks the capacity to sue because she is the wife of Robert W. White and under the laws of Texas one spouse may not bring a personal injury action against the other. This fact does not appear on the face of the petition. The defendants also argued that in fact the plaintiff was not their employee but was a co-employer. They relied upon facts which do not appear upon the face of the petition. The trial court sustained the demurrers to the petition and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for review.
View caseA California employee injured by her husband's negligent driving sues him for damages. At the time of the accident California still recognized interspousal immunity for negligent torts. The court applies the recently announced abrogation rule and permits the negligence claim to go forward.
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm. Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position. Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983. Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
View case2 common questions
No. The large majority of states have abolished the doctrine for both intentional and negligent torts. A few states retain limited versions, but the trend has been wholesale abrogation.
Many courts treat the issue as one of family-law capacity rather than tort liability. They therefore apply the law of the spouses' marital domicile instead of the place of injury.
In a state prosecution Ira Irving is charged with arson. Prosecutors call his wife Irene Ingalls, who is willing to testify about pre-marriage threats. Ira objects. Because the case is in state court the privilege belongs to the party spouse, so Ira may prevent Irene from testifying even though she wishes to cooperate.
3 common questions
The privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse. That spouse decides whether to testify against the defendant spouse and cannot be compelled to do so. The defendant spouse has no power to block the testimony.
No. The privilege against adverse testimony may be invoked only while a valid marriage exists. Once the marriage is dissolved the privilege disappears, although the separate marital-communications privilege may survive divorce.
Yes. Once a valid marriage exists the privilege may be asserted even as to matters that took place before the marriage.
…for loss of consortium ( Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 389-404); and abrogated the rule of interspousal immunity for negligent torts. ( Klein v. Klein (1962) 58 Cal.2d 692, 697-699 [26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70].) Every one of these landmark decisions required a difficult choice among competing…