Also known as:interest in the subject matter · interests in subject-matter · insurable interest
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in donative transfers
A beneficial ownership stake in property conveyed by gift or will. The stake is typically divided into successive interests such as a life estate held by a named individual or a remainder held by a described class.
2
Sense 1
1
in donative transfers
A beneficial ownership stake in property conveyed by gift or will. The stake is typically divided into successive interests such as a life estate held by a named individual or a remainder held by a described class.
See Our Sources· 2 sources
Restatements
Sense 2
2
in litigation and judicial proceedings
A personal financial or proprietary stake in the property or transaction that forms the basis of a lawsuit or other proceeding. The stake may trigger ethical bars on acquisition by counsel, rights to intervene, or judicial disqualification.
A personal financial or proprietary stake in the property or transaction that forms the basis of a lawsuit or other proceeding. The stake may trigger ethical bars on acquisition by counsel, rights to intervene, or judicial disqualification.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Examples2
Life Interest in Renewal Commissions
Martin’s will left his insurance book of business to his daughter Erin for her lifetime, then to her children. Erin sold the entire book to Apex Insurance Group. After Erin died, her children claimed the post-death renewal commissions. The children held the remainder interest in the subject matter of the gift and therefore owned the commissions generated after Erin’s death.
Remainder Interest in LLC Shares
An entrepreneur’s will left membership interests in SunPeak Solar to his son David and David’s children. At the entrepreneur’s death David had one child, Claire, and later had another. David received a life interest in the membership interests while Claire and her sibling received the remainder interest in the subject matter of the gift.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What distinguishes a life interest from a remainder interest in the subject matter of a gift?
A life interest entitles the named individual to possession or income for the duration of that person’s life. The remainder interest belongs to the class members and becomes possessory only after the life interest ends.
Supporting sources
Examples3
Assignment Retaining No Interest
A plaintiff assigned a contract claim to a third party but retained no continuing stake in the underlying transaction. Because the assignor held no interest in the subject matter after the transfer, the assignment was not collusive and federal diversity jurisdiction remained proper.
Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.394 U.S. 823 (1969)
In May 1959, Caribbean Mills, Inc., a Haitian corporation, entered into a contract with an individual named Kelly and the Panama and Venezuela Finance Company, a Panamanian corporation. The agreement provided that Caribbean would purchase from Panama 125 shares of corporate stock, in return for payment of $85,000 down and an additional $165,000 in 12 annual installments.
No installment payments ever were made, despite requests for payment by Panama. In 1964, Panama assigned its entire interest in the 1959 contract to petitioner Kramer, an attorney in Wichita Falls, Texas. The stated consideration was $1. By a separate agreement dated the same day, Kramer promised to pay back to Panama 95% of any net recovery on the assigned cause of action, solely as a Bonus.
Kramer soon thereafter brought suit against Caribbean for $165,000 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging diversity of citizenship between himself and Caribbean. The District Court denied Caribbean’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a $165,000 verdict in favor of Kramer.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional question.
Minority applicants sought to intervene in a challenge to a law school’s admissions policy. They claimed an interest relating to the admissions process that was the subject of the action. The court evaluated whether that interest in the subject matter satisfied the requirements for intervention of right.
Grutter v. Bollinger188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
Before us are two cases in which proposed defendant-intervenors were denied intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). The actions were brought against the University of Michigan to contest the use of an applicant's race as a factor in determining admission. The appeals come from separate district courts but present similar issues. We have therefore consolidated the two cases for purposes of this opinion.
In Gratz v. Bollinger, the named plaintiffs are two white applicants who were denied admission to the College of Literature, Arts and Science. They allege that the College's admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. The plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief forbidding continuation of the alleged discriminatory admissions process, and admission to the College. The proposed intervenors are 17 African-American and Latino/a individuals who have applied or intend to apply to the University, and the Citizens for Affirmative Action's Preservation (CAAP), a nonprofit organization whose stated mission is to preserve opportunities in higher education for African-American and Latino/a students in Michigan. The district court denied their motion for intervention as of right, holding that the plaintiffs did not have a substantial interest in the litigation and that the University could adequately represent the proposed intervenors' interests. The district court also denied the proposed intervenors' alternative motion for permissive intervention.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the named plaintiff is a white woman challenging the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School. She alleges that the race-conscious admissions policy utilized by the law school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. Grutter seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief forbidding continuation of the alleged discriminatory admissions process, and admission to the law school. The proposed intervenors are 41 students and three pro-affirmative action coalitions. The individual proposed intervenors include 21 undergraduate students of different races who currently attend different undergraduate institutions, all of whom plan to apply to the law school for admission. Five black students who currently attend local high schools also plan to apply to the law school for admission. Twelve students of different races currently attend the law school. A paralegal and a Latino graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin intend to apply to the law school for admission. A black graduate student at the University of Michigan is a member of the Defend Affirmative Action Party. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right on the basis that the intervenors failed to show that their interests would not be adequately represented by the University. The district court also denied the proposed intervenors' alternative motion for permissive intervention.
The plaintiff opposed the motion to intervene, but the defendants, officials of the Law School and the University, did not oppose the motion. The appeals were argued on June 8, 1999, and decided on August 10, 1999.
Designation of Agent for Service
A lease agreement designated an agent to accept service of process on behalf of the lessee. The lessee argued the designation was invalid because the agent had no independent interest in the subject matter of the dispute. The Supreme Court upheld the designation as sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964)
In 1961 Steve and Robert Szukhent, father and son farmers residing in Michigan, obtained two incubators from National Equipment Rental, Ltd. under a lease. National Equipment Rental is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in New York. The lease was a standard printed form less than a page and a half long that contained eighteen numbered paragraphs.
The final numbered paragraph, printed in the same type as the rest of the document and appearing immediately above the Szukhents' signatures, stated that the lessees designated Florence Weinberg, 47-21 Forty-first Street, Long Island City, New York, as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York. The Szukhents had never met, seen, or heard of Florence Weinberg before the lawsuit.
In 1962 National Equipment Rental filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that the Szukhents had failed to make any of the periodic payments required by the lease. The marshal delivered two copies of the summons and complaint to Florence Weinberg. On the same day she mailed the summons and complaint to the Szukhents by certified mail together with a letter stating that the documents had been served upon her as their agent pursuant to the lease. National Equipment Rental also notified the Szukhents of the service by certified mail. The Szukhents moved to quash service. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a lawyer acquire a prohibited interest in the subject matter of litigation?
A lawyer acquires a prohibited interest by obtaining a direct ownership stake in the very property or rights whose title the lawsuit will determine. The prohibition does not apply to ordinary liens or contingent fees measured by a monetary recovery.
Supporting sources
How does an interest in the subject matter support intervention of right under Rule 24(a)?
The applicant must claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, show that disposition may impair the ability to protect that interest, and demonstrate that existing parties do not adequately represent it.
When must a judge recuse because of an interest in the subject matter?
A judge must recuse when the judge, spouse, or minor child has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party, or when any other interest could be substantially affected by the outcome.
Supporting sources
188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
…entitled to intervene as a matter of right: (1) that the motion to intervene was timely; (2) that they have a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) that their ability to protect that interest may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) that the parties already before the court may not adequately represent…