intentional infliction of mental distress

Ronald Galella, a free-lance photographer specializing in the making and sale of photographs of well-known persons, brought suit against three Secret Service agents and Jacqueline Onassis. Defendant Onassis is the widow of the late President John F. Kennedy, mother of the two Kennedy children, John and Caroline, and is the wife of Aristotle Onassis. Galella fancies himself as a "paparazzo" and makes himself as visible to the public and obnoxious to their photographic subjects as possible to aid in the advertisement and wide sale of their works. Some examples of Galella's conduct brought out at trial are illustrative. Galella took pictures of John Kennedy riding his bicycle in Central Park across the way from his home. He jumped out into the boy's path, causing the agents concern for John's safety. The agents' reaction and interrogation of Galella led to Galella's arrest and his action against the agents. Galella on other occasions interrupted Caroline at tennis, and invaded the children's private schools. At one time he came uncomfortably close in a power boat to Mrs. Onassis swimming. He often jumped and postured around while taking pictures of her party notably at a theater opening but also on numerous other occasions. He followed a practice of bribing apartment house, restaurant and nightclub doormen as well as romancing a family servant to keep him advised of the movements of the family. After detention and arrest following complaint by the Secret Service agents protecting Mrs. Onassis' son and his acquittal in the state court, Galella filed suit in state court against the agents and Mrs. Onassis. Mrs. Onassis answered denying any role in the arrest or any part in the claimed interference with his attempts to photograph her and counterclaimed for damages and injunctive relief charging that Galella had invaded her privacy, assaulted and battered her, intentionally inflicted emotional distress and engaged in a campaign of harassment. The action was removed to the United States District Court. On a motion for summary judgment Galella's claim against the Secret Service agents was dismissed. At the same time the government intervened requesting injunctive relief from the activities of Galella which obstructed the Secret Service's ability to protect Mrs. Onassis' children. After a six-week trial the court dismissed Galella's claim and granted relief to both the defendant and the intervenor. Galella was enjoined from keeping the defendant and her children under surveillance or following any of them, approaching within 100 yards of the home of defendant or her children or within 100 yards of either child's school or within 75 yards of either child or 50 yards of defendant, using the name, portrait or picture of defendant or her children for advertising, and attempting to communicate with defendant or her children except through her attorney. Galella appealed from the judgments dismissing his complaints, the grant of injunctive relief to defendant Onassis on her counterclaim and to the intervenor on its intervening complaint, and a third judgment retaxing transcript costs to plaintiff.

Petitioner Curtis, a Black woman, brought this action under Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 claiming that respondents, who are white, had refused to rent an apartment to her because of her race in violation of Section 804(a) of the Act. In her complaint she sought only injunctive relief and punitive damages, though a claim for compensatory damages was later added. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the respondents from renting the apartment to anyone else pending trial on the merits. This injunction was dissolved some five months later with the petitioner's consent after she had obtained other housing, and the case went to trial on the issues of actual and punitive damages. Respondents made a timely demand for jury trial in their answer. The District Court denied the jury request and after trial on the merits found that respondents had discriminated against petitioner on account of her race. The District Court awarded $250 in punitive damages while finding no actual damages and denying petitioner's request for attorney's fees and court costs. The Court of Appeals reversed on the jury trial issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in view of the importance of the jury trial issue in the administration and enforcement of Title VIII.

In 1981, Curtis Campbell was driving with his wife Inez in Cache County, Utah, when he attempted to pass six vans on a two-lane highway. This caused an oncoming driver, Todd Ospital, to swerve onto the shoulder, lose control, and collide with a vehicle driven by Robert G. Slawson and his wife, killing Ospital and permanently disabling Slawson. Campbell's insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, declined settlement offers of the $50,000 policy limit from Slawson and Ospital's estate despite early investigations indicating Campbell's fault and advice from its own adjuster. A jury in the underlying tort actions found Campbell 100 percent at fault and returned a judgment of $185,849 against him. State Farm refused to pay the $135,849 excess over policy limits or post a supersedeas bond. The Campbells then entered an agreement with Slawson and Ospital's estate under which the claimants would not seek satisfaction of the judgment in exchange for the Campbells pursuing a bad-faith action against State Farm, being represented by the claimants' attorneys, and assigning 90 percent of any recovery to them. The Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court bifurcated the case into two phases before separate juries. In phase one the jury found State Farm's refusal to settle unreasonable. In phase two the jury heard evidence that State Farm's decision was part of a nationwide Performance, Planning and Review policy implemented since 1979 to cap payouts and meet corporate profit goals, including testimony from former Utah employees and experts about practices in multiple states over twenty years. The jury awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1 million and the punitive award to $25 million. Both sides appealed. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award after applying the three guideposts from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and relying on the nationwide evidence, State Farm's wealth, and the statistical likelihood of punishment in only one of 50,000 cases. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In March 1989 the Exxon Valdez supertanker grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, releasing millions of gallons of crude oil. Exxon Shipping Company, the vessel's owner and now known as SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., together with its parent Exxon Mobil Corporation, confronted widespread liability from the spill. The company settled a class action brought by more than 32,000 commercial fishermen, Native Americans, landowners, and others for $2.5 billion in compensatory damages. Exxon also pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Refuse Act, paying $150 million in criminal fines, and spent an additional $2.1 billion on cleanup. Respondents, other persons whose businesses and livelihoods were disrupted by the spill, filed this civil action seeking punitive damages. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs into three classes and conducted a three-phase trial. In the first phase the jury found Exxon Shipping Company and Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the ship's master, reckless and therefore potentially liable for punitive damages. In the second phase the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon. The District Court later reduced the punitive award to $2.5 billion. On appeal the Ninth Circuit reinstated the jury's original $5 billion punitive damages award. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the $2.5 billion punitive damages award was excessive under maritime law.