A particular form or branch of productive labor. An aggregate of enterprises employs similar production and marketing facilities to produce items having markedly similar characteristics.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Minority Set-Aside Challenge
Ironwood Capital bids on a city contract but loses to a firm qualifying under a racial set-aside. The city defends the program by pointing to past discrimination against minority contractors in the local construction sector. Ironwood sues, arguing that general societal bias cannot justify the preference and that the city failed to identify specific discrimination within the relevant industry and jurisdiction.
Commerce Clause Gun Case
Isaiah Ishikawa is prosecuted under a federal statute for possessing a firearm near a school. He moves to dismiss, contending that Congress lacked power because the activity is local manufacturing and possession rather than interstate commerce. The government responds that the statute regulates an industry whose products move in interstate channels.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. manufactures valve assemblies in Japan and sells them to a Taiwanese firm that incorporates them into motorcycle tires sold worldwide. A California plaintiff injured by a tire containing an Asahi valve sues in state court. Asahi argues that its contacts with the forum are too attenuated because it never targeted the California market in the tire industry.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.480 U.S. 102 (1987)
In September 1978 Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle on Interstate Highway 80 in Solano County, California, and collided with a tractor. Zurcher suffered severe injuries while his passenger and wife Ruth Ann Moreno was killed.
In September 1979 Zurcher filed a product liability action in the Superior Court of California for Solano County against Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle tube, and other defendants. Zurcher alleged that defects in the tire, tube, and sealant caused the accident.
Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the Japanese manufacturer of the tube’s valve assembly. Zurcher’s claims against Cheng Shin and the other defendants were eventually settled and dismissed, leaving only Cheng Shin’s indemnity action against Asahi.
Asahi is a Japanese corporation. It manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells them to Cheng Shin and other tire manufacturers for use as components in finished tire tubes, with all sales to Cheng Shin taking place in Taiwan. Asahi sold Cheng Shin 150,000 valve assemblies in 1978, 500,000 in 1979, 500,000 in 1980, 100,000 in 1981, and 100,000 in 1982. Those sales accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi’s income in 1981 and 0.44 percent in 1982. Cheng Shin alleged that approximately 20 percent of its United States sales occur in California.
In 1983 an attorney for Cheng Shin examined valve stems at one cycle store in Solano County and found that of 115 tire tubes, 12 Asahi-marked valve stems were incorporated into Cheng Shin tubes. An affidavit from a Cheng Shin manager stated that discussions with Asahi had covered worldwide sales including the United States. Asahi’s president stated the company never contemplated that its limited sales would subject it to lawsuits in California. The Superior Court denied Asahi’s motion to quash service of summons. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ commanding the Superior Court to quash service. The California Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Penn Central Transportation Co. owns Grand Central Terminal and seeks to build a tower above it. The city denies the permit under its landmarks law, citing the need to support tourism and business in the historic district. Penn Central claims the restriction destroys the economic value of its property in the transportation industry.
Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v. New York City438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest.
The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month.
Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction.
Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals.
Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Irene Ingalls buys a new car from Bloomfield Motors. The vehicle vibrates severely because of an assembly defect common in the industry. She sues under the implied warranty of merchantability. The dealer contends that the warranty does not cover defects whose precise cause cannot be isolated.
In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation.
Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them.
The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident.
An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims.
The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.
Imran Iyer, a New Jersey resident, is served with process while attending a three-day conference in California. The plaintiff claims general jurisdiction over Iyer because of his physical presence. Iyer moves to quash, arguing that brief presence unrelated to the litigation or any industry activity in the state cannot support jurisdiction.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990)
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home.
In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey.
In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
What evidence must a government show to justify a racial set-aside in public contracting?
The program must rest on a strong basis in evidence of specific past discrimination against minorities in the relevant industry and jurisdiction. General societal discrimination is insufficient.
Supporting sources
Does departure from an industry automatically terminate a commercial servitude in gross?
No. A benefit in gross continues until terminated by its terms, extinguished under general servitude doctrines, or transferred. Leaving the logistics industry does not end the right.
Supporting sources
When is a recorded restriction barring sale to competitors in the same industry enforceable?
It is treated as a direct restraint on alienation and is valid only if reasonable after balancing utility against harm to marketability.
Supporting sources
How does the scope of a prescriptive easement for utility lines relate to industry practice?
Scope is limited to the historic use actually made during the prescriptive period. Normal modern equipment needs in the utility industry do not enlarge the easement beyond that use.
Supporting sources
…past”; protecting and enhancing “the city’s attractions to tourists and visitors”; “support[ing] and stimul[ating] business and
industry
”; “strengthen[ing] the economy of the city”; and promoting “the use of historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for the education, pleasure and welfare of the…