individualized-suspicion requirement

On March 1, 1976, a special agent of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation presented a complaint for a search warrant to an Illinois circuit court judge. The complaint recited that a reliable informant had observed fifteen to twenty-five tin-foil packets on the person of the bartender Greg and behind the bar at the Aurora Tap Tavern over the weekend of February 28 and 29. The informant had seen such packets on Greg and in a drawer on at least ten other occasions. The informant had been told by Greg that he would have heroin for sale on March 1. On the strength of this complaint the judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of the Aurora Tap Tavern and the person of Greg the bartender for heroin, contraband, other controlled substances, money, instrumentalities, and narcotics paraphernalia. In the late afternoon of March 1, 1976, seven or eight officers proceeded to the tavern. Upon entering they announced their purpose and advised all those present that they were going to conduct a cursory search for weapons. One officer then patted down each of the nine to thirteen customers present while the remaining officers searched the premises. The officer who frisked the patrons found Ventura Ybarra standing by a pinball machine. In the first patdown the officer felt a cigarette pack with objects in it but did not remove it. After completing the process the officer returned to Ybarra two to ten minutes later, relocated and retrieved the pack from Ybarra's pants pocket, and found six tinfoil packets containing a brown powdery substance that later proved to be heroin. Ybarra was subsequently indicted by an Illinois grand jury for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the contraband seized from his person. At the suppression hearing the State sought to justify the search by reference to an Illinois statute authorizing officers to detain and search persons found on premises being searched pursuant to a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the search had been conducted under the authority of the statute to prevent the disposal or concealment of things described in the warrant. The case proceeded to a bench trial and Ybarra was found guilty. On appeal the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was not unconstitutional in its application to the facts of the case because the search occurred in a one-room bar where heroin was being sold, the packets could easily have been concealed, and Ybarra was not an innocent stranger having no connection with the premises. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra's petition for leave to appeal. There followed an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a high drug area of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign. The driver was looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained stopped at the intersection for more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right without signaling and sped off at an unreasonable speed. The policemen followed and overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver’s window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment with violating federal drug laws, including 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal drug-dealing activity and that Officer Soto’s asserted ground for approaching the vehicle was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression motion. Petitioners were convicted of the counts at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft allegedly authorized federal prosecutors and law enforcement officials to use the material-witness statute to detain individuals with suspected ties to terrorist organizations, with no intention of calling most of them as witnesses. Abdullah al-Kidd, a native-born United States citizen, was apprehended by FBI agents in March 2003 as he checked in for a flight to Saudi Arabia. Two days earlier, federal officials had informed a Magistrate Judge that if al-Kidd boarded his flight, information crucial to the prosecution of Sami Omar al-Hussayen would be lost. Al-Kidd remained in federal custody for 16 days and on supervised release for 14 months, but prosecutors never called him as a witness. In March 2005, al-Kidd filed a Bivens action against Ashcroft to challenge the constitutionality of the alleged policy. The District Court denied Ashcroft's motion to dismiss based on absolute and qualified immunity. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Judge Bea dissented, and eight judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In the early morning hours of August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding at 3:16 a.m. The vehicle had three occupants: Donte Partlow, the driver and owner of the car; respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger; and Otis Smith, the back-seat passenger. When Partlow opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a large amount of rolled-up money inside. After the officer checked the computer system and issued an oral warning to Partlow, a second patrol car arrived. Partlow consented to a search of the vehicle, which yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer questioned all three men about the ownership of the drugs and money and informed them that if no one admitted ownership he would arrest them all. None of the men offered any information, so the officer placed all three under arrest and transported them to the police station. Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and provided an oral and written confession acknowledging that the cocaine belonged to him, that he and his friends were going to a party, and that he intended to sell the cocaine or use it for sex. Pringle stated that the other occupants did not know about the drugs, resulting in their release. A jury convicted Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. The trial court denied Pringle’s motion to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. A jury convicted Pringle, and he received a sentence of 10 years’ incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided vote, reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.