Speech or conduct that is patently offensive because of its vulgar sexual or excretory references. Unlike obscenity, such material receives First Amendment protection but remains subject to targeted regulation in broadcasting due to the medium's pervasiveness and accessibility to children.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Midday Broadcast of Graphic Monologue
Cedar Stream aired a full uncensored routine containing repeated graphic sexual descriptions and crude excretory jokes at 2:00 p.m. when many children were home unsupervised. The Department of Defense imposed civil sanctions on the network. The sanctions stand because the broadcast occurred during school hours without warnings and intruded directly into homes via free over-the-air television.
Possession of Lewd Photographs
Ismael Ibrahim kept photographs depicting nude minors posed in a manner the state labeled lewd. Police arrested him under an Ohio statute. The conviction is upheld because the state may criminalize possession of such material even when it falls short of obscenity.
In order to combat child pornography, Ohio enacted Revised Code Annotated section 2907.323(A)(3). The statute prohibits any person from possessing or viewing material or a performance that shows a minor who is not the person's child or ward in a state of nudity, unless certain exceptions for bona fide purposes or parental consent apply. Columbus, Ohio police officers conducted a valid search of petitioner Clyde Osborne's home and found four photographs. Each photograph depicts a nude male adolescent posed in a sexually explicit position. Osborne was convicted of violating the statute and sentenced to six months in prison.
An intermediate appellate court affirmed Osborne's conviction. The Supreme Court of Ohio likewise affirmed. Relying on its construction of the statute, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected Osborne's claim that the First Amendment prohibits states from proscribing private possession of child pornography. The court also found that the statute, as narrowed to require a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on the genitals, is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The court held that scienter is an essential element of the offense.
Osborne objected that the trial judge had not required the government to prove lewd exhibition and scienter as elements of the crime. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these contentions because Osborne had failed to object to the jury instructions at trial and the court did not believe the failures amounted to plain error.
The Ohio Supreme Court denied a motion for rehearing and granted a stay pending appeal. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in June 1989.
Ike Ingram applied for an NEA grant to stage a performance incorporating explicit sexual imagery. The agency denied funding after considering the work's indecency. The denial is constitutional because the statute requires consideration of general standards of decency without imposing an outright ban on expression.
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) v. Finley524 U.S. 569 (1998)
In 1965 Congress created the National Endowment for the Arts through the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act. The statute vests the NEA with substantial discretion to award grants for artistic projects.
In 1989 two NEA-supported exhibitions drew congressional criticism. The Institute of Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania had used $30,000 of a visual arts grant it received from the NEA to fund a 1989 retrospective of photographer Robert Mapplethorpe's work. Andres Serrano had been awarded a $15,000 grant from the Southeast Center for Contemporary Art, an organization that received NEA support, for his photograph Piss Christ depicting a crucifix immersed in urine.
Congress responded in the 1990 appropriations legislation by first barring funds for obscene or indecent materials. After an Independent Commission report, Congress enacted the Williams/Coleman Amendment that became 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). That provision directs the Chairperson to ensure that artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public. The language has appeared in every subsequent NEA appropriation.
Four performance artists—Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller—applied for NEA grants before the 1990 amendment. Advisory panels recommended approval of their projects both initially and on reconsideration. A majority of the Council subsequently recommended disapproval, and in June 1990 the NEA informed respondents that they had been denied funding. The artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations later joined as plaintiffs.
The respondents sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They alleged statutory violations, Privacy Act breaches, and First Amendment claims arising from the grant denials. After Congress passed § 954(d)(1), respondents amended their complaint to add a facial challenge to the new provision. The District Court granted summary judgment for the respondents in 1992. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in 1996. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1997.
Ivan Ivanov and his partner were arrested in their bedroom under a Texas law criminalizing same-sex intimacy. They challenged the statute as an invalid restriction on private conduct. The law falls because it criminalizes private consensual adult activity without a legitimate state interest beyond moral disapproval.
Lawrence v. Texas539 U.S. 558 (2003)
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance.
They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)." Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions. The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
Ilana Isaacs sought to perform totally nude at the Kitty Kat Lounge. Indiana enforced its public indecency statute requiring pasties and G-strings. The requirement is valid because the state may regulate public nudity to protect order and morality without targeting the expressive content of the dance.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.501 U.S. 560 (1991)
Respondents Glen Theatre, Inc. and Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc. operate establishments in South Bend, Indiana, that provide adult entertainment including live performances by nude or seminude dancers viewed through glass panels or on stage.
Darlene Miller worked at the Kitty Kat Lounge on commission and sought to dance totally nude to increase her earnings. Gayle Ann Marie Sutro performed at Glen Theatre after a professional career in dancing and modeling. In 1985 the city enacted an ordinance banning public nudity, defined as the showing of genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female nipples with less than full opaque covering, which required dancers to wear pasties and G-strings.
Respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging that the ordinance violated the First Amendment by prohibiting totally nude dancing. The District Court originally granted respondents' prayer for an injunction, finding that the statute was facially overbroad. On remand after the Seventh Circuit's initial reversal, the District Court concluded that the type of dancing these plaintiffs wish to perform is not expressive activity protected by the Constitution of the United States. It rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The case was again appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and a panel of that court reversed the District Court, holding that the nude dancing involved here was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether nude dancing is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Ivy Investments operated a cable channel that transmitted adult programming during evening hours. Congress required full scrambling of the signal to prevent signal bleed into non-subscribing homes. The requirement is unconstitutional because it burdens protected speech without the least restrictive means of shielding children.
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.529 U.S. 803 (2000)
Congress enacted Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to address signal bleed from channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming.
The statute required cable operators either to fully scramble or block such channels or to limit transmission to the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. owns and prepares programs for Playboy Television and Spice. It transmits its programming to cable operators who retransmit the signals in scrambled form to paying subscribers via addressable converters. Almost all of Playboy's programming consists of sexually explicit material as defined by the statute. Imperfect analog scrambling on RF or baseband systems produced signal bleed, allowing non-subscribers to see or hear portions of the programming.
Most cable operators complied with Section 505 by time channeling the targeted programming. This eliminated the targeted programming for two-thirds of the day in affected service areas. The result was a significant reduction in Playboy's revenues because 30 to 50 percent of adult programming was viewed before 10 p.m.
Playboy filed suit in a three-judge District Court. It obtained a temporary restraining order on March 7, 1996. After the FCC began enforcement on May 18, 1997, the court held a full trial in March 1998.
At trial the Government presented anecdotal evidence of complaints from two city councilors, eighteen individuals, one senator, and officials of one city. The Government also presented an expert estimate that 39 million homes with 29.5 million children had the potential to be exposed to signal bleed. A survey showed fewer than 0.5 percent of subscribers requested blocking under Section 504 during the period when Section 505 was enjoined. The District Court found the Government had not quantified the actual extent of signal bleed. It also found that Section 504 supplemented with adequate notice could serve as an effective alternative. The District Court declared Section 505 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The United States filed a direct appeal. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1999.
How does broadcast indecency differ from obscenity?
Indecent speech is patently offensive sexual or excretory content that lacks prurient appeal and therefore receives First Amendment protection. Obscenity lacks such protection entirely. Regulators may still sanction indecent broadcasts when children are likely in the audience because of the medium's unique intrusiveness into the home.
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What notice must the FCC provide before changing its indecency policy?
The FCC must give broadcasters fair notice of any shift in enforcement standards. When the agency altered its policy without adequate warning, sanctions under the new standard violated due process because broadcasters could not reasonably anticipate the change.
Supporting sources
Can a state criminalize private consensual adult sexual conduct under an indecency rationale?
No. Moral disapproval alone supplies no legitimate state interest sufficient to justify criminalizing private consensual intimacy between adults. Such statutes fail even rational basis review when they target conduct occurring in the home without additional justification such as protecting minors or preventing coercion.
Supporting sources
539 U.S. 558 (2003)
…relied extensively on Bowers when we concluded, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. , 501 U. S. 560, 569 (1991), that Indiana's public indecency statute furthered "a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality," ibid. (plurality opinion); see also id. , at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). State laws…