An activity or practice that ordinary members of the community routinely engage in as part of everyday life. The inquiry focuses on whether the conduct is widespread and customary rather than specialized or rare.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Wildlife Sanctuary Escape
A nonprofit group maintains a remote sanctuary housing adult lions and bears in open-air enclosures. One animal escapes and injures a passing cyclist. The cyclist sues under strict liability. The activity is not a matter of common usage because ordinary landowners and businesses do not keep large predators as a routine practice.
Life Sentence Challenge
A defendant receives a mandatory life sentence without parole for possessing a large quantity of cocaine. He argues the punishment is unusual. The sentence is upheld because life imprisonment for serious drug offenses is a punishment in common use across many jurisdictions.
Harmelin v. Michigan501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)
Ronald Harmelin was convicted in Michigan state court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.
Michigan law imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that quantity of the drug. Harmelin had no prior felony convictions.
The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and affirmed the sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The quantity of cocaine at issue had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. The sentencing court imposed the mandatory term without considering any individualized circumstances of the offense or the offender.
Harmelin challenged the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing both that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime and that the mandatory nature of the penalty was unconstitutional.
A theater manager is prosecuted for showing an allegedly obscene film. The manager claims the material is protected expression. The court notes that obscenity prosecutions remain a matter in common use and therefore do not automatically violate constitutional limits on regulation of expression.
Jacobellis v. Ohio378 U.S. 184 (1964)
Nico Jacobellis served as manager of a motion picture theater in Cleveland Heights, Ohio.
He was convicted on two counts of possessing and exhibiting an obscene film in violation of Ohio Revised Code (1963 Supp.), § 2905.34. He received a fine of $500 on the first count and $2,000 on the second count, along with a sentence to the workhouse if the fines went unpaid. His conviction came after a trial by a court of three judges following his waiver of a jury trial.
The film at issue was the French motion picture “Les Amants,” also known as “The Lovers.” It depicts a woman who grows bored with her life and marriage before leaving her husband and family for a young archaeologist. An explicit love scene appears in the final reel. The film received favorable reviews in several national publications and was ranked by at least two prominent national critics among the best films of its production year. It played in roughly one hundred major cities across the United States, among them Columbus and Toledo in Ohio.
An intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction in a decision reported at 115 Ohio App. 226, 175 N. E. 2d 123. The Supreme Court of Ohio then affirmed that judgment in 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N. E. 2d 777. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the appeal under docket number 371 U. S. 808 before restoring the case to the calendar for reargument at 373 U. S. 901.
A landlord objects when a cable company installs equipment on the exterior of a rental building without consent. The company claims the installation is a minor and common utility practice. The court treats the permanent physical occupation as distinct from uses in common with the general public.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
A resident challenges a total ban on possessing operable handguns in the home for self-defense. The government defends the law by arguing that certain weapons fall outside protection. The court holds that handguns qualify for protection because they are in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.
District of Columbia v. Heller554 U.S. 570 (2008)
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for one-year periods.
District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities.
Respondent Dick Heller is a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home.
The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for self-defense. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A state enacts a statute requiring legislative approval before any new ice plant may be built. An existing operator challenges the law as an improper restraint on ordinary business. The dissent notes that manufacturing ice is an activity in common use and therefore not subject to special legislative gatekeeping.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
In 1925 the Oklahoma legislature passed Chapter 147 of the Session Laws. That statute declared the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice a public business. It prohibited any person from engaging in that business without first obtaining a license from the Corporation Commission.
The statute directed that a license would issue only after a formal hearing at which competent evidence established the necessity for additional ice facilities at the proposed location. It authorized the Commission to deny an application if existing licensed plants already provided sufficient capacity to meet public needs. New State Ice Company secured such a license and for several years operated an ice manufacturing and distribution business in Oklahoma City in which it had invested $500,000.
While New State Ice Company was operating under its license, E.A. Liebmann purchased a parcel of land in Oklahoma City and began construction of an ice plant without applying for or obtaining a license from the Commission. Liebmann acted with the purpose of entering the business in direct competition with the licensed company. New State Ice Company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking an injunction to prevent Liebmann from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice without a license.
The district court dismissed the bill of complaint for want of equity. It concluded that the ice business is a private enterprise not subject to the statutory restrictions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The case arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the circuit court decree. The record before the Court included evidence of the structure of the ice industry in Oklahoma, the extent of competition or monopoly in communities across the state, the Commission's prior exercise of regulatory authority over ice plants under earlier statutes dating to 1908, and the practical effects of the 1925 licensing requirement on service and pricing in the state.
How does the common usage factor affect strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities?
The factor asks whether ordinary members of the community routinely perform the activity. When an activity such as keeping adult lions or operating a nuclear reactor is not a matter of common usage, that absence weighs in favor of classifying the activity as abnormally dangerous and imposing strict liability.
Supporting sources
Does compliance with safety regulations prevent a finding that an activity is not in common use?
No. Regulatory compliance addresses the exercise of reasonable care. The common usage inquiry instead examines whether the activity itself is routine and customary among ordinary community members, regardless of regulatory oversight.
Supporting sources
What role does common use play in Second Amendment analysis?
Weapons that are in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes receive Second Amendment protection. Weapons that are dangerous and unusual fall outside that protection because they are not in common use.
Supporting sources
487 U.S. 654 (1988)
…properly designated as inferior; but the Court essentially admits that she is not subordinate. See ante , at 671. If it were common usage to refer to someone as "inferior" who is subject to removal for cause by another, then one would say that the President is "inferior" to Congress. The second reason offered by the Court —…
TortsCommon-law strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities and defenses to such claims · Common-law strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities and defenses to such claimsNEXTGENFoundational