An indorsement or issuance of a negotiable instrument or document without naming a specific recipient or completing required details. The holder may then fill the blank to direct payment or service as needed.
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Common Examples
6
Blank Subpoena Issued to Prosecutor
The clerk hands Ivan Ivanov a signed and sealed subpoena form with no witness name or hearing details filled in. Ivan completes the blanks with the name of a key eyewitness and the correct trial date before serving the document. The completed subpoena compels the witness to appear and testify as required.
Indorsement in Blank Creates Bearer Paper
Ike Ingram receives a promissory note payable to his order. He signs the back without naming any indorsee. The note now belongs to whoever holds it, allowing free negotiation by delivery alone.
Chiarella v. United States445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
In 1975 and 1976 Vincent Chiarella worked as a markup man in the New York composing room of Pandick Press, a financial printer.
Among the documents he handled were five announcements of corporate takeover bids. The identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or false names. The true names were sent to the printer on the night of the final printing.
Chiarella deduced the names of the target companies from other information contained in the documents. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies. He sold the shares immediately after the takeover attempts were made public.
By this method he realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of fourteen months. The Securities and Exchange Commission subsequently began an investigation of his trading activities.
In May 1977 Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to return his profits to the sellers of the shares. On the same day he was discharged by Pandick Press. In January 1978 he was indicted on seventeen counts of violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.
After he unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, he was tried and convicted on all counts in the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Isla Ireland holds a check indorsed in blank by the payee. She transfers the check to a friend simply by handing it over. The friend becomes the holder entitled to enforce the instrument.
Crawford v. Washington541 U.S. 36 (2004)
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso during a confrontation at Lee's apartment.
Crawford and his wife Sylvia had gone there after Sylvia alleged that Lee had attempted to rape her several weeks earlier. Lee was taken to the hospital and later died from his wounds. Police arrested both Crawford and Sylvia that night.
Detectives gave Miranda warnings and interrogated Sylvia twice at the station house. In her recorded statement Sylvia initially denied involvement but eventually admitted she had led Crawford to Lee's apartment and had seen the stabbing. Crawford also gave police a statement describing the events and his belief that Lee may have reached for something before the stabbing. At trial Crawford asserted self-defense, but Sylvia did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege.
The State offered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense and invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court admitted the statement after finding it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The jury convicted Crawford of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after applying a nine-factor test and concluding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.
The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. It determined that Sylvia's statement interlocked with Crawford's statement and therefore bore adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, noting that both accounts were ambiguous on whether Lee had possessed a weapon. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ibrahim Iqbal attempts to run for Congress but leaves the candidate qualification form partially blank under state rules. Federal constitutional limits prevent the state from imposing extra requirements that effectively block his candidacy.
United States Term Limits v. Thornton514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
In November 1992 the voters of Arkansas approved Amendment 73 to their state constitution. The amendment's preamble declared that long-term incumbency had reduced voter participation and made elections less competitive and less representative.
Section 3 barred any person elected to three or more terms in the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas from appearing on the ballot for that office. It imposed a parallel bar on any person elected to two or more terms in the United States Senate from Arkansas.
The amendment was self-executing and applied to all persons seeking election after January 1, 1993. On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself and similarly situated Arkansas citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters, together with the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County seeking a declaratory judgment that section 3 was unconstitutional and void. The complaint named then-Governor Clinton, other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas as defendants.
The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, intervened as a party defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment, including petitioner U. S. Term Limits, Inc., also intervened. On cross-motions for summary judgment the Circuit Court held that section 3 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution. In a 5-to-2 decision the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that holding. The State and the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted both petitions and consolidated the cases for argument.
Isaiah Ishikawa buys a car under a sales contract containing a blank space for warranty exclusions. The dealer never completes the blank. The buyer successfully claims an implied warranty because no effective disclaimer was made.
In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation.
Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them.
The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident.
An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims.
The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.
Idina Iverson designates her spouse on an ERISA plan form but leaves the contingent beneficiary line blank. After divorce the plan documents control without reference to state revocation rules, so the ex-spouse remains the primary beneficiary.
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff532 U.S. 141 (2001)
Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff. Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy and a pension plan. Both plans were governed by ERISA, and Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both.
In April 1994, the Egelhoffs divorced. Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident. At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy and the pension plan. The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her.
Respondents Samantha and David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law. They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds. In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits.
The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy and the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases. The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed. Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy and the pension plan. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed.
Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
What happens when a negotiable instrument is indorsed in blank?
The instrument becomes payable to bearer. It may then be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until it receives a special indorsement naming a particular person.
How does a blank subpoena differ from a completed one under the criminal rules?
A blank subpoena is signed and sealed by the clerk but contains no witness name or hearing details. The requesting party must fill those blanks before service occurs.
Does leaving a space blank in a contract always create an alteration problem?
An unauthorized insertion into a blank space constitutes a material alteration. If the signer later authorizes the completion, the signature is treated as adopted with respect to the added terms.
541 U.S. 36 (2004)
…think that he pulled somethin' out and I grabbed for it and that's how I got cut . . . but I'm not positive. I, I, my mind goes blank when things like this happen. I mean, I just, I remember things wrong, I remember things that just doesn't, don't make sense to me later." App. 155 (punctuation added). Sylvia generally…