Also known as: implied conditions of reverter · possibility of reverter
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A condition precedent limiting the duration of an estate granted that arises by implication from the purpose or nature of the conveyance rather than by express words of reservation. The condition creates a possibility of reverter in the grantor that becomes possessory upon occurrence of the limiting event.
Ike Ingram conveyed a strip of land to Interlink Communications for railroad purposes. After the railroad ceased operations, Ike sought to reclaim the strip. The implied condition of reverter ripened into a present possessory estate because the grant carried an implied limitation tied to continued railroad use.
Ivan Ivanov held a fee simple conditional in a parcel that had been granted subject to an implied condition of reverter. Upon Ivan's death without the required issue, the land passed to the person entitled under the possibility of reverter rather than to collateral heirs.
Isabelle Inman held a fee tail estate subject to an implied condition of reverter. After Isabelle died, her surviving spouse asserted dower rights, but those rights remained subordinate to the possibility of reverter that restricted the original estate.
Israel Irving received a fee tail preserved for a single lifetime only, subject to an implied condition of reverter. Upon his death the surviving spouse sought curtesy, yet the claim yielded to the possibility of reverter that had restricted the deceased spouse's estate.
Idina Iverson held a fee simple conditional subject to an implied condition of reverter. A judgment creditor recorded a lien against the land, but the lien attached only to interests Idina could transfer and remained subordinate to the possibility of reverter.
India Inoue's predecessor granted a right of way to a railroad under a pre-1871 statute. When oil was discovered beneath the strip, the successor to the grantor asserted ownership of the minerals. The implied condition of reverter meant the railroad held only a limited fee that did not include subsurface rights.
In 1908 the Laramie, Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railroad obtained a 200-foot-wide right of way across public lands in Wyoming under the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875. The railroad completed construction of its line in 1911. The line later passed through several owners and was used primarily to transport timber and cattle. In 1976 the United States issued a land patent conveying an 83-acre parcel in Fox Park, Wyoming, to Melvin and Lulu Brandt. The patent conveyed to the Brandts fee simple title to the land "with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever nature, thereunto belonging, unto said claimants, their successors and assigns, forever." The patent stated that the land was granted "subject to those rights for railroad purposes as have been granted to the Laramie[,] Hahn's Peak & Pacific Railway Company, its successors or assigns." The right of way crossed approximately ten acres of the patented parcel. In 1996 the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad notified the Surface Transportation Board of its intent to abandon the right of way. After removing the tracks and ties and obtaining Board approval, the railroad completed abandonment in 2004. In 2006 the United States filed suit seeking a judicial declaration of abandonment and an order quieting title to the right of way in the Government. The complaint named the owners of 31 parcels crossed by the abandoned right of way, including Marvin Brandt who held the Fox Park parcel through a family trust. Brandt contested the claim and filed a counterclaim asserting that the right of way was a mere easement extinguished by abandonment. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
An implied condition of reverter arises from the nature and purpose of the grant itself, such as a conveyance for railroad purposes, without any explicit words of condition. An express possibility of reverter requires language that creates a condition precedent in the deed.
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No. A possibility of reverter retained by the grantor or the grantor's successors is categorically exempt from the rule against perpetuities regardless of whether the condition is express or implied.
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Yes. Unlike a power of termination, a possibility of reverter is freely alienable by inter vivos conveyance because it is a reversionary interest subject only to a condition precedent.
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The interest passes according to the form of the original gift, typically to the person entitled under the possibility of reverter when no issue or alternative executory interest exists.
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Yes. Once the implied condition occurs the possibility of reverter ripens into a present possessory estate without any requirement of affirmative action by the holder.
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