Also known as: impleader claim · impleader's claim · third-party claim · Rule 14 claim
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural device by which a defending party brings a nonparty into an action on the ground that the nonparty may be liable to the defending party for all or part of the claim asserted against it. The device requires derivative or secondary liability such as indemnity or contribution rather than an independent claim. A third-party complaint may be filed as of right only within fourteen days after the defendant serves its original answer. Thereafter leave of court is required.
Igor Ito sued Ironwood Capital for breach of a loan agreement. Ironwood answered and then filed a timely third-party complaint against Indigo Textiles seeking contractual indemnity on the same loan transaction. Ironwood also asserted an unrelated breach-of-warranty claim against Indigo arising from a separate equipment sale. The court permitted both the indemnity and warranty claims to proceed together in the third-party action.
Iain Irons sued Island Manufacturing for product liability. Island answered and impleaded Interlink Communications on an indemnity theory. The court granted summary judgment on the indemnity claim alone and expressly determined that no just reason for delay existed. The partial judgment became immediately appealable even though the main claim remained pending.
Imani Idowu, a citizen of State A, sued Ibrahim Iqbal, a citizen of State B, in federal court on a state-law claim exceeding $75,000. Iqbal answered and impleaded Israel Irving, also a citizen of State B, for contribution. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the impleader claim despite the lack of diversity between Iqbal and Irving.
In 1991, about 10,000 Exxon dealers filed a class-action suit against the Exxon Corporation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They alleged an intentional and systematic scheme by which they were overcharged for fuel purchased from Exxon. The plaintiffs invoked the District Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Each dealer's claim was for slightly less than the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the District Court certified the case for interlocutory review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction over class members who did not meet the jurisdictional minimum. In a separate action, a 9-year-old girl sued Star-Kist in a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She sought damages for unusually severe injuries she received when she sliced her finger on a tuna can. Her family joined in the suit seeking damages for emotional distress and medical expenses. The District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist, finding that none of the plaintiffs met the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court's extension of supplemental jurisdiction to the class members who did not meet the amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the injured girl, but not her family members, had made allegations of damages in the requisite amount. It further held that section 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district court has original jurisdiction over the action. In a diversity case, original jurisdiction is lacking if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court.
View caseIngrid Innes sued Interlink Communications for antitrust violations. Interlink answered and impleaded Ironwood Capital on a contribution theory. The court scheduled a bench trial on the impleader claim alone. Ironwood demanded a jury, and the court granted the demand because the contribution claim presented legal issues triable to a jury.
Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc. operated a movie theatre in San Bernardino, California and exhibited films under contracts with distributors granting exclusive first-run rights and clearance periods during which no other theatre could show the same pictures. Beacon Theatres, Inc. built a drive-in theatre about 11 miles away and notified Fox that it considered the clearance provisions to be violations of the antitrust laws, threatening treble damage suits against Fox and its distributors. Fox filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California alleging a controversy under the Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Act. The complaint sought a declaration that the clearances were reasonable and not in violation of the antitrust laws together with an injunction preventing Beacon from instituting any antitrust actions against Fox and its distributors arising out of the controversy. Beacon filed an answer denying the threats, a counterclaim against Fox, and a cross-claim against an intervening exhibitor. These pleadings asserted that there was no substantial competition between the theatres, that the clearances were unreasonable, and that a conspiracy existed between Fox and distributors to manipulate contracts so as to restrain trade and monopolize first-run pictures. They sought treble damages. Beacon demanded a jury trial of the factual issues under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). The district court directed that the issues raised by Fox's complaint, including the question of competition between the theatres, be tried to the court first under Rules 42(b) and 57 before any jury determination of the antitrust violation charges in the counterclaim and cross-claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Beacon's petition for mandamus to vacate the district court's orders, holding that the trial judge had acted within his discretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA defendant may implead as of right only within fourteen days after serving its original answer. After that period expires, the defendant must obtain leave of court by motion before filing the third-party complaint.
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The third-party claim must assert derivative or secondary liability such as indemnity or contribution. An independent claim against a different wrongdoer does not qualify for impleader.
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Yes. The possibility that the third-party defendant might also be directly liable to the original plaintiff does not defeat impleader when the defendant asserts a proper claim for indemnity or contribution.
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The filing is procedurally improper. The court may grant a motion to strike or dismiss the third-party complaint on that ground even if the substantive indemnity theory would otherwise be viable.
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…at 377. Federal courts, by the time of Kroger , were routinely exercising ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, impleader claims, cross-claims among defendants, and claims of parties who intervened "of right." See id. , at 375, n. 18 (collecting cases). In Kroger , however, "the nonfederal claim . . . was…