Also known as: high crime and misdemeanor · impeachable offenses
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional standard authorizing removal of the President, Vice President, and civil officers upon impeachment and conviction for treason, bribery, or other serious abuses of official power that betray the public trust.
President Martin privately assured the CEO of Horizon Communications that appointing the company's executive to lead the Federal Communications Authority would follow if the network reduced critical reporting on the administration. The arrangement surfaced in a congressional probe. The House considered articles charging that the conditional appointment constituted bribery or another high crime or misdemeanor warranting removal.
Congress enacted a statute directing the Comptroller General to calculate automatic spending cuts and requiring the President to implement them without alteration. The Court held that Congress could not assign executive functions to an officer removable only by joint resolution. Congress may remove an executive officer only through impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors.
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The statute sets a maximum deficit amount for each fiscal year from 1986 through 1991. It requires across-the-board cuts in specified federal programs if the deficit exceeds the target by more than a specified sum. These cuts, called sequestrations, are made by the President on the basis of a report prepared by the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' reports, then reports his conclusions to the President. The Comptroller General must use the more pessimistic of the two sets of estimates, may make adjustments he deems appropriate, and must specify the precise reductions required on a program-by-program basis. The President is then required to issue a sequestration order that incorporates the Comptroller General's report without modification. The Comptroller General is an officer of the Legislative Branch. He is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year term. The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), which is an independent office in the legislative branch of the Government. He is removable not only by impeachment, but also by joint resolution of Congress at any time for permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude. He is required to make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee of either House. He is to make recommendations to the Congress and to the heads of Federal agencies on legislation and other measures to improve the efficiency and economy of Government operations. Within hours of the Act's signing, Congressman Mike Synar, who had voted against it, and eleven other Members of Congress filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The National Treasury Employees Union filed a parallel action alleging injury to its members from suspended cost-of-living benefit increases. A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions. The District Court held that the role of the Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process violated the Constitution's command that Congress may not retain the power to remove an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. The court therefore held that the reporting requirements of the Act were unconstitutional. It declared the presidential sequestration order based on those reports to be without force and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Treasury from implementing the sequestration order. The parties appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration.
View caseA former presidential aide sued the President for damages arising from an alleged conspiracy to terminate his employment in retaliation for congressional testimony. The Court recognized that impeachment supplies the constitutional mechanism for addressing high crimes and misdemeanors committed in office, distinct from private civil remedies that remain available after the term ends.
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
View caseA postmaster appointed by the President with Senate confirmation was removed by the Postmaster General acting under a statute requiring Senate concurrence. The Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally restricted the President's removal authority. The Constitution permits Congress to remove civil officers only by impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors.
Frank S. Myers was appointed postmaster at Portland, Oregon, of the first class on July 10, 1917, for a term of four years fixed by statute. On January 3, 1921, President Wilson directed his removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers protested to the department that his removal was illegal and refused to surrender his office. He was, however, ousted and a successor appointed with the consent of the Senate. He brought suit in the Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against him. The case comes here on appeal. By act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, it was provided that postmasters of the first, second and third classes should be appointed and might be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term of the office was fixed at four years.
View caseA federal district judge convicted of bribery refused to resign and continued receiving salary while incarcerated. The House impeached him on articles alleging false testimony and bringing disrepute on the judiciary. The Senate used a committee to receive evidence under its impeachment rules. The Court held that the Senate alone determines the procedures for trying high crimes and misdemeanors.
Walter L. Nixon, Jr., served as Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. A federal grand jury investigated reports that Nixon had accepted a gratuity from a Mississippi businessman in exchange for influencing a local prosecution. Nixon was convicted by a jury of two counts of making false statements before the grand jury and sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his judicial office and continued to receive his salary during his incarceration. On May 10, 1989, the House of Representatives adopted three articles of impeachment against Nixon. The first two articles charged him with giving false testimony before the grand jury, and the third charged him with bringing disrepute on the Federal Judiciary. The Senate then invoked its Impeachment Rule XI, which permits a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony and report to the full Senate. The committee held four days of hearings at which ten witnesses, including Nixon, testified. It submitted a complete transcript and a report summarizing the evidence to the full Senate. Nixon and the House managers submitted briefs and presented oral arguments to the Senate. The Senate convicted Nixon on the first two articles by the required two-thirds majority and removed him from office. Nixon filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that his conviction was void and that his salary and privileges should be reinstated. The district court dismissed the action as nonjusticiable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseA private citizen sued the President for damages based on alleged sexual harassment that occurred before he took office. The Court rejected any claim of temporary immunity from civil suit. The Constitution addresses accountability for official misconduct through impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, leaving pre-office private conduct subject to ordinary judicial process.
In May 1994 Paula Corbin Jones, a California resident who had worked at the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against William Jefferson Clinton, then President of the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer. The complaint alleged that on May 8, 1991, while Clinton was Governor of Arkansas and attending an official conference at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Ferguson persuaded Jones to leave the registration desk and visit Clinton in a business suite where he made unwanted sexual advances that she rejected. Jones further alleged that after she refused the advances her superiors at the Commission treated her in a hostile and rude manner and changed her duties in retaliation. After Clinton became President, Ferguson made defamatory statements to a reporter implying she had accepted the advances, while Clinton's authorized spokespersons publicly branded her a liar by denying the incident. The four-count complaint asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 plus state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, seeking $75,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Jurisdiction was predicated on federal-question and diversity grounds. With the exception of the defamation count, the alleged misconduct occurred before Clinton took office and was unrelated to any official presidential duties. Clinton promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. He requested the court to defer all other pleadings and motions until after the immunity issue was resolved. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any statutes of limitation until he is no longer President. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, allowed discovery to proceed, but stayed the trial until the end of the presidency. Both parties appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of dismissal on immunity grounds but reversed the stay of trial, holding that the District Court had abused its discretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The Constitution authorizes removal upon impeachment and conviction for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors without requiring a prior judicial finding of criminal guilt. Congress itself determines whether the conduct meets the constitutional standard.
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No. The Constitution provides the exclusive mechanism of impeachment by the House followed by conviction in the Senate for high crimes and misdemeanors. No other procedure authorizes removal for misconduct.
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Yes. Offering an official appointment in exchange for arranged financial support constitutes bribery or another high crime or misdemeanor because it corrupts the appointment power for personal political gain.
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The phrase reaches serious abuses of official power and corrupt uses of the office that betray the public trust, including but not limited to violations of criminal statutes.
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