Also known as: heat of passion · sudden provocation · provocation · sudden heat of passion
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A common-law mitigating circumstance that reduces an intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The doctrine applies when the defendant kills while in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation and before a reasonable cooling-off period has elapsed. Adequate provocation must be of a type that would arouse sudden intense passion in an ordinary person, the defendant must actually have been provoked, and the defendant must not have cooled off before acting.
Henry Hoffman returns home unexpectedly and finds his wife in bed with another man. Overcome by sudden rage, Henry grabs a nearby object and strikes the man, killing him instantly. Because the discovery of spousal adultery constitutes adequate provocation at common law, the killing is mitigated from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Hiroshi Hasegawa strikes Harold Hunt during an argument that Harold started with insulting remarks. Harold sues for battery and seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. The jury awards full compensatory damages despite Harold's provocation but reduces the punitive award after considering how the provocation affected Hiroshi's state of mind.
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Hana Huang learns that her coworker has been spreading false rumors about her. The next day Hana confronts the coworker, who calls her a liar. Enraged by the insult, Hana stabs the coworker with a letter opener, killing her. Because mere words are inadequate provocation at common law, the killing remains murder rather than voluntary manslaughter.
Helena Hoffman is punched without warning by a neighbor during a property dispute. While still in the grip of sudden anger, Helena picks up a rock and strikes the neighbor on the head, causing death. The serious battery supplies adequate provocation, so the killing qualifies as voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.
Henry Harrison is beaten by a rival in the morning and retreats to discuss the matter with friends. Hours later Henry sees the rival again and shoots him. Because a reasonable person would have cooled during the intervening period, the original provocation no longer supports reduction to voluntary manslaughter.
Harold Hunt catches his spouse in an adulterous act and immediately pursues the lover on foot. After a brief chase Harold overtakes and kills the lover while still inflamed by the discovery. Because Harold never cooled off between the provocation and the act, the killing is reduced to voluntary manslaughter.
Common law recognizes serious battery on the defendant or a close relative and catching one's spouse in the act of adultery as adequate provocation. Mere words, trivial battery, and provocation based on old wrongs are legally insufficient.
The doctrine requires that the killing occur while the defendant is still in the grip of sudden passion. If a reasonable person would have cooled or if the defendant in fact cooled, the mitigation to voluntary manslaughter is unavailable and the killing remains murder.
Provocation by the injured person does not reduce compensatory damages but is considered when deciding whether to award punitive damages and in what amount.
When malice aforethought is an element of murder, the prosecution must prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt. A state may not shift the burden to the defendant to prove heat of passion.
…might invoke today: that Cobham's statements were self-inculpatory, 2 How. St. Tr., at 19, that they were not made in the heat of passion, id. , at 14, and that they were not "extracted from [him] upon any hopes or promise of Pardon," id. , at 29. It is not plausible that the Framers' only objection to the trial was that…