genuine dispute as to any material fact

In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over, but respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. Deputy Timothy Scott heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by police vehicles from the pursuing officers. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway. Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a Precision Intervention Technique maneuver. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to go ahead and take him out. Scott instead applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle. As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed, rendering respondent quadriplegic. Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow respondent's Fourth Amendment claim to proceed to trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The record includes a videotape capturing the events in question.

In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas. Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad. Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In September 1980 respondent Catrett, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced a wrongful-death action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations including petitioner Celotex Corporation. The complaint alleged that her husband Louis H. Catrett died in 1979 from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on diversity grounds. After extensive discovery Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1981 asserting that respondent had failed to produce any evidence that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex asbestos products. In response respondent produced a transcript of the decedent's deposition taken in a separate California proceeding, a letter from an official of one of Celotex's former insurance companies, and a letter from one of Celotex's customers. In July 1982 the District Court granted summary judgment to Celotex on the ground that respondent had made no showing of exposure to Celotex products in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Respondent appealed only that ruling. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden because it made no effort to adduce affirmative evidence supporting its motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the proper standard under Rule 56.

Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982. Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects. The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries. Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.