full and fair disclosure

Yaser Esam Hamdi, a United States citizen born in Louisiana in 1980, moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as a child and resided in Afghanistan by 2001. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that killed approximately 3,000 people, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force one week later. Hamdi was seized by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan during the ensuing conflict and turned over to United States military authorities, who initially detained and interrogated him in Afghanistan before transferring him to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in January 2002; upon learning of his American citizenship, authorities moved him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and later to Charleston, South Carolina. In June 2002, Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of his son, alleging that the Government had held Hamdi without access to legal counsel or notice of any charges and that the detention violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court found the father a proper next friend, appointed the federal public defender as counsel, and ordered access to Hamdi, but the Fourth Circuit reversed that order and directed a more deferential inquiry on remand. The Government then submitted the Mobbs Declaration, a sworn statement from a Defense Department official describing Hamdi's travel to Afghanistan in July or August 2001, his affiliation with a Taliban military unit, receipt of weapons training, surrender of a Kalashnikov rifle to Northern Alliance forces, and classification as an enemy combatant based on interviews and association with the Taliban. The district court found the Mobbs Declaration fell far short of supporting the detention, criticized its generic and hearsay nature, and ordered the Government to produce additional materials including copies of Hamdi's statements, interview notes, lists of interrogators, and records of capture and detention for in camera review. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that because it was undisputed Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat no further factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing was necessary or proper, that the Mobbs Declaration provided a sufficient basis for detention, and that the district court's inquiry went beyond the acceptable scope of review; the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In May of 1982, the Davises entered into a contract to buy for $310,000 the Johnsons' home, which at the time was three years old. The contract required a $5,000 deposit payment, an additional $26,000 deposit payment within five days and a closing by June 21, 1982. The crucial provision of the contract, for the purposes of the case at bar, is Paragraph F which provided that prior to closing at Buyer's expense, Buyer shall have the right to obtain a written report from a licensed roofer stating that the roof is in a watertight condition, and in the event repairs are required either to correct leaks or to replace damage to facia or soffit, seller shall pay for said repairs which shall be performed by a licensed roofing contractor. Before the Davises made the additional $26,000 deposit payment, Mrs. Davis noticed some buckling and peeling plaster around the corner of a window frame in the family room and stains on the ceilings in the family room and kitchen of the home. Upon inquiring, Mrs. Davis was told by Mr. Johnson that the window had had a minor problem that had long since been corrected. He also told her that the stains were wallpaper glue and the result of ceiling beams being moved. There is disagreement among the parties as to whether Mr. Johnson also told Mrs. Davis at this time that there had never been any problems with the roof or ceilings. The Davises thereafter paid the remainder of their deposit and the Johnsons vacated the home. Several days later, following a heavy rain, Mrs. Davis entered the home and discovered water gushing in from around the window frame, the ceiling of the family room, the light fixtures, the glass doors, and the stove in the kitchen. Two roofers hired by the Johnsons' broker concluded that for under $1,000 they could fix leaks in the roof and by doing so make the roof watertight. Three roofers hired by the Davises found that the roof was inherently defective, that any repairs would be temporary because the roof was slipping, and that only a new $15,000 roof could be watertight. The Davises filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, and sought rescission of the contract and return of their deposit. The Johnsons counterclaimed seeking the deposit as liquidated damages. The trial court entered its final judgment on May 27, 1983. The court made no findings of fact, but awarded the Davises $26,000 plus interest and awarded the Johnsons $5,000 plus interest. Each party was to bear their own attorneys' fees. The Johnsons appealed and the Davises cross-appealed from the final judgment. The Third District found for the Davises affirming the trial court's return of the majority of the deposit to the Davises ($26,000), and reversing the award of $5,000 to the Johnsons as well as the court's failure to award the Davises costs and fees. The Supreme Court of Florida granted review because the decision expressly and directly conflicts with Banks v. Salina and Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Co.

On March 10, 1976, Otis Trammel was indicted with Edwin Lee Roberts and Joseph Freeman for importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the Philippine Islands and for conspiracy to import heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 962(a), and 963. The indictment also named six unindicted co-conspirators, including petitioner’s wife Elizabeth Ann Trammel. According to the indictment, petitioner and his wife flew from the Philippines to California in August 1975, carrying with them a quantity of heroin, and Freeman and Roberts assisted them in its distribution. Elizabeth Trammel then traveled to Thailand where she purchased another supply of the drug. On November 3, 1975, with four ounces of heroin on her person, she boarded a plane for the United States. During a routine customs search in Hawaii, she was searched, the heroin was discovered, and she was arrested. After discussions with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, she agreed to cooperate with the Government. Prior to trial on this indictment, petitioner moved to sever his case from that of Roberts and Freeman. He advised the court that the Government intended to call his wife as an adverse witness and asserted his claim to a privilege to prevent her from testifying against him. At a hearing on the motion, Mrs. Trammel was called as a Government witness under a grant of use immunity. She testified that she and petitioner were married in May 1975 and that they remained married. She explained that her cooperation with the Government was based on assurances that she would be given lenient treatment. She then described, in considerable detail, her role and that of her husband in the heroin distribution conspiracy. The District Court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify in support of the Government’s case to any act she observed during the marriage and to any communication made in the presence of a third person. However, confidential communications between petitioner and his wife were held to be privileged and inadmissible. The motion to sever was denied. At trial, Elizabeth Trammel testified within the limits of the court’s pretrial ruling; her testimony, as the Government concedes, constituted virtually its entire case against petitioner. He was found guilty on both the substantive and conspiracy charges and sentenced to an indeterminate term of years pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b). In the Court of Appeals petitioner’s only claim of error was that the admission of the adverse testimony of his wife, over his objection, contravened this Court’s teaching in Hawkins v. United States and therefore constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. It concluded that Hawkins did not prohibit the voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity from the Government in return for her testimony.