Also known as: forgers
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An individual who fabricates or alters a writing or signature with intent to deceive. The act produces a forged instrument that is void from inception and transfers no interest to the forger or subsequent grantees.
Freya Freeman forges the signature of the record owner on a deed conveying Blackacre to Frank Fisher. Fisher records the deed and later sells the parcel to Fairfield Bank, a purchaser without notice. The bank takes nothing because the forged deed conveyed no title from the outset.
Forrest Falconer creates forged investment certificates and mails them to out-of-state victims to obtain funds. The scheme uses the postal system to distribute the false instruments. Prosecutors charge Falconer with mail fraud based on the forged documents.
In the 1970s petitioners James E. Gray, a former Kentucky public official, and Charles J. McNally, a private individual, along with Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt, participated in arrangements involving the Commonwealth's insurance contracts. After Democrat Julian Carroll was elected Governor in 1974, Hunt became chairman of the state Democratic Party and obtained de facto control over selecting the insurance agencies from which Kentucky would purchase its policies. In 1975 the Wombwell Insurance Company agreed with Hunt that, in exchange for continuing as the Commonwealth's agent for a workmen's compensation policy, it would share commissions exceeding $50,000 a year with other agencies designated by Hunt. Between 1975 and 1979 Wombwell funneled $851,000 in commissions to 21 agencies specified by Hunt, including Seton Investments, Inc., a company controlled by Hunt and Gray and nominally owned and operated by McNally, which received approximately $200,000. Gray served as Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation from 1976 to 1978 and as Secretary of the Governor's Cabinet from 1977 to 1979. Prior to his 1976 appointment, Hunt and Gray had established Seton for the purpose of receiving the commission payments, which were used to benefit Gray and Hunt. Pursuant to Hunt's direction, Wombwell also made payments through the Snodgrass Insurance Agency that ultimately went to McNally. Hunt later pleaded guilty to mail and tax fraud charges and received a three-year prison sentence. Petitioners were charged with one count of conspiracy and seven counts of mail fraud; six of the mail fraud counts were dismissed before trial. The remaining mail fraud count was based on the mailing of a commission check to Wombwell by the insurance company that had secured coverage for the State. It alleged that petitioners had devised a scheme to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly. The count also charged that petitioners sought to obtain money and other things of value by means of false pretenses and the concealment of material facts. The conspiracy count alleged that petitioners had conspired to violate the mail fraud statute through that scheme. It further alleged that they had conspired to defraud the United States by obstructing the collection of federal taxes. After trial in the District Court the jury convicted petitioners on both the mail fraud and conspiracy counts, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions in 1986. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.
View caseFatima Flores is convicted of forgery and sentenced to death under a state statute that imposes capital punishment for that offense. She challenges the sentence as cruel and unusual. The Court examines whether the punishment is disproportionate to the crime of forgery.
In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.
View caseFloyd Franklin forges a government check and negotiates it through Clearfield Trust. The United States as drawee seeks recovery after discovering the forgery. The bank asserts a defense based on the government's delay in giving notice of the forgery.
On April 28, 1936, a check was drawn on the Treasurer of the United States through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia to the order of Clair A. Barner in the amount of $24.20, dated at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania for services rendered by Barner to the Works Progress Administration, and placed in the mail addressed to Barner at his address in Mackeyville, Pa., but Barner never received the check. Some unknown person obtained the check in a mysterious manner and presented it to the J. C. Penney Co. store in Clearfield, Pa., representing that he was the payee and identifying himself to the satisfaction of the employees of J. C. Penney Co. He endorsed the check in the name of Barner and transferred it to J. C. Penney Co. in exchange for cash and merchandise, but Barner never authorized the endorsement nor participated in the proceeds of the check. J. C. Penney Co. endorsed the check over to the Clearfield Trust Co., which accepted it as agent for the purpose of collection and endorsed it as follows: “Pay to the order of Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Prior Endorsements Guaranteed.” Clearfield Trust Co. collected the check from the United States through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and paid the full amount thereof to J. C. Penney Co. Neither the Clearfield Trust Co. nor J. C. Penney Co. had any knowledge or suspicion of the forgery. Each acted in good faith. On or before May 10, 1936, Barner advised the timekeeper and the foreman of the W. P. A. project on which he was employed that he had not received the check in question, and this information was duly communicated to other agents of the United States. On November 30, 1936, Barner executed an affidavit alleging that the endorsement of his name on the check was a forgery. No notice was given the Clearfield Trust Co. or J. C. Penney Co. of the forgery until January 12, 1937, at which time the Clearfield Trust Co. was notified, and the first notice received by Clearfield Trust Co. that the United States was asking reimbursement was on August 31, 1937. This suit was instituted in 1939 by the United States against the Clearfield Trust Co., the jurisdiction of the federal District Court being invoked pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 41(1). The cause of action was based on the express guaranty of prior endorsements made by the Clearfield Trust Co., J. C. Penney Co. intervened as a defendant, and the case was heard on complaint, answer and stipulation of facts. The District Court dismissed the complaint. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the problems raised and the conflict between the decision below and a decision from the Ninth Circuit.
View caseA forged deed is void from the beginning and passes no title, so even a later bona fide purchaser receives nothing. A deed procured by fraud is merely voidable, allowing a subsequent purchaser without notice to obtain good title.
Supporting sources
The forger acquires nothing and can convey nothing. Recording acts may protect a subsequent bona fide purchaser only in limited jurisdictions depending on the type of statute and chain-of-title rules.
Supporting sources
Modern authority under the UCC permits ratification of a forgery in some commercial settings, though older common-law rules often barred ratification because the act was not done on behalf of the victim.
Payment on a forged indorsement constitutes conversion, and the true owner may recover from the bank that paid a person not entitled to enforce the instrument.
…The consequence was, that the law was changed; and when secondary punishments were substituted for the penalty of death, a forger had no better chance of an acquittal than any other criminal. Thus it is that the power which juries possess of refusing to put the law in force has, in the words of Lord John Russell,…