first appearance

In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against him carried a potential life sentence. Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 bond. In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other crimes by information without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. At the time respondents were arrested, a Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. The Florida courts had held that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. They had also held that habeas corpus could not be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to test the probable cause for detention under an information. The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 days. Arraignment was often delayed a month or more after arrest, as the District Court found. Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials in the Federal District Court claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Respondents Turner and Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently intervened. Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for Dade County, was one of several defendants. After an initial delay while the Florida Legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court granted the relief sought. The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) and ordered the Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for further detention. It also ordered them to submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted by information. The defendants submitted a plan prepared by Sheriff E. Wilson Purdy and the District Court adopted it with modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a first appearance hearing. The magistrate would explain the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If either requested more time, the magistrate would set the date for a preliminary hearing. The hearing was to be held within four days if the accused was in custody and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the District Court's order pending appeal. While the case was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the new rules rather than the Dade County procedures. Under the amended rules every arrested person must be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. This first appearance is similar to the first appearance hearing ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause. The rule amendments also changed the procedure for preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to persons charged by information or indictment. In a supplemental opinion the District Court held that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without a judicial determination of probable cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable as long as it was provided to all defendants in custody pending trial. State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.

In June 1987 Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted by a Tennessee jury on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree. The victims were twenty-eight-year-old Charisse Christopher, her two-year-old daughter Lacie, and her three-year-old son Nicholas, who survived multiple stab wounds. The three lived in an apartment in Millington, Tennessee, across the hall from Payne’s girlfriend Bobbie Thomas. On Saturday June 27 1987 Payne entered the Christophers’ apartment after visiting Thomas’s apartment several times, became violent when Charisse resisted his advances, and inflicted forty-two stab wounds on Charisse, multiple stab wounds on Lacie, and repeated stab wounds plus a slashed throat on Nicholas. Police arrived to find blood covering the walls and floor, Charisse and Lacie dead on the kitchen floor, and Nicholas still breathing. Payne was apprehended later that day hiding in the attic of the home of a former girlfriend. It was later determined that the blood stains matched the victims' blood types. A search of his pockets revealed a packet containing cocaine residue, a hypodermic syringe wrapper, and a cap from a hypodermic syringe. His overnight bag, containing a bloody white shirt, was found in a nearby dumpster. At trial Payne testified that another man had committed the crimes and that he had only tried to help the victims, but the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. During the sentencing phase the State called Charisse’s mother Mary Zvolanek, who testified that Nicholas cried for his mother and sister, asked whether she missed Lacie, and did not understand why they did not come home. A probation officer’s victim impact statement describing the family’s devastation and Nicholas’s nightmares was also introduced. In closing argument the prosecutor emphasized that Nicholas had witnessed the murders, would grow up knowing what happened, and would want to know what justice had been done, while also noting that Lacie would never attend a high school prom and that Charisse would never again sing a lullaby to her son. Payne presented four mitigation witnesses: his parents, who stated he had no prior criminal record and no history of alcohol or drug abuse; Bobbie Thomas, who described him as caring and good with her children; and a clinical psychologist, who testified that Payne was mentally handicapped, polite, and neither psychotic nor schizophrenic. The jury sentenced Payne to death on each murder count and to thirty years in prison for the assault. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider its prior holdings concerning the admission of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings.

On August 10, 2004, law enforcement officers in Tampa, Florida, entered an apartment rented by Kevin Dewayne Powell’s girlfriend. They were seeking to apprehend Powell in connection with a robbery investigation. After spotting Powell coming from a bedroom, the officers searched the room and discovered a loaded nine-millimeter handgun under the bed. The officers arrested Powell and transported him to the Tampa Police headquarters. Once there, and before asking Powell any questions, the officers read Powell the standard Tampa Police Department Consent and Release Form 310. The form stated that Powell had the right to remain silent. It also stated that anything he said could be used against him in court. The form advised that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of the officers’ questions. It further stated that if he could not afford a lawyer one would be appointed without cost and before any questioning. Finally, the form noted that he had the right to use any of these rights at any time during the interview. Powell signed the form acknowledging that he understood his rights and was willing to talk to the officers. Powell then admitted that he owned the handgun found in the apartment. He explained that he had purchased and carried the firearm for his protection despite knowing he was prohibited from possessing a gun due to a prior felony conviction. Powell was charged in state court with possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor in violation of Florida law. The trial court denied Powell’s motion to suppress his inculpatory statements. A jury convicted him of the gun-possession charge. On appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal held that the trial court should have suppressed Powell’s statements. The Miranda warnings did not adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present throughout the interrogation. The court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. The question asked whether the failure to provide express advice of the right to the presence of counsel during questioning vitiates Miranda warnings that advise of the right to talk to a lawyer before questioning. The question also asked about the right to use that right at any time during questioning. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and affirmed the reversal of Powell’s conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the case.